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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
A dialogue on i n t e r e s t - f r e e banking, genera l ly known 
as " I s l a n i c Banking", i s going on in the world of Islam, I t i s 
a modem phenomenon and mainly a r e s u l t of the c r i s i s in the 
c a p i t a l i s t system. I t has an appealing fea ture , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
because of f inanc ia l c r i s i s around the world e spec ia l ly a f t e r 
the debt burden of the t h i r d world coun t r i e s ; as a r e s u l t of 
which, there accrued a tendency of i n f l a t i on followed by recession 
and then a large scale of unemployment. Ult imately there 
developed a growing gap between the resources necessary to 
finance and the revenues ac tua l ly r a i s ed . 
No doubt, huge o i l income has played a c ruc i a l ro le in 
the development of Islamic banking. But i t s emergence in low 
iiicome countr ies in south East Asia and Africa also speaks of 
i t s v i a b i l i t y f iram re l i g ious poin t of view. U p t i l l now, around 
47 Islamic finance i n s t i t u t i o n s have been repor ted. 
In recent times a good deal of l i t e r a t u r e have appeared 
on the subject wri t ten mainly by Muslim apologe t ics . An a t tenpt 
i s being made to develop a new study t h a t could on the one hand, 
• spe l l out an Islamic c r i t i que of modem economics and, on the 
other , to undertake a reformation of economic theory and pol icy 
in the l i g h t of Is lamic values and p r i n c i p l e s , Professic»ial 
economists are also taking i n t e r e s t in i s sues r e l a t ed to Is lamic 
banking. These wr i t e r s are t ry ing t o work out the monetary and 
f i s c a l • p o l i c i e s ' of Islam mainly through the i n s t i t u t i o n of 
zakah and the proh ib i t ion of r lba i . e . i n t e r e s t - around which 
roost of the contenporary l i t e r a t u r e on Islamic banking revolves . 
However, in a ntanber of Muslim count r ies . Is lamic banking 
has been introduced - spec ia l banks operate on a non- in te res t 
b a s i s . Countries l i ke the Islamic Republic of I ran claims tha t 
the e n t i r e f inanc ia l system i s based on Is lamic p r i n c i p l e s . 
I t has r i gh t l y been pointed out tha t Muslim economists seemed 
to be so fasc ina ted by a l l those ideas t h a t appears to be good 
tha t they become •Islamic* fo r them. For example, the object ives 
of monetary pol icy adopted by western eccmomles do not appear 
un-Islaroic for them. Almost every too l used in macro-economic 
ana lys i s i s a l so applied in Islamic economic system. This has 
brought a charge from the western p ress t h a t Muslims have 
h a s t i l y r e i n t e r p r e t t e d t h e i r orthodox doct r ine to adopt recent 
tendencies or ig ina t ing in the West* 
There are many areas where disagreement p e r s i s t ' s among 
Muslim economists. For example, the question whether crea t ion 
of c r ed i t i s allowed in s h a r i ' a h . s ince re la t ionsh ip of c r e d i t 
with i n t e r e s t i s v i t a l and a bank's czredit supply I s g r e a t l y 
influenced by the i n t e r e s t r a t e s . Then question ar i ses i how 
does Islamic bank, do t h i s job ? Muslim scholars in t h i s matter 
object tha t cornnercial bank in the process of c r ed i t creat ion, 
c rea te money for which n e i t h e r the bank nor t h e i r deposi tors 
make any s a c r i f i c e . They argue tha t under present system the 
primary bene f i c i a r i e s of c r e d i t creat ion a re cooinercial banks 
and t h e i r customers. Other main areas of disagreements aret 
s t ra tegy of t t a n s i t i o n to Islamic economy* short-term financing, 
indexation of loans during i n f l a t i on , s t a b i l i t y of the economy 
and so on. All these and other issties have sparked among Islamic 
wr i t e r s and- a lso lead them to think on these l i n e s . One 
wonders, how an i n t e r e s t - r a t e which i s the cos t of loans wi l l 
disappear frcxn c red i t market. Likewise, i n an Islamic economy, 
how the r a t e of i n t e r e s t w i l l be replaced by the ra t e of p r o f i t . 
The r a t e of p r o f i t , however, depends on the business condi t ions . 
Thus, the saving, investment decision in an Is lamic economy would 
not depend on the r a t e of i n t e r e s t but only on the e3q>ectation 
about business p rospec t s . How then the monetary pol icy wi l l 
have any impact on the r ea l sec tor of economy? I have t r i e d to 
examine a l l these i s sues in the l i g h t of the curzrent discussions 
tha t have appeared in the exis t ing Islamic economic l i t e r a t u r e . 
The ba s i s of t h i s t h e s i s i s on the f ac t tha t the Islamic 
concepts of i n t e r e s t - f r e e banking system t o t a l l y r e j e c t s the 
i n s t i t u t i o n of i n t e r e s t . As a mat ter of fac t , question of 
banking on Is lamic p r i n c i p l e , i f we go through the earj^ier 
l i t e r a t u r e , had i t s or ig in in e a r l i e r rauslim wr i t e r s of the l a t e 
I9th and ear ly 20th century, jn Ind ia , fo r example, Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan and in Egypt Muhammad 'Abduh ra ised these i s s u e s . The 
l a t e r works of Anwar Ic#)al Qureshi and Abul A ' l a Mawdudi 
are worth mentioning. Qureshi, jji h i s book Islam and the tbeory gf 
i n t e r e s t (l945) po in t s out tha t i n t e r e s t prevents the flow of 
c a p i t a l towards pro jec t with a low y ie ld even though they are 
most use fu l . He has argued t h a t in the absenve of i n t e r e s t the 
margin of investment could be extended t i l l the r a t e of return 
approaches zero . In h i s book he ana lys ises the question of 
i n t e r e s t in the l i g h t of economic theory . In the book, he 
explained the western view-point about i n t e r e s t , exposed the 
weaker aspects of a l l the theor ies of i n t e r e s t . While discussing 
the o r ig ins of usury and i n t e r e s t he has e luc ida ted the prohi -
b i t i on of banking system from Islamic stand po in t . He has also 
mentioned the j?eprucussions of p r o f i t and i n t e r e s t on human 
soc i e ty . Another wr i t e r , Abul A ' l a Mawdudi, in h i s book'Sud' 
(1961) (o r ig ina l ly wr i t ten in Urdu and l a t e r on t r ans l a t ed in to 
English and Arabic) , pointed out t ha t a bas i c imbalance i s 
caused between production and consumption by the phenomenon of 
i n t e r e s t . This happen in two ways. F i r s t l y , i n t e r e s t on 
consumption loans t r ans f e r s pa r t of the purchasing power fran a 
group of people with high propensi ty to consume to a group with 
low propensi ty to consxime. This l a t t e r grovip mostly re inves t 
i t s income from i n t e r e s t which means tha t consumption demand i s 
accompanied by an increase in production. Secondly, i n t e r e s t 
on productive loans r a i s e s the cost of production, hence the 
p r ice of consunption goods.Once again the amovint taxed away from the 
people, in the form of higher p r i ce s f a l l s in the hands of a c lass 
with a lower than average propensi ty t o consume. This imbalance 
i s seen as the source of many e v i l s such as stagnation and 
depression, monopoly and u l t imate ly imperialism. 
Another s ign i f i can t work on i n t e r e s t and banking i s the 
Report of the Council,of Is lamic Idealoqy. I t was statwnitted to 
the Government of Pakistan in Jxine 1980, The report contains a 
de t a i l ed blue p r i n t fo r reorganizat ion of banj^ing p r a c t i c e s and 
and procedures on the ba s i s of the p r inc ip l e of p r o f i t - l o s s -
sha r i i ^ in accordance with the Is lamic l ega l concept of Shirkah 
and mudarabah. The methodology suggested in the repor t i s 
modelled more or l e s s on the same l i n e as in the case of commer 
c i a l banks. The council of Is lamic idealogy, however, recognise 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s in the e l iminat ion of i n t e r e s t from t ransact ions 
r e l a t ing to i n t e rna t i ona l loans and a ids and has therefore , 
accept government borrowing from abroad on the bas i s of i n t e r e s t 
for the time being. 
Among the recent important works on title subject includes? 
Issues in Is lamic Banking by M,N, S idd iq i , This book in the 
foxm of co l lec ted essays, introduce the idea of a banking 
operation based on the Islamic p r i n c i p l e s of par tnersh ip and 
p ro f i t - sha r ing f ree of i n t e r e s t . I t demonstrates how the creation 
of high powered money as well as of bank money in the Islamic 
system can be firmly l inked, Canparing and ccmtrasting the 
Islamic system with the in te res t -based banking system i t 
shows the super io r i ty of the formers on grovmds of d i s t r i b u t i v e 
j u s t i c e , a l l oca t ive ef f ic iency , s t a b i l i t y and growth. The 
author shows how the r a t i o of p ro f i t - sha r ing between suppl iers 
of c a p i t a l and i t s users can be determined r a t i ona l l y by the 
forces of supply and demand. The book surveys recent c o n t r i -
but ions to the theory of money, banking and monetary pol icy in 
an Islamic economy, 
Another work re la ted to t h i s top ic i s Money and Banking in 
Islam^ ed i ted by Ziauddin Ahmad, Manawar Icfjal, and. .M.Fahim 
Khan, This i s a useful contr ibut ion by Muslim scho la r s . This 
book i s based on the proceedings of the seminar on the Monetary 
and F i sca l Economics of Islam held in Islamabad, 1981, The book 
deals with an I s l a n i c economy which hasca bearing on monetary and 
f i s c a l p o l i c i e s , and i t s object ives and inst ruments . I t a lso 
takes a thorough examinations of the experiments in Islamic 
banking in d i f fe ren t p a r t s of the world in general , and the 
Report of the Coiancil of Is lamic Idealogy of Pakistan on the 
el imination of i n t e r e s t from the economy in p a r t i c u l a r . 
Another i n t e r e s t i ng work i s Towards an i n t e r e s t - f r e e 
•Igl9m.i.C, fiCOnoniiC SyS.tSlP ^y Waqar Masood Khan, This book i s 
Dasical ly a Ph,D t h e s i s submitted a t the Univers i ty of Boston; 
the author has denonstrated tha t under a se t of condi t ions 
f 
the interes t - f ree system i s superior to the t radi t ional system. 
Mr, Khan cautions the policy makers about the increased 
monitoring costs which Islamic financial Ins t i tu t ions will have 
to incur in order to make the new systena operational. 
The author arrives a t the above conclusions through a 
rigorous analysis. In a nvunber of ways his analysis i s worth 
studying. He accepts the position of to ta l prohibition of 
in teres t and adopts prof i t - loss sharing as the al ternative for 
interest-based financing, but he has analysed both issues in the 
context of secular economy. In th is way, he has departed from 
the usually assxamed ideal Islamic society condition. Among the 
important worte done by a non-muslim on th i s topic includes Ingo 
Karesten's paper "Islam and Financial Intermediation" in IMF's 
Staff papers, (March 1982), This paper describes a number of 
steps that have been taken towards the Islamization of financial 
system. I t reviews some of the pract ical issues that have to 
be resolved; and analyses the implications for savings, invest-
ments, and development process. Part icular attention i s paid 
to the Pakistani Model. Some of the problems, the author points 
out are : how to ensure that the uncertainties iinplicit in th is 
system do not undermine saving incentives. He, however, finds 
i t d i f f icul t to make any assessment of the prospect for the 
financial success of Islamic banks, because infooaation on their 
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performance i s r a the r l imi ted , A c r i t i c a l survey of Islcmic 
economics, e n t i t l e d , 'The Economic Systen in Contenporary 
Is lamic Thought* In t e rp re t a t ion and Assessment', by Timur Kuran 
i s in In t e rna t iona l Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (U.S.A.) 
Vol. 18, 1986, pp . 135-164. This i s an scholar ly paper, fu l ly 
documented and useful contr ibut ion in Is lamic economics. In the 
paper author r a i s e s ser ious questions about the claim tha t 
Islamic economic system provides a funct ional a l t e r n a t i v e to 
ex i s t ing system. VRiile focusing on the c e n t r a l fea tures of 
proposed systen where ind iv idua l s are guided in t h e i r economic 
decis ions by a se t of behaviour norms, mainly derived from the 
Qur'an and sxannah, the author says t h a t the i n p l i c a t i o n s of 
these norms are ambiguous in most of the context ^ e r e they 
are es^ected to opera te . Moreover, these norms cannot f i t i n t o 
the modem society of today. In the paper the author has also 
examined the ro le of s t a t e in Is lamic economic system, the 
i n s t i t u t i o n of zakah and the r a t iona le fo r the prohibi t ion of 
i n t e r e s t , and f i n a l l y the contemporary experiences of Islamic 
banks. 
As for the proh ib i t ion of i n t e r e s t , the author bel ives 
tha t i t i s iinenforceable in a la rge soc ie ty . Unless one can 
shov tha t people ' s need to borrovi and lend a t i n t e r e s t would 
disappear with the establishment of an Is lamic syst^n, i t i s 
reasonable to e3q>ect i n t e r e s t to p e r s i s t , i f in t h in ly 
disgviised form. He has a l so pointed out t ha t even with the 
ex i s t ing Is lamic banking system, no l e s s than in medieval 
f inanc ia l c r i c l e s , various i n d i r e c t foiaaas of i n t e r e s t have been 
legi t imized. 
I^e author ha s , however, t r i e d t o show t h a t a successful 
economic growth and development requires a measure of i n s t i t u -
t i ona l f l e x i b i l i t y . He says t ha t even in jBrophet Muhammad's 
time i n s t i t u t i o n s were modified or abandoned as circumstances 
warranted. The major flow in Islamic economics, as t h e j ^ l ^ h t S 
out, i s t ha t i t shuns confrontation with h i s t o r i c a l evidence 
when tile Is lamic community began to grow, the : ^ i r i t of the 
ban on i n t e r e s t was rout ine ly v io la ted throughout Islamic 
h i s t o r y . The author concludes t ha t a large socie ty of present 
day can be hardly siaitable fo r Islsoiic economist 's i d e a l economy. 
This t h e s i s at tempts t o describe ce r t a in s a l i e n t 
fea tures of Islamic banking system and focuses on the e^qperiments 
ca r r i ed out in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, t h i s work, in one way, 
i s a survey of important thoughts on Is lamic banking both on 
t h e o r e t i c a l as well a s empir ical l e v e l . Our object ive i s to 
look a t the e f fo r t of the Muslim scholars devoted to the 
development of Is lamic f inanc ia l system, I have a lso t r i e d to 
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find out tha t how Islamic banking, based on equi ty pa r t i c ipa t i on , 
provides the bes t path of development for f inanc ia l c r i s i s facing 
the t h i rd world and how Islamic bank w i l l work in ccxnpetition 
with Western banks and what are i t s t oo l s and ra t iona le behind 
the opera t ion . I t i s t h i s problem of f e a s i b i l i t y , e spec ia l ly in 
respects of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, t ha t forms the subject-
matter of t h i s t h e s i s . In short , i t i s concerned with idea logica l 
as well as p r a c t i c a l problems of Islamic banks. Much of my 
discussion i s based on tho l i t e r a t u r e s produced by Islamic 
w r i t e r s , I have t r i e d to r a i se the various important i ssues 
tha t are under constant d i scuss ions . My purpose i s to h ighl ight 
these i s sues so as to see in the framework of contet^orary eco-
nomic t h e o r i e s . For example, how in the absence of i n t e r e s t 
r a t e , the p ro f i t - sha r ing wi l l subs t i t u t e the mechanism of western 
f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
The ava i lab le l i t e r a t u r e on Islamic banking cons is t s of 
e i t h e r wr i t ings of a t h e o r e t i c a l nature explaining how Islamic 
banking would work in an i n t e r e s t - f r e e atmosphere or some a r t i c l e s 
r epo r t s . However, an a t t enp t was made to co l l ec t as many repor ts 
and documents, on Islamic banks as pos s ib l e , Pix>ceedings of 
various i n t e rna t i ona l conferences on the subject have also been 
used in t h i s t h e s i s . A recent report on the problems of Islamic 
banking published by In te rna t iona l Monetary Fund (IMP) covers 
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gives an i n t e r e s t i n g account of the f e a s i b i l i t y of Is lamic 
f inanc ia l system. The report of Is lamic Research and Training 
I n s t i t u t e , Jeddah, a lso provides important da ta on the working 
of Is lamic banks. I t dea ls with business operat ions of Islamic 
banks and associated problems. The t h e s i s i s divided in to 
seven chapters . The f i r s t chapter t r ace s the o r ig ins of modem 
controvers ies on i n t e r e s t . The second ciiapter deals with c r i t ique 
of i n t e r e s t / and p ro f i t - sha r ing system. Chapter th ree describes 
the h i s t o r i c a l background of Islamic banking and focuses on i t s 
various f inanc ia l instruments . I t a lso examines the business 
p r ac t i ce s of Islamic banks. Chapter four i nden t i f i e s cer ta in 
problems tha t hinders the e f fec t ive iraplaDtientation of Islamic 
banking system. Chapter f ive i s on the monetary system of Islam 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in the context of modem l i t e r a t u r e wri t ten by 
Muslim w r i t e r s . Chapter s ix th and seventh are devoted to the 
c r i t i c a l assessment of the ejqperiments in Islamic Banking in 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Useful appendices have been added which 
contain some important data regarding the performance of these 
Is lamic banks. 
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CHAPTER - I 
ORIGINS OF MDDERN CONTROVERSY ON INTEREST 
Throu^iout the history, interest has been an important topic 
of discussion every\*iere. Almost all the religious thinters and 
and philosophers of the world have condemned it, Witii the passage 
of time various theories of the rate of interest were put forward. 
Available literature on this issue is full of arguments about the 
h i ^ and low rate of interest. Even in modem world, economists 
believe that, interest creates "liquidity preference" for specula^ 
tive jHirposes and results in keeping a large part of the money 
supply in hoards waiting for the rate of interest to rise. In the 
Islamic world too there emerged differing views regarding the words 
'interest' and'riba' (usuary). Among the Islamic writers, the 
prevalent view is that the institution of interest is 'neither 
indispensible nor ineradicable', Most of the Muslim economists 
think that interest should be prohibited regardless of its level 
1 Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism, (Narfolk j The OSietford 
Press Limited, Thetford, U.K., 1983), Ch.l4. Ifee autiior, while 
tracing the evolution of capitalism, gets the conclusion that 
ongoing increase in the nominal rate of interest combined with 
permanent inflation may fozbid longterm investment project alto-
gether, i.e.; both reinforce the reduction in the turnover-time 
of fixed capital due to the acceleration of technological inno-
vation, and postpone indefinitely certain projects which are too 
risky because of the long duration of tunover involved in them 
(P.454). 
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and of the nature and purpose of the loan Involved, However, 
there are still many others for whom it is« not at all clear 
whether the Qur'anic ban also covers tiiat institution of interest 
as it exists today. They claim that what Our'an banned was the 
ancient Arabian practice of riba, whicih allowed the doubling and 
redoubling of debt when the borrower failed to ina}ce restitution on 
time. Uiey think that in pre-Islaraic Arabia, rJba was responsible 
for the effective enslavement of people. The purpose of the 
Qur'anic ban, in their view, mist have been the * elimination of 
2 
this potent source of inequality and communal friction', 
Mhether the ban was in fact intended to apply on all the ^ 
3 
forms of interest, this was not clear even to the early Muslims, 
However, a controversy that is often raised is in regard to the 
defination of riba. While explaining the controversy on riba, as 
a result of some conflicting Traditions, some modem writers have 
started thinking that the controversy on riba is not due merely to 
2 Timur Kuran, "The Economic System in Conteisporary 
Islamic Thought", International Journal of Middle East Studies 
(U.S.A.), vol,18 (1986), pp, 135-164, 
3 The doubts concerning this issur? bave been documented 
by Fazlur Rahman, "Riba and Interest", ' Igi<>Bic S.t\i6aies, 
(Karachi),1- - C-1966,P,44 
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the meaning attached to it by some translators of the Our'an; for 
if that vere the case then the insertion of the word 'interest' 
for 'usury' in the translation would have resolved the matter. The 
fact that there was room for different interpretations of the 
Qur'anic injunctions against riba is traceable to the tiaae of the 
caliph 'umar in the first century of the Islamic period, who is 
quoted as having said » 'The last to be revealed was the verse of 
usury (riba) and the Prophet expired without e:^lainlng it to us, 
4 
Therefore, give up usury or anything resenibling it. 
In this way, it is implied that not only 'Umar wished there 
were a greater escplanation regarding all aspects of riba, but also 
that he wanted an interpretation according to which one must avoid 
anything which might resemble riba. One writer, on the basis of 
Caliph 'Uraar's views, writes that : 
"If he (Uraar^  meant that riba is usury 
then Islamic behaviour would require two 
kinds of patterns, one a following of the 
given interpretation case by case as est-
ablished by fiqh (systematic interpretation 
of Qur'anic injtanctions), and the other, 
4 This report is recorded in the Maspad of Ahmad b, 
Hanbal the Sunan of Ibn Majah, Musannaf 6f Ibn Ali Shaybah, 
Dala'il al-Nubuwwah of al-Bayhaqi and similar other coopila-
tion of the Muhaddithun of the later period. See 'Ali 
al-Muttaqi, Kanz al-'umroal, 1312 A.M., ll«23l (No,4954),, 
as cited by Fazlur Rahman,, Op,cit,, p,8 
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in case of dotibti in which a person must 
follo%« his best Judgement until assessment 
is given by ifta (the scholarly exercise 
of such Judgement)• If* on the other hand, 
'Ulnar meant interest in his statement* then 
only nonroonetlzed transactions in the form 
of barter may involve some problems of 
interpretation. For monetized transactions 
any interest above zero would qualify as 
riba. In the case of noninonetlzed transac-
tion there are also two types of behaviour 
patterns under the latter interpretatlcm 
of riba; first, avoiding examples Involving 
barter which had been declared as consti-
tuting riba by the Prophet Muhaonad* and 
second^ monetized transactions through the 
market and thus avoiding problems of inter-
pretation ",5 
In fact« the main Issue of this oontroversy Is the effort 
to make a distinction between riba and interest. The conflicting 
Hadith literature (which we will elaborate later on) do not help 
to define riba in exact manner« But at the same time the view 
may be taken that the Qur'anlc injunction against riba are abso-
lute and thus the prohibition must be accepted as they stand. 
Imam Razvi and other scholars of Islamic law have presented a 
variety of arguments for these injxjnctions. In the final analysis 
5 M, Siddleq Noorzoy, "Islamic Laws on Riba (Interest) 
and their Economic Inqplications", International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, (U.S.A.) vol, I4(l982;, pp. 3-17, 
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they ^^^ reduced to the tvro types of loan transactions on 
consui4>tion and investment^ and the reasons attached to the 
prohibition of rJba on these types of loans, Aiaong the 
contemporary writers, both views are found; one is that the 
positive rate of interest is acceptable for the modem ccHonercial 
transaction, whereas economic rate of interest occupies the sane 
place as price and reflates the supply and demcnd for credit, 
and in this way ration it among the customers, Yusuf Ali, an 
eminent translator of the Our*an, translates riba as 'usury* and 
states that "My defination (of usury) would include profiteering 
of all kinds but exclude economic credit, the creature of modezn{ 
banking and finance". However, this view is rejected by several 
modem writers. They generally interprete riba to mean interest 
rather thsoi usuiry, and thus argue for a zero rate of interest 
6 See M.A, Mannan, Islamic Economic t Theory and Practice, 
(Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delhi, l#6b), pp, l57-l5^ and fluresKl, 
Islam and the Theory of Interest, pp, 45-48, 
7 Holy Our'an, tran, (3rd ed,) Yusuf Ali, p.Ill, p.324. 
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on all transactions. 
Meaning of Rlba. 
As mentioned above the Arabic word riba literally means 
•increase or addition of to any thing'. It also means 'expansion 
9 
and growth*. The Qur'anic suras as quoted earlier clearly 
indicate the meaning of riba j "God destroyes riba but makes alms 
8 See for detail but uncritical study, M,N, Siddiqi, 
Muslim Economic Thinking » A Survey of Contgpaporary Literature, 
CLeicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1981), The author has 
presented the views of Islamic writers who have analysed the role 
of interest in the economy and have traced the consequences of its 
abolition, Muslim scholars compare interest and "profit share" 
as means of mobilising saving and channelising them into the 
productive process. They have pointed out that the institution of 
interest introduces atj essential duality of interest between the 
capitalist and the entrepreneurs, which is a source of fluctuation 
in the systems. According to them, by abolishing interest and 
bringing the capitalists and the entrepreneurs together on the basis 
of profit-sharing, Islam ends this duality and harmonises the 
interest of two classes. However, their main argument against the 
interest is that the borrowed capital whose repayment to the 
lender is guaranteed takes no part in the enterprise in which it is 
invested and is, therefore, not entitled to any returns even when 
the enterprise does make a profit. This capital does not expose 
itself to the risks and vmcertainties of the enterprise (p.64), 
9 See the word riba in ibn Manzur Lis'an al-Arab 
(Beirut : Dar Sadir Li Taba'a wa'l-Nashr, 1968;, vol,i4, pp, 304-7, 
as cited by M, Umar Chapra, 'The Nature of Riba in Islam', 
Harodard Islamicus, vol, 7; 1984, p.4, 
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prosper" (11*276) and "And whatever you inves t in r lba so t h a t 
i t may increase upon the peop le ' s wealth, i t increases not with 
God". (xxxi39). 
Thus, i t i s not every increase o r growth which has been 
p roh ib i t ed . In Islamic jur i spmdence i t i s defined as "an 
increment in money o r goods having no compensation in a t ransac-
t ion" , In o ther words, i t i s a predetermined excess or surplus 
over and above the loan c a p i t a l received by the c r e d i t o r condi-
t i o n a l l y in re la t ion to a specif ied pe r iod . Thus i t incltides a l l 
types of i n t e r e s t r e su l t ing due to l a t e pa3^ment o r due to unequal y 
exchange of the same commodity. '' 
The question whether the ban on i n t e r e s t should a lso apply 
10 
to commercial bank i n t e r e s t charges had for long been debated. 
Those who support the conroercial i n t e r e s t think t h a t Islam pro-
h ib i t ed i n t e r e s t only on consumption loan, which e n t i t l e d exploi-
ta t ion of the needy and the iinderprivileged„ So f a r as commercial 
and productive loans are concerned, Islam has no object ion to 
them. As such there i s nothing wrong with modem banking. 
10 Abu'1-A'la Mawdudi, "The Prohibi t ion of Commercial 
I n t e r e s t in Islam", Islamic Thought, (Aligarh), vo l .7 (July-September 1960), p .36 . 
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Although the controversy has continued for long time, 
especially in the christian world after the industrial revolu- v , 
tion, it did not carry much weight with the Islamic people. The | 
early Muslim modernists opposed riba but defended interest. Now//. 
the idea is gaining ground among many muslin writers and ecano**! 
mists that interest is prohibited in all its form, ^ ^ The Islamic 
injunction against riba is in fact a special case of a more 
general rule which prohibits all financial deals which promote 
social inequalities, A contanporary rouslim economist has asserted 
that : 
"Prohibition of riba is the Islamic 
rejection of a particular mode of capital 
pricing, namely through positive interest 
rates, which offends the Islamic ethical 
philosophy instruments. It follows that 
to enforce the Islamic injunction, alter-
native means must be fovmd to price capital 
11 Mohsin S, Khan and Abbas Nirfchor, "The framework 
and practice of Islamic banking". Finance & Development/ 
September 1986), p,33,, also in detail, see Khursheed Ahmad 
(in forward), A Survey of Issues and a Programme for Research 
in Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam^ (Islamabad : 
Institute of Policy Studies, 1981), p,2. It is now a general 
view that Islam is opposed to the principal of a fixed pre-
determined return on capital, whether used for consumption or 
productive purposes and whatever be the rate of this pre-
determined return, normal or exorbitant. 
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appropriately, satisfying the requirenvents 
of Islamic ethics". 12 
The concept of the cost of capital is a controversial 
issue aiDong many Muslim scholars. In modem context, the cost 
of capital originates from the concept that money is a limited 
stock and it cannot be a "free commodity, hence there should be 
a price for it. 
12 S.N.H, Naqvi, Ethics and Economics^ (Leicester: Islamic 
Foundation, 1981), p,43f Muslim Scholars, generally do not accept 
the cost of capital, because, if a saver deposits his money in a 
bank, he can always draw his money from the bank and avail of the 
'opportunity' that he may have come across. Therefore, there is 
no opportunity cost involved - In fact the concept of opportunity 
cost of capital was raised by the money — lender to legitimise 
to their unlawful interest eajaaings. Originally there was a lot 
of resistance on the part of Church to allow usury. Then the 
opportunity cost argximent was coined to persuade it to allow 
interest in those cases where a lender losses an opporttmity 
to invest, if it arises during the period his money is being used 
by the borrower. The church agreed to relax the prohibition of 
usury on the basis of this argument. From this relaxation followed 
the wholesale legitimisation, 
21 
Modernist Views on Interest 
It is gsierally asked whether there is any distinction 
between riba of the Qur'an and the interest of the capitalist 
13 f^orld. This is an isoportant question because it makes one 
to further ask whether an interest-free eccmomy can come into 
existence and further that what is the alternative of Interest 
and whether the elimination of interest from the economy can be 
replaced by profit-sharing system. The modernists "think that 
the prohibition on borrowing and lending at interest can only 
14 be enforced in a primitive Islamic society with Islamic morals. 
This iraportant assumption is considered necessary before interest-
based system is eliminated. The main reason for the modernist 
13 M.A, Mannan. Islamic Economic i Theory and Practice, 
(Idarah-i-Adabiyat-i-Delli, 1980), p. 158? A searching criticism 
of some recent attenpt to justify interest hap been made by 
Mahraud Abu Saud, who also warns against the tendency of treating 
money capital as if it were capital goods or real assets, a 
tendency that has become quite frequent in modem literature. 
Western writer, particularly, equates the price with the rental 
use of money, giving the impression that to use the service of 
money is exactly as to use the service of a doctor. The obvious 
objections to treating interest as rent are that money as a 
medium of exchange is not supposed to depreciate and that you do 
not rent something that perishes or disappears once you use it. 
See for detail, Abu saud, Mahmud^ "Interest free banking". Paper 
presented at the First International Conference on Islamic 
Economics, Mecca, 1976, Mimeo,, p,164, 
14 For an excellent discussion see; S.N.H, waqvi. Ethics 
and Economics ; An Islamic Synthesis, (Leciester t Islamic 
Foundation, liOndon, 1982), 
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to defend interest is that, the economies of the Islamic 
World have shifted to a greater exteat into the vestem block 
and no doubt, for this, 'many obstacles of religious nature 
cc»ne in their way to reach the western standard of living and 
to adopt the monetary instruroocits and the institution of the 
West, But so far as monetary conditions are concerned, the main 
facts to be noted is that the Our'an prohibited riba which 
according to traditional interpretation should also cover 
interest*, 
The modernists bel ieve t h a t what Islam p r o h i b i t s i s 
r iba and not i n t e r e s t . In t h e i r opinion i n t e r e s t paid on loans 
fo r investment in productive a c t i v i t i e s would not contravene the 
laws of the Our* an, for i t r e fe r s only t o r iba on non-productive 
loans which prevailed in pre-Is lamic tiroes when people were not 
fami l ia r with productive loan. The b a s i s of the injxinction 
agains t r iba on consumption loan i s t h a t those who borrows are 
assumed to be in need of such loan fo r purpose of maintaining 
some standard of l i v i n g . To make loan to another without r iba , 
then, i s an act of cha r i t y . Thus, those with higher incomes. 
15 Ulgener Sabri, Monetairy Condition of Economic 
Growth and the Islamic Concept of I n t e r e s t , Islamic Review (London), No. 55, No.2, February 1967, pp . 11-14, 
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therefore^ higher savings, are asked to make loans to those with 
lover income who are in need without having to extract riba from 
them, Ihe prohibition of riba on consumption loan is also clearly 
aimed at the allocation of purchasing power from the rich to the 
poor. The loans can be classified into consumption loan and 
production loan and that £iba forbidden by the Our* an is that 
which is connected with constmption loan only. It is thought that 
in the case of production loan, where, due to investment in 
productive projects of lucrative return, there would be no sin 
16 
in demanding interest. 
Production Loan 
Regarding the controversy over the product ive and non-
productive loans in pre-Islaraic Arabia the re are s t i l l differences 
of opinion on t h i s x the modernists argue t h a t people of the 
pre-Xslaraic Arabs resor ted to r iba fo r meeting t h e i r consunption 
requirements only . Therefore, in t h e i r view, the Qur 'anic p roh i -
b i t i on of r iba , in any case, cannot apply to such economic 
16 Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Taf s i r a l -Qur 'an , v o l . l , 
pp . 298-313, Aligarh 1882,, The Indian Modernist, Sayyid Ahmad 
holds the view tha t i n t e r e s t on production loan i s not r iba 
and tha t i n t e r e s t on consumption loan would be r iba caily i f the 
debtor was poor and not able to pay the i n t e r e s t . 
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17 practices which were not present at that time. 
Among the Muslim modernists Muhammad 'Abduh is considered 
as the first among the prominent *ulama' of modem times who 
initiated a discussion on the problem. He is quoted as having 
recommended bank interest as lawful according to the shari'ah. 
It is said that he gave this opinion at the request of the 
Postal Authority of Cairo, "He gave a verdict that the profits 
on the postal saving accounts operated by the Muslim depositors 
could be apportioned by them. It should not come voider the 
category of riba, but it should be treated as profit gained from 
17 CF, Ziauddin Ahmad, 'The Theory of Riba, Islamic 
Studies, Vol, 17, 1978, The author has mentioned the Egyptian 
uleraas7 who were in favour of bank interest merely on the above 
ground. All of them suppose that bank interest is not 'riba'l-
nasi'ah^ hence lawful. They also regarded it as subject o^"^  
ij tihad as riba'1-fadl. The author has presented the view of 
* modem Arab •Ulema, some of whom held the post of Shaykh 
al-Azhar i,e.. Mufti Abdhuh, Rashid Rida, Mahimid Shaltut, 
Abd al-wahab al-Khallaf, Ibrahim Zaky al-Din al-Badwai are 
reputed for their opinion that present bank interest is not the 
same as riba in Our'an. 
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18 Mudarabah business xjndertaken by the pos t a l a u t h o r i t i e s ' 
Mtihairanad Rashid Rida, the d i s c i p l e of Muhanunad 'Abduh followed 
h i s master in t h i s respec t , 
A modem Muslim v r i t e r says tha t : Rashid Rida was 
"an exponent of the Mudarabah theory of 
bank business (with i n t e r e s t ) who very often 
quotes h i s teacher in support of the pos i -
t ion taken by himself in l ega l i z ing bank 
i n t e r e s t from the Shar i ' ah view p o i n t . But 
according to author scholars opposing bank 
i n t e r e s t as lawful are genera l ly r e luc tan t 
to give any c reden t i a l of au then t i c i t y to 
'Abduh*s opinion on the problem as fovund in 
the wri t ing of Rashid Rida, In t h e i r view 
Rashid Rida might have sometimes a t t r i b u t e d 
h i s own opinion to h i s t eacher . But about 
another Egyptian w r i t e r the author mention 
tha t "Mtdiaraniad Shal tu t , a former Shaykh 
of al-Azhar^ refused to recognize bank I n t e r e s t 
as lawful, but l a t e r on he changed h i s opi-
nion and ranked himself with Rashid Rida and 
o thers to accord sanction of l e g a l i t y t o the 
present bank i n t e r e s t . On the o the r hand, 
Ibrahim Zaky, a l - D l n ' l Badawl remained a 
stoxjnch supporter of bank i n t e r e s t in h i s ea r ly 
wr i t ings , and l a t e r he reviewed h i s opinion 
and authouted the book e n t i t l e d , N a z a r l w a h ' l -
Rlba«1-Muharram f11«l~Sharl* a ' l - l s l amlyyah . i^ 
IS iki5»# P . 184, 
19 Ib id . , p . 185. 
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Nature of COD sumption and Productix?n Loan 
As £ar as the modernists vievs on the nature of loan 
are concerned, there is absolutely no evidence to support the 
contention that riba of the Jahiliyyah was on consumption and 
not on production loan. There are a good deal of historical 
record to prove that position of the Arabs in Mecca was as a 
trader, and hence it is difficult to believe that loans were for 
consxiraption purposes only. The Qur'anic verses about remitting 
the principal in the event of the borrowers hardship does not 
refer to consumption loan. It refers essentially to interest 
20 based, 
•yyafit^-t^ional View of I n t e r e s t 
Tradi t iona l view on i n t e r e s t g r e a t l y d i f f e r s from modem 
thinking, where Qur'anic r iba and contemporary commercial 
i n t e r e s t s are t rea ted a l i k e . In recent years l i t e r a t u r e supporting 
20 Most of the in te res t -based t ransac t ions mentioned in 
the c l a s s i c a l coramentatires in r e l a t ion to the prohib i t ion of 
r iba are loan taken by the t r i b e s from each other , each t r i b e s 
act ing l i k e a large par tnership cocopany, (For an exce l len t 
fac tua l presenta t ion on the subject with nvunerous so l id references 
firora primary sources, see. Mufti Muhammad Shafi, Mas'al a ' -e-Sud (Urdu) (Karachi, Idarah a l -Ma' r i f ) 1374 A.H,), p p . 18-23, and 
•Riba» in Urdu Encyclopaedia of Islam/ (Lahore : D a ' i r a t a l 
Ma'ar i f - i - Is lamiyya; n , d . 
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this traditional thinking are appearing at an increasing scale. 
Though it cannot be claimed that an interest-free system will 
replace present interest-based system, but the emergence of 
Islamic banking system (interest-free banking) have generated 
21 
the debate on this issue. 
By traditional view here is meant that line of thinking 
which is in accordance with Sha'ri'ah law. The basic attitude 
of the traditionalist is this that riba and interest are one and 
the same. According to a well-known medieval Muslim theologian 
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi the Arabs of the Jahiliyah period recovered 
riba monthly without affecting the sum advanced. When the time 
for settlement came, the principal amount lent was demanded and 
if the debtor was xmable to pay, the lender increased the amoxant 
in his own favour and granted extension of time. This was how 
the Arabs of the Jahilliyah used to transact their lending 
operations. From the observation of this learned jurist, it can 
safely be said that riba which was prevalent in pre-Islamic era 
consisted in extending the time limit and increasing the amount 
21 For a general survey of this point of view .on inteijest' 
see Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Muslim Economic Thinkingt 
A Survey of Contemporary Literature (Leicesters The Islamic 
Foundation, U.K., 1981), p,63-68 and Ariff, ed„ Monetary and 
Fiscal Economics of Islam, (Jeddah t Intematicaaal Centire for 
kesearch in Islamic Economics, King Abdul Aziz University, 1982), 
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due so much so that the borrower would at the end of the period 
of the loan returned to the lender double or even more of the 
22 principal sum* * 
A survey of Islamic history shows that the Muslims always 
considered riba as forbidden. They managed their economy and 
carried on domestic and international trade without the insti-
tution of interest. Profit-sharing and various kinds of parti-
cipation arrangement served as adequate bases for saving and 
investment and considerable capital was mobilized in mining, 
ship-building, textile and other industries as well as for war-
23 time trade. There did not exist any distinction between interest 
and riba but the conflict between the Shari'ah and practice conti-
nued to exist as an xinresolved problem of Islamic history. It was 
realised that the Islamic notion of interest was mainly a 
medieval idea and it has no connection with what actually takes 
place in the modem world. As a result of this, Muslim econo-
mists started to find out the alternative of interest. It is 
22 M,A, Mannan,, op. cit„ p. 159. 
23 Muhammad Neja tu l lah Siddiqi , I ssues in Is lamic Banking 
( se lec ted papers) (Leices ter s The Islamic Foundation t U.K.), 
Po9, 
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pzoflt and loss-sharing that bears the true spirit of Islamic 
24 
concept of Justice. Up till now a good nuniber of literature 
has come out in the support of the theory that profitrloss 
sharing system is superior to interest-based debt financing on 
ground of efficiency. 
Gontrovergy o" Hadith Literature 
The main controversy on the riba arises due to its 
definition. The riba mentioned in Qur'an implies to that kind of 
riba which is consisted In doubling and redoubling of the original 
amoxmt. This is the riba related to pre-Islamic days i.e. 
p,^* 1-Jahilivah> Although the Our* an does not give any specific 
definition of riba' l-Jahilllwah, but its nature and characteristic 
24 A Current Study on the issue is by Waqar Masood Khan, | 
Towards an Interest-Free Islamic Economic System, (Leicester: j 
Thie Islamic Fotindation, U.K., 19857, The author accepts the 
position of total prohibition of interest and adopts profit-
loss-sharing as the alternative to interest-based financing. He 
has analysed the issue in the context of secular economy. In 
this way he has departed from the usually assumed ideal-Islamic 
society condition. He has integrated the prof it-loss sharing 
into the mainstream economies. This is an approach which Muslim 
economists could adopt to Islamise economies, instead of the 
more common style of stating Islamic Jurisprudence in the termi-
nology of secular economies. 
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features are manifested in various riba verses of the Our'an. 
The modernists also think that Qur'an prohibited only such kinds 
of pre-Jslamic riba as used to make the principal sura several 
fold with the passage of time. As we have mentioned earlier, 
in pre-Islamic Arabia j^ jba became due when a man owned another a 
debt, at the time of its maturity the creditor would ask the 
debtor>wiil you repay x Will you increase ? If the debtor paid up, 
the amount was received otherwise the debtor increased the amount 
25 
and the creditor extended a further term. 
By the above statement, it is inplied that credit was 
offered free of riba for the first terra, and that the riba was 
charged only when the debtor failed to discharge the debt at the 
end of the first term. Therefore, the riba' 1-jahilliyah is 
certainly different from the usual interest bearing dealing which 
stipulates the increase from the very beginning. In comparison to 
riba'l^jahiliyah, and the loan with interest, in which the 
increase is stipulated in the first term is something different. 
Hence the question arises t was it not a common knowledge among 
the Arabs that what Qur'an prohibits is merely riba' 1--jahiliyyah 
25 For an authentic point of view see, Malik, Muwatt'a, 
cited by Fazlur-Rahman., op, cit., p,5. 
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and not the riba as production loan ? This is the main point 
from which the controversy oririnates. The Qur'an has not 
mentioned clearly the nature and definition of riba. The fact 
that there was room for different interpretation of the Qur'anic 
injunction against riba is traceable to the time of Caliph Umar, 
in the first half century of Islamic period who is reported to 
have said "The last to be revealed was the verse of usury and the 
Prophet e3?pired without e:q>laining it to us. Therefore, give up 
26 
usury or any thing resembling it", 
Thus not only Caliph 'Umar wished there were a greater 
e:q>lanation regarding all aspects of riba, but also that to be 
safe he opted for an interpretation according to which one mast 
avoid anything which might resemble riba in dealing with others. 
The Hadith literature covering the various dimensions of the 
nature of riba is soraetitaes in conflict with each other. Parti-
cularly the traditions related to the exchange of same item. 
Take for example, the following haditht "Abu, Rafi, a client of 
the Prophet said t "the Prophet borrowed a young camel from 
some person, and when camel from the camel of the Sadaqah came to 
26 For detail see, M, Siddiq Noarzay, "Islamic Lavjs 
on Riba (interest) and their economic inrolication". International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,(U.S.A,J, vol 18,I9a6,p,4 
32 
him, he ordered roe to pay back the roan his young camel. When I 
told him that I could find only an "excellent" camel in its 
seventh year, he said, 'give it to him, for the best person is he 
27 
who discharges his debt with something better**. It is said 
that the above tradition created doxibt that the conversion of riba 
into the "virtue of the goodness' in the repayment of loan" 
i related only to the purchase and sale of cattle. Regarding this 
1 tradition two opinions have been expressed. The first is that, 
if at the time of repayment of a loan, the excess paid over and 
above the principal sxim of money is not riba in the case of cattle, 
what is to happen to the universility of the dicticxi so very much 
insisted upon by our * doctors ( that every loan from which a profit 
accures is riba. 'The second question that is asked regarding 
this tradition is that 'gooctaess in the repayment of loan' in the 
case of cattle, becomes, when applied to forms of wealth other 
than cattle, an evil of enormity that it is characterised as an act 
of war against God and his Prophet, In this way the variation 
in the Hadith literature creates doubts and controversy. The Sun an 
of Abu Da'ud and the Masnad of Ahmad b, Hanbal are quoted to 
showing that such an unjust distinction between cattle and other 
forms of wealth cannot be attributed to the Prophet, A similar 
27 Muslinv Sahih, Kitab al-Bu'yu, 
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Hadith in the Sxinan of Abu Da'ud is : "hiuharib reported that he 
heard Jabir b. 'Abd, Allah saying that Prophet ovjed hi!» ^ abirj 
some money and at the time of repayment of the loan the Prophet 
28 
added some money in excess of the principal borrowed", 
The modernists on the groxind of this tradition say that 
'no attempt to define riba in the light of Hadith have so far 
been successful. The question is asked whether all the traditions 
relating to riba, having been found unauthentic should be rejected 
in toto ? It is also asked whether the Qur'anic declaration that 
if people do not give up riba, they should be prepared for a 
•war from God and his Prophet* refers to such transaction ? and 
whether it is witii reference to these dealings that such hadith 
have been narrated in which it is said that the taking of riba 
is as revolting as incest'. 
28 Abu Dawud, Sunan, K^ . al~Buyu*B| husn al-gada • ? 
Ahmad b. Hanbal, frlxsnad, 111:319, as quoted by Fazlur-
Rahman, Op.cit,^ P.29, 
29 Ibid,, p.30,, Regarding this issue, the author thinks 
that the evolutionary process through which these hadiths have 
passed, and these do not seem to be authentic. But it would be 
a grave folly to ignore their moral iiqpoirt since they are sincere 
and performed attenpts at interpreting and elaborating the 
sunnah of the Prophet and the Qur'anic Injunctions. The Fact is 
that the spirit underlying these efforts was the Qur'anic spirit 
in respect of economic life and economic system that it wanted to 
promote. Therefore, in order to understand riba as meant by the 
Hadith, it is first necessary to tinderstand what the Our'an meant 
by riba (p.30). 
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Regartllng the various t:ypes of Uadith on rlba^ a inoclemist 
writer says : 
"The contradiction found in the Hadlths 
In respect of rlba Is difficult to resolve. 
On the basis of Isnad alone, there is not 
inuch scope elther~lEor the rejection or 
accpetance of these traditions because, the 
Slhah works contain a good nuniber of Hadlths 
on each aspect of these topics. Every one of 
these Hadlth is either Sahih i.e. supported 
by a strong chain of authorities or is 
supported by other Hadlths of the level of 
Sahih Hadlth. The surmise made on the basis 
of qiyas (analogy) are not so linportant in 
our opinion as the historical order of these 
Hadlths, because the historical order is 
something which is based on certainty, and 
is not a mere matter of probability. If 
these Hadlths are viewed in this way, it 
becomes apparent that there is a clear 
process of development Involved therein ,,., 
This process of development is at the 
bottom of the contradiction found in 
Hadlth material. Besides, the abovementloned 
contradiction roost of these Hadlth are full 
of other conplexltles, which we find it 
almost impossible to resolve" ,-^ 0 
30 The author mentions that if there is hand to hand exchange 
of articles like gold, silver, wheat, dates or salt in excess or 
in deficiency, that would become rlba, in accordance with the most 
widely current traditions. This is called as riba'1-fadl. The 
author put question that whether the Qur'anic declaration that if 
people do not give up rlba, they should be prepared for 'a war 
from God and His Prophet*, refers to such transactions and whether 
it is with reference to those dealings that such hadith have been 
narrated in which it is said that the taking of rlba is as 
revolting as incest. The author quotes the Muwatta of Malik and 
the sahih of al-Bukharl, who say that excess is permissible in a 
transaction involving cattle, even on credit, and such excess 
cannot be characterised as riba. The question, therefore, arises as 
why such excess in respect of other forms of wealth should be 
considered riba. Further more, the Sahih of Muslim and other Sahih-
works contain hadiths showing that the credit transactions, not 
only of cattle but even of slaves and coins of copper is permissi-
ble, even when such transaction involves excess. See al-Bayhaql, 
'al-Sunan al~Kubra', (Hyderabad),1352. A.H., V: 288; as quoted by 
Fazlur Rahman, Op^cit.. p.20. 
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The above statement throws some light on the complexities 
of Hadith that concern with riba'l-f adl. In view of these sharp 
differences found in the Hadith literature the modernists do not 
think the commercial interest also comes in the category of riba. 
So far as riba'l-nasi'ah is concerned/ there is hardly 
any difference of opinion among Muslim writers because Our* an has 
clearly mentioned it. The controversy arises from the riba'1-fadl 
which concerns the exchange of the items about which there are 
31 
contradictory statements in the Hadith. 
In modem times, particularly when the commercial interest 
is considered as Qur'anic riba by the Muslim traditionalists, 
their roost persuasive argument against interest is that it is 
31 For detail see Fazlur Rahman n, "A study of commercial 
interest in Islam", Islamic Thought (Aligarh) 5 ( 4 & 5 ) 
July-October, 1956, p. 24-46; In fact, the prohibition of 
riba'1-fadl has been looked upon as a discouragement of barter and 
a step directed at roonetizatlon of the economy. The primary aim 
of this injunction is, however, to eliminate the possibilities of 
ea^loitation and injustice sixailar to that which is the target of 
prohibition of interest on money loan. See Sheikh Ahmad Irshad 
"Islamic Economy and the Elimination of Interest", Voice of Islam 
(Karachi), vol, 12> November 1963j pp, 78-85. 
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xinjust to demand a reward wi thou t p a r t i c i p a t i n g in t h e r i s k of 
e n t e r p r i s e . But according t o t h i s d e f i n i t i o n l a r g e number of 
economic t r a n s a c t i o n s can be brought unde r r i b a . 'What about 
a doc to r who charges a f i x e d f e e wi thou t ensu r ing t h a t h i s t r e a t -
ment would c e r t a i n l y have a p o s i t i v e e f f e c t on t h e p a t i e n t ? 
Again, why should a lawyer charge a f i x e d wage r a t e wi thout being 
a b l e t o g u a r a n t e e t h e s u c c e s s f u l de fense of t h e c l i e n t ? and why 
should a l abour xanion c o n t r a c t f o r a f i x e d wage r a t e wi thout 
c a r i n g f o r t h e p r o f i t a b i l i t y of t h e e n t e r p r i s e ? These a re the 
impor tan t ques t ion when t h e n a t u r e and d e f i n i t i o n of r i b a i s 
32 d i s c u s s e d . 
32 This i s a ccwtplex p o i n t i n I s l a m i c economic l i t e r a t u r e . 
For a f u l l d i s c u s s i o n see Waqar Masood Khan ' s admirable . Towards 
An I n t e r e s t - F r e e I s l amic Econoroic Sys toa , ( L e i c e s t e r j The 
I s l a m i c Foundation^ U.K., 1985) , The a u t h o r n o t e s t h a t i t i s no t 
a f i x e d p rede t enoen t reward t h a t makes a payment r i b a no r i s i t 
non - sha r ing of r i s k , Riba i s an inc rement on P r i n c i p a l sum, 
which does n o t have an e q u i v a l e n t i n exchange . The l e n d e r g ives 
t h e money to t h e borrower and t a k e s i t back, b u t t h e i n t e r e s t 
t h a t t h e former r e c e i v e s i s n o t compensat ion f o r a n y t h i n g . 
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CHAPTER - II 
MUSLIM CRITICISM OF INTEREST 
AND PROFIT-SHARING 
During the recent years there has emerged a growing 
interest in the monetary and fiscal economics of Islam, Based 
on the con tempo rairy debate in western economies on these issues 
some Muslim apologists are trying to work out the monetary and 
fiscal policies of their countries which they call 'Islamic 
Economies', The two most important pillars of 'Islamic Economics'-
the institution of Zakah and the prohibition of riba - are fiscal 
and monetary measures around which most of the contemporary 
literatures on 'Islamic economies' revolves. It is claimed that 
if riba is prohibited, banking and other financial institutions 
could function efficiently on the basis of pix)fit-sharing. But 
some Muslim apologists have begion to ask question whether they 
should cariry on their analysis within the framework of the 
capitalist system or they should depart from the capitalist system 
and be attached with the ethical value system of Islam, In this 
connection, the following remarks of a Muslim ^ologist are 
1 M.A, Khan in,, Muslim World Book Review« 
(London t Islamic Foundation 1981),' vol,2, 1-4, p,47. 
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interesting. He says that 'One-climensional thrust of Western 
eoonoinic thought, which is based on the vision of eighteenth 
century England, have kept Muslim economists on the straight and 
narrow path. According to him 'Muslim economists are deeply 
sxonk in the quicksand of western economic paradigm. From the 
statements of objectives onwards, they have adopted the western 
economic paradigm in its totality. The major themes of western 
economics occur again and again in the literature on Islamic 
economics : 'productivity', 'macro-consiuiption economies', 'full-
enployment'; 'economic growth', 'welfare programmes', 'cost-
benefit analysis' and 'monetarism'. Because the main frame of 
reference is the western economic paradigin, its tools, methodolo-
gies, issues and institutions are accepted and (^estions are 
always asked in relation to them,,. These metaphysical notions, 
and the accompanying borrowing of institutions, ideas and tools 
of the western economic system, are implicitly leading Muslim 
economists to produce policies that are hardly different from 
the capitalist and socialist alternatives. In the end they will 
lead the muslim countries to the same crisis that confronts 
2 industrialized societies". 
2 ziauddin sardar, "Islamic Economics: From partial 
to Axiomatic Approach", in Islamic Future (Mansell publishing 
Limited, 1985, U.S.A.), p.207. 
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Questions are being asked as what is Islamic economics ? 
How does it differ from the conventional capitalist and socialist 
models ? What are its axioms and principles ? How will Islamic 
economics replace the dominant economic orders in Muslim 
societies ? It is generally felt that the elimination of interest 
is not the only condition for the Islamisation of the economy, 
as it is evident from the fact that a socialistic economy, which 
is contrary to Islam, also functions on the basis of a zero rate 
of interest in financial transactions. Thus the aJaolition of 
interest is not a necessary first step to attain a truely Islamic 
state. It is argued that 'a transitional Islamic society will 
have to shoulder this "necessary evil" till a truely Islamic state 
is finally established, in which case, of course, there would not 
3 
by any need for the rate of interest to exist any longer". 
According to a modem Muslim writer "Islamic economics is not 
capitalism minus interest plus Zakah or socialism minus state 
4 
control plus Allah" , Another Muslim writer explains the rationale 
behind the prohibition of interest in these words : 
"If the Islamic system is equated simply 
with the abolition of interest and introduc-
tion of Zakat, this would amoisnt to some kind 
3 S.N.H. Naqvi, Ethics and Economics, Ch.?; p. 109, 
4 This remark is made by Ziauddin Sardar, Op.cit., 
P.199. 
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of an over simplification, I agree that 
abolition of interest and the introduction 
of Zakah are the most important pillars on 
which we have to base new structure of 
society and economy, but they do not go to 
make up the whole structure ,,. Abolition 
of interest is one of our primary targets. 
Establishment of Zakah is a priority of 
objective in our scheme. But they do not 
constitute the be-all and end-all of the 
Islamic economics ,,,, our target is a 
fundamental change in the economy and 
society t a change that affects people's 
attitudes and motives, their consumption 
and production relationships, society's 
institutions and structures, individual 
life styles and collective policies at all 
levels,^ 
The rationale of the prohibition of interest is looked 
rather with doubt, A numbers of points are raised. Regarding 
the traditional view that business partners face the risk of a 
possible loss whereas the lenders face no risk at all as the 
reason for prohibiting interest, Homa Katouzion, says there is 
nothing in the Qur'an and tradition to say that riba is prohibited 
because it does not involve the lender in the risk taking. He 
further says that the rate of return on capital bears a relation-
ship to the degree of risk involved in various types of investment 
5 Khurshid Ahmad made this remark on opening speech in 
Ariff (ed.) Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam (Jeddahj 
Internal Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, King Abdul 
Aziz University, 1982), 
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The higher the risk^ the higher the r a t e of r e tu rn , A borrower 
vould noimially expect a lower r a t e of i n t e r e s t than r a t e of prof i 
he would have earned on h i s c a p i t a l had he entered a par tnership 
with borrower. In t h i s way, they each take d i f fe ren t degree of 
r i s k and expect d i f fe ren t r a t e of r e t u r n . He also thinks tha t 
the re a re var ious degrees of r i s k and r a t e s of re turn associated 
with d i f fe ren t types of business a c t i v i t y . In some partnership, 
the pa r tne r may face higher r i sk , and even higher p r o f i t s , than 
o t h e r s . But Muslim economist does not maintain tha t business 
involving higher r i s k s are superior to those facing lower r i s k . 
As i t can be seen however, there i s no genuinely r i sk - f ree 
decision of any kind, and, in any case, the degree of r i sk i s 
r e l a t ed to the r a t e of r e t u r n . 
The emphasis of the Muslim idealogye i s t h a t the Islamic 
economic system i s a p a r t of the t o t a l Islamic way of l i f e . For 
a balanced economic growth 'curbing conspicious consumption, both 
p r i v a t e and pxiblic, and guaranteeing a minimum leve l of consuraptio 
to a l l , accompanied by f i s c a l d i s c i p l i n e ensuring the channelisa-
t ion of the add i t iona l incomes generated to c a p i t a l formation' , 
a re e jSsent ia l ' . 
6 Homa Katouzian, Review on S i d d i q i ' s Book in In te rna t iona l 
Journal of Middle East Studies^ Vol, 17., 1985), p , 2 9 5 - 3 l i . 
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'IslaLinic economics' as it has been already mentioned 
have still not faced a testing groxind. That is why Islamic 
economic theories cannot be justified merely on the ground, as 
they claim, that other prevailing systems have proved a failure. 
Not only the concept of interest, but iitportant aspects like the 
Zakah and Islamic financial systems still remain obscure. They 
discuss Islamic fiscal policy within the framework of Islamic 
distributive justice. Zakah dominates the whole discussion, as 
if distributive justice is concerned only with transfer payments 
and as if Zakah is the only instrument available. Islamic 
thinkers have expressed differences of opinion with respect to 
Zakah base. One view is that Zakah is a form of wealth tax and 
therefore, it is not permissible to include income in the Zakah 
base. Another view is that Zakah raast be paid on a Zakah-able 
asset regardless of whether it is owned by private individual 
or by government, it is because Zakah is earmarked by certain 
purposes as spelled out in the Qur'an, whereas Government revenues 
are not. One writer rejects this point and says that commercial 
exploitation of mineral resources can be undertaken only by the 
state and not by individuals. He even goes so fcir as to suggest 
that revenues from such state-owned mines are similar to Zakah, 
regardless of whether these are used to benefit the poor or 
7 
society as a whole. The question is generally raised: what will 
7 Mohammad Ariff (ed.) Monetary ^nd fiscal Economics 
of Islam., p,i6 
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happen if interest i s abolished in an Islamic economy? I t 
i s claimed that the prof i t - loss sharing system i s superior to 
interest-based debt-financing on grounds of efficiency. The 
prevalence of debt-financing in the -world i s e^qplained by the 
Q 
high information cost of profit-sharing system, Islam, as 
it is believed, is neither opposed to competitive effort nor is 
averse to the operation of market forces. But monopoly, 
hoarding* speculation and other \jnlslamic practices have been b i 
9 
banned. Islam, like capitalism, permits private ownership of 
property including the means of production and grants freedom of 
enterprise. It holds trade and therefore production in high 
10 
esteem, 
8 Waqar Masood Khan, Towards an Interest-free Islamic 
Economic System, (Leicester : The Islamic Foundation, U,K,, 1985), 
p. 126,, It is originally a ph,D thesis at the University of 
Boston, 
9 The Our* an condemn the hoarding of wealth in following 
words : "And let not those who hoard up that which Allah hath 
bestowed upon them of His bounty think that it is better for 
them. Nay, it is worse for them. That which they hoard will be 
their collar on the Day of Resurrection, Allah's is the heritage 
of the heavens and the earth, and Allah is informed of what 
ye do (111:180). 
Even Prophet is reported to have said t "Fear God and 
be moderate in your pursuit of wealth, take only that which is 
allowed and leave that which is forbidden", Ibn. Majah, vol,2, 
p. 725*2144. 
10 Zubair Hasan, "Theory of Profit tThe Islamic Viewpoint". 
Journal of Research in Islamic Economics, (Jeddah) King Abdul 
Aziz University, vol, 1-1-summer 1983, p. 14, 
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Interest and Islamic Economy 
Keeping in view the fianction of interest in the capitalistic 
system, it is argued that interest cannot be abolished instantly 
from the "Islamic economy", for if it is done so there are chances 
that economy will collapse. Because a capital scarce economy 
in transition to an Islamic economy will need a rate of interest 
which performs certain desirable functions, and in the absence 
of interest it cannot acheive its goals. Thus interest rate would 
be required to allocate scarce resources optimally among various 
sectors of the economy. Moreover, in a dynamic economy's positive 
rate of interest is desired to account for the positive social 
rate of time preference, for the social cost of capital consxinption 
resulting from its use, and for the declining real value of saving 
11 
over time'. Hence for an economy in transition to the Islamic 
state, a positive rate of interest cannot be substituted by the 
11 Even in the socialistic system the price of capital 
is counted. Recent studies shows that planners in the Soviet 
Union are anxious not to be denounced as apologists for 
capitalism; yet they need some form of interest rate (or "discount 
rate", or "payoff period") for making efficient investment 
calculations. See, Paul A. Samuelson,, Op,cit., p.669, 
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12 Islamic concept of profit-sharing. For an economy in transition 
to the Islamic state, a positive rate of time preference can 
move towards zero only by extensive cut back on consumption, 
which means that public saving will take the upper hand and less 
reliance would be placed on private saving. While abolishing 
interest in the transition period, government interference will be 
necessary in creating saving, cut back in consumption loan, 
increase in real investment and so on. In short, the presence 
of the interest rate is a "necessary evil" in a capital scarce 
economy dtxring its transitional phase to full-fledged Islamic 
economy. If the rate of interest is at all to be abolished, 
13 
then it will lead to gross inefficiencies. 
12 An inportant function of the rate of interest is iihat 
it is essential for the efficient allocation of scarce investment 
resources. Interest is a device that service two functions in 
the economy. It provides an incentive for people to save and 
accuraulate wealth. But the interest rate is also a rationing 
device; it allows society to select only those investment projects 
with the highest rates of return. Interest rate play a major 
role in determining the market value of asset, 'When the interest 
rate drops from a high to low level, there follows a rise in the 
present value of existing machines, land, bons, stocks, yielding 
a stream of futxire return. The rate of interest also performs the 
fxinctions of safeguarding the real value of private saving. 
Besides this interest income provides the reserve funds to 
finance monetary escalation of money expenditure on depreciation 
and new Investment. 
13 S.N.H. Naqvi, 'Interest Rate and Interten^joral 
Allocative Efficiency in an Islamic Economy, in Ariff (ed,) 
Op. cit., p,43 
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par tnersh ip and Prof it-sharinc? 
Replacement of i n t e r e s t by p ro f i t - sha r ing i s the basic 
"reform", t ha t has been advocated by Muslim economists. The 
reason behind i t i s tha t the ' i nves to r faces an uncertain world 
in which the r e s u l t of h i s en te rp r i se cannot be forseen with 
14 
c e r t a i n t y , 
What i s t h i s 'par tnersh ip and p r o f i t - s h a r i n g ' ? and 
how much i t i s d i f fe ren t from the concept of i n t e r e s t ? and 
can t h i s be svibstituted in place of the functioning of i n t e r e s t 
without doing any harm to the economy ? Muslim scholars are a t 
pa ins to prove the eff iciency of profit-sha:^ing system, but not 
without much complexities t ha t are associa ted with t h i s . 
There i s a general consensus among the Muslims tha t prof i t -
sharing i s leg i t imate in Island, and an a l t e r n a t i v e to i n t e r e s t . 
What makes p r o f i t sharing permissible in Islan^ while i n t e r e s t 
i s not , i s the fact tha t i t i s the p ro f i t - sha r ing r a t i o and not 
the r a t e of return which i s predetermined. I t i s because, the 
14 Almost every Muslim scholar has emphasised Irhis po in t . 
For a comprehensive account on t h i s u s e . See M.N. Siddiqi , 
Muslim Economic Thinking., Ch„ 4 , 
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owners of capital have no p r io r i ty over others in the form of 
a fixed rate of return. 
As for the coirjplexities are concerned, i t i s said that 
the sxibstitution of in teres t with profit-sharing would lead to 
nonopolies, al locative inefficiency and economic ins tab i l i ty 
and so on. I t i s also f e l t that inflation might exist in the 
profit-sharing system. The reason i s given that some possible 
factors may contribute the inflation l ike excess demand, 
shortage of supply, market regidi t ies and unbalanced resource 
allocation between luxuries and necessi t ies , specially those 
which can a r t i f i c i a l l y be created,1^ 
Definition 
*Shirkah means part icipation of two or more persons in a 
certain business with defined amoxints of capi tal according to a 
contract for jo in t ly carrying out a business and for sharing 
profi ts and loss in specified proportions, 
'Mudarabah means that one party provides capital and 
the other u t i l i s e s i t for business under the agreement that 
15 Ariff (ed,) Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam.^ 
P.260, 
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profit from the business will be shared according to a specified 
proportion'. Thus, the roost accepted solution for interest 
is the application of the principles of shirkah (partnership) 
and inudarabah (profit-sharing) as the medieval Muslim jurists 
have accepted that as legal. Now the main concern is that how 
the profit-sharing works in an interest-less Islamic economy. 
The main economic arguments are given as follows : 
The Islamic jurists have worked out the details about 
shirkah and roudarabah on the basis of the Our*an and sunnah. 
A deeper analysis of the concept of roudarabah reveals that it 
is essentially an investment-management agreement. The sahib 
al-nial (capital contributor or investor) is basically not the 
lender but the owner of the business to the extent of his shares 
16 Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Partnership and Profit 
Sharing in Islamic Law# (Leicester t The Islamic Foundation, 
1985), p.15. 
Also, under Mudarabah, the party that provides the 
merchandise and the party that engages.ln business may each 
comprise many persons, i.e. the capital may be provided by 
several persons and the business may be carried out by several 
other persons. Alternatively, capital may belong to one person 
and the party that utilises it in business may be many or 
several persons may pool their capital while one person uses 
if for carrying on business. 
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in the to ta l financing of the business. The mudarib, (manager 
or enterpreneur) manages the investment fund placed at his 
disposal by the sahib al-mal in accordance f^Jith the roudarabah 
agreement, Mudarabah i s a form of equity which i s temporary in 
nature and i s liquidated as soon as the objectives are realized. 
In accordance with the rationale behind the prohibition of riba, 
the manager of Mudarabah funds i s not en t i t led to a fixed 
return for his management services irrespective of what happends 
to the business. If there i s a prof i t , he shares the profi t in 
an agreed proportion as a reward for h i s managerial and entreprenu-
r i a l services. If there i s a loss, he gets no reward, and his 
loss amounts to the opportunity cost of h is services. However, 
he shares the loss if he has a share in the equity of the 
business, but only to the extent of h is shares because losses 
according to the fuqha const i tute erosion of equity. This f i t s 
perfectly into the rationale of the Islamic model of Riba-free 
econora^ ^ and implies that the s p i r i t of business relationship 
preferred by the Shari'ah i s "investment management" and not 
"borrowing-lending", taking into account the modem connotation of 
these terms. 
Equity financing in place of loan-financing wil l help 
eliminate the poss ib i l i ty of a large superstructure of finance 
being raised on a narrow equity base. I t would help bring 
r 0 
about a wide d i spersa l of ovnriership of business and contr ibute 
substantially to the realization of the goal of equitable 
17 distribution of income and wealth. It is said that expected 
rate of profit in the economy will play the allocative role which 
is supposedly played by the rate of interest in the modem 
economies. Accordingly capital as a scarce factor of production, 
will have a price, not in the form of a pre-determined rate of 
interest, but in the form of a probable rate of return thrown up 
by the profit-sharing system. Savers will have the expected 
rate of returns to bank deposits on the incentives to save and 
deposit their saving in bank investment accounts. The profit-
sharing arranganent would result in a just and equitable sharing 
of social surplus. The syston based on interest is unjust because 
it guarantees a definite positive return to the financier whereas 
18 
the value productivity of investment is uncertain. Thus, 
it is claimed that profit-sharing system is not only feasible, 
it is also more efficient than the system based on interest. 
17 M, Umar Chapra, "Money and Banking in an Islamic 
Economy**, in Ariff „ Op. cit.< P. 153 
18 M,N. Siddiqi, Issues in Islamic Banking., p. 125. 
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This profit-sharing, vhich include also the risk sharing 
is considered the only alternative for interest, Muslim 
apologists believe that principle of profit-sharing will ensure 
mobilisation of saving, its channelling to productive enterprise, 
and its allocation in accordance with social preference will be 
achieved by the rate of profit. This rate of profit, according 
to thenv will be more efficient mechanism for allocation of 
resources than interest. 'The rate of interest tends to be a 
"perverted" price and reflects price determination in favour of 
the rich, the more "creditworthy" the borrower, the lower the 
rate of interest and vice versa. The result is that "big" businesi 
is able to get more funds at a lower price because of its "higher" 
credit rating. Thus those who are roost able to bear the burden, 
because of their bigness claimed "higher" productivity, bear the 
19 
least burden. In this system if there is a profit, the entre-
preneur shares the profit in an agreed proportion as a reward for 
his managerial services. If there is a loss he gets no reward. 
However, he shares the loss if he has a share in the equity of the 
business. It is further argued that,*a wholly equity-based system. 
19 M, Umar Chapra, "Money and Banking in An Islamic Ecoxiomv" 
in Ariff,, Op.cit.^ P. 160, 
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-with the rate of profi t not fluctuating as e r ra t ica l ly as the 
rate of interest and the dis tr ibut ion of the to ta l return 
(profit + Interest) bet^ p}een the entrepreneur and the financier 
determined more equitably, should on the contrary tend to have 
the effect of reducing rather than accentuating economic 
ins tab i l i ty* . As regards the differences between profi t and 
interes t i t i s said that Islam has recognized the prof i t only in 
a res t r ic ted sense. Because xinrestricted and 'abnormal prof i t ' 
which a cap i ta l i s t earns i s a c lear case of ea^loi tat ion. While 
Islam recognizes normal prof i t , i t prohibi ts in te res t . Unlike 
interest , profi t i s the result of productive e f for t s . In the 
case of interest , productive effort i s not a t a n made by the 
lender, but in the case of prof i t that element remains throughout 
the process of production and marketing. Thus prof i t i s the 
reward of progress. In the case of in teres t , the element of 
loss i s altogether missing because i t i s fixed and certain, whereas 
profi t i s a payment for the a ssuraption of r isk by the en t r^reneurs . 
20 M. Umar Chapra, (in) Muslim World Book Revieiw, (London t Islamic Foundation, 1981), vol ,2, p ,4 l . 
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It is enterpreneur*E income which is uncertain and unknown. 
Because of these vast differences, it is claimed Islam has 
allowed profit and condemned interest, 
Muslim economists, in recent decades, have started to work 
out different models of Islamic banking, based on profit-sharing 
instead of interest. Thus profit-sharing is considered as true 
ideal of Islam. 
The proposed 'Islamic bank', it is argued, will work "as a 
financial intermediary mobilising savings from the public on the 
basis of mudarabah, and advancing capital to entrepreneurs on the 
capital advanced by the banks are shared by the banks according 
to a mutually agreed percentage. The bank also provides a number 
of familiar banking services against a fee or a conmission. The 
bank's own share capital also goes into its business of offering 
banking services and advancing capital on a profit-sharing basis. 
Making allowance for administrative costs, the net revenue on all 
these counts constitutes business profits, to be distributed 
over the entire capital involved: public deposits on the bank's 
share capital. The percentage profits so worked out are then 
shared with depositors according to a proportion announced in 
advance. Profits received by the depositors in mudarabah accounts 
are, therefore, a percentage part of banking profits which mainly 
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accure to the bank as a percentage part of the profits of 
enterprises financed by it. 
Thus, in naidarabah system, instead of interest which is 
unjust, profit -will play the aiiocative role. The advantage of 
this system is that the banks as suppliers of investable funds 
examine the projects presented to them and supply investable 
fxinds only vhen they are fully satisfied that the project will 
result in the production of a value larger than that invested, 
since the bank*s own returns depend on it, 'in the interest 
based system supply of investable funds by banks involves creation 
of new money. This applies to the profit-sharing system also. 
But the creation of new money in profit-sharing system is effec-
tively linked with the genuine possibilities of creating 
additional value. It may not be so in the interest-based system 
where credit worthiness of the borrower is more important than 
the prospective productivity of the project''. 
21 M,isi, Siddiqi, "Islamic i^proaches to Money, Banking 
and Monetary Policy - A Review", in Ariff,, Op,cit., p,3o, 
22 M.N. siddiqi. Issues in Islamic Banking. Ch,5„ p. 127. 
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Mudarabah t An Analysis 
The claim that profit-sharing applied to Islamic banking 
system/ has the unique advantage of not being prone to inflation 
has been challenged by many economists. It is argued that 
profit-sharing system offers no solution for inflation. The 
reasoning is that "in an Islamic economy, where interest is 
replaced by profit-sharing, the higher the profit share ratio, 
the lower the demand for liquidity and the greater the velocity 
23 
of circulation", As the mudarabah partnership depends on 
pirofit-sharing the profit and interest cannot duplicate each 
other's role, because in a perfectly competitive markets all 
profits are normal profits and are, therefore, inadequate to 
perform the functions of a positive rate of interest. Moreover/ 
profit maximisation under the mudarabah will lead to the growth 
of monopolies and monopolistic market would create economically 
inefficient allocation of resources both in a static and dynamic 
market situation. The argument runs thus : 
"Interest rate cannot be abolished just 
by an administrative fiat, without making 
alternative arrangements, financial and real 
23 M.A. Khan, Inflation and the Islamic Economy., 
Op.cit., p. 237, 
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to ensure the effective perfonnance of these 
functions ... since a zero rate of interest 
is a property of an Islamic economic system 
and not of capitalism, thus, if interest 
rate is abolished by an administrative fiat 
while leaving all other capitalistic insti-
tutions intact, the Islamic 'reform* may 
end up by pushing the economy away from the 
Islamic ideal. To put this argximent 
formally, while a zeino rate of interest is 
a necessary condition for an Islamic econo-
mic order, it is by no means a sufficient 
condition in that this step, all by itself, 
need not usher in an Islamic society, based 
on al-Adl".24 
The above proposition that elimination of interest will 
not be a sufficient condition for an ideal Islamic economy, 
be. 
deserves to be considered carefully. He may right or wrong, 
but it is fact that there is not any established Islamic economic 
model available in the Islamic world for empirical studies. Even 
those "economists" who are full of praise for the mudarabah system, 
cannot justify their claim merely on scholastic ground. As a 
matter of fact it has yet to prove its potentiality. 
24 S.N.H. Naqvi, "Interest Rate and International 
Allocative Efficiency in An xsiamic Economy", m Arltt., 
Op. cit., p.76. 
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CHAPTER - III 
ISLAMIC BANKING 
A Historical Background : 
The concept of public finance among Muslims goes back 
to the early Islamic period when Bayt-al Mal-Muslimin (the 
treasury of Muslims) played an inportant role in the affairs 
of the states. The supreme head of the central Bayt-al-Mal 
was the Caliph himself and his Amir (govemer) both being res-
ponsible for the smooth running of all the departments \inder 
their control. The Caliph distributed the entire revenues 
according to his own will for purpose of general utility. The 
chief treasurer was authorised to control all forms of income 
and expenditure both of the centre and of the provinces. He kept 
aside the surplus to meet any future emergehcy and borrowed money 
to settle debts. 
During the time of the Sascmids there lived a group of 
Christian minority in Mada'in and they were mostly engaged in 
moneif-changing business and dealt with Persian silver coins. 
They migrated to Katah in the early days of Islam and played an 
iBpportant role in the development of banking organization in 
Iraq, which seems to have passed to other parts of the world. 
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especially Egypt and Spain, and later on to some parts of Europe, 
Under the Abbasid the sarraf used to collect gold and silver from 
people and in exchange give theiti coins equivalent to the value of 
the bullions, thus profiting themselves by the difference between 
the face and instinct value of gold and silver coins. The sarraf 
also assisted trade by lending money, receiving goods as agents 
and introducing certain media of credit. In the time of the 
'Abbasid Caliph al-Muktadir, (295-320/908-32) however, the 
2 
Dijahbah emerged as a banker in the modem sense, who, in addi-
tion to his functions as an administrator of deposits and as a 
remitter of funds from place to place, was called upon to advance 
huge suras to the Caliph and other court officials on credit terms 
with interest rates and securities. The Pijahabah were mostly 
christian and jews. By virtue of their vast resources and 
1 S.M, Imamuddin, "Some Aspects of Banking in Medieval 
Muslim Countries", in Thoughts on Islamic Economics, (Dacca : 
Islamic Economic Research Bureau^ 197^), p,182, 
2 A term of persian origin used during the Sasanid 
administration. It was used in the sense of a financial clerk, 
expert in matters of coins, skilled money exotminer, treasury 
receiver, government cashier, money changer or collector. 
5y 
coininercial connections these jews and merchants were instru-
mental in establishing the first state bank in Islamic history 
(302/913), through which the urgent financial needs of the state 
could be satisfied. They were given interest on their loans and 
securities in the foinn of the tax revenues of the province of 
3 
Ahwaz. 
The early eccaiomic history of the Arabs tells us that 
merchants used to employ not only their own capital, but they had 
entered into partnership agreements, or had received goods on 
pidharabah basis. Thus they combined their own resourqes with 
those of others or, conversely, made their own capital multiply 
in the hands of others, with the object of widenning their 
business activities and spreading the risks. It has been said 
that the conditions govejcning trade compelled merchants to carry 
hard cash with them. When they were on vast distances, they 
4 
developed the letter of credit, Suftaja which allowed someone to 
have the necessary svun of money advance to an associate or 
3 See The Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 382, 
4 suftaj a is the Arabicised form of the Persian word 
saftah meaning paper money as letter of credit. This was a pay 
order from one man or a bank to another on mutual understanding 
for a specified sura to be handed over to the bearer of the order 
by a certain date. Under the Abbasids and Patiraids, it was conmon-
ly used in commercial, governments and private transaction^ See 
E.I., p,382. 
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partner by a third pairty at some distance place:;, on a reciprocal 
basis, a procedure which iioplies the maintenance of regular accounts 
and correspondence. It vas of course also possible to contract 
ordinary loans and make deposits, and private individuals and 
government alike made wide use of prcxnissary notes to be used 
for payments. The state's finance was administered through 
local treasuries and a central treasury, A central treasury was 
established in the state's capital- and was headed by a treasurer 
not the head of state. The central treasury had two functions: 
first to act as a local treasury to the area where it was 
situated, the capital and its provinces, and second, to act as 
an organiser among local treasuries. Those treasuries that had 
surpluses were to forward their surplus to the central treasury 
in order to meet the needs of the other local treasuries that 
had defecits, or to receive instructions from the capital 
treasury to transfer from their surpluses that could meet others' 
deficits. Some provinces were rich and some were poor, but 
esqienditures were not to be tailored according to the provinces* 
surpluses. As for the insurance of currency, the central treasury 
5 The Cambridge History of Islam, vol,2 (Cambridge 
University'"Press7 19707, p,525. 
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did not have any function of this kind, it vas left to the 
6 
state as a direct function of its ovm. 
The concept of profit-sharing system, however, is not 
confined to the Islamic period. The history tells us that in 
the pre-Islamic period, the method of business finance was in the 
form of partnership. The differences between partnership before 
and after the coming of Islam was a difference of sale rather 
than of principle. While the concept of allocating gains and 
risk of partners was still the same, partnership after the 
coming of Islam developed into a larger form so as to embrace a 
greater nuniber of fund suppliers and entrepreneurs. Capital was 
divided into small shares which helped investors purchase the 
number of shares which could afford in accordance with their 
financial capacity and the degree of risk associated with the 
investment. This suggests that by the expansion of the state 
and its economic activities the partnership became a sort of 
Joint Stock enterprise. However, it can't be rulled out the 
possibility that interest-based lending might have existed in 
6 Ahmad Abdel-Fattah El-Ashker, The Islamic Business 




Emergence o£ 1slamic Banks s 
The past tv?o decades have witnessed an important develop-
ment in the field of Islamic Banking, During the 1970s there 
was spectacular growth both in the number of Islamic banks and 
in the volume of their global activities. The energence of 
substantial balance of payment surpluses in a number of oil 
exporting countries paved the way for the formation of giant 
multinational Islamic banks, and helped the spread of Islamic 
banking in other Muslim countries as well. At the time it was 
stiggested by some financial analystt that this was short lived 
phenomenon, and that with the drying up of the petro-dollar of 
the oil e3q>orting countries this would end with a sudden 
financial collapse. The subsequent events, however, have proved 
8 
the contrary. 
7 There are evidences to suggest that under a disguised 
form some tricks of fictitious transactions, such as selling 
and buying an cirticle simultaneously at different selling and 
buying prices were practised, see Maxime, Rodinson Islam and 
Capitalism, tr, by Brian Pearce, 'Suffolk t Allen lane, 1974), 
The following example illustrates a widely practiced tricks. 
Persia A sells an object to person B for Rs.lio, to be paid after 
a year, but promptly buys it back for Rs.lOO, payable immediately. 
While technically no interest payment is involved, this double 
transaction is equivalent to a single transaction in which A lends 
Rs,i00 to B for one year at 10 per cent, 
8 See "Islamic Banking x A Maturing Movement", 
Inquiry (liondon) Novanber 1987, p,22. 
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The present phenomenon of Islamic banking is associated 
with the rise of the revivalist trend in the Muslim vjorld. 
Muslims in the field of banking have been looking for legally 
permissible means of finance, saving and investment. This 
was the major motive behind the emergence of what is now termed 
'Islamic banking', A second reason is the economic deteriora-
tion of the Muslim world, especially in the field of produc-
tion and project finance, a problem which is severely aggravated 
by the external debt. The oil-rich Muslim countries have their 
own 'ailments*. Following the serious oil crisis of the early 
serventies they were left with accunulated liq^ iidity problems. 
Banks were needed to provide for the necessary organization of 
saving and investments. The idea of actually establishing 
Islamic banks ripened in the same decade. Thirdly, a genuine 
need on the part of Muslim communities to accentuate and 
reassert their economic identity moulded itself into political 
resurgencei. The slogan raised included a demand for economic 
liberation and the application of Islamic principles as the 
main regulator of legal, economic and social behaviour. An 
alternative to western economic institution was eagerly sought 
especially for the third world. The movement for the establish-
ment of Islamic Banks started in -^ he early seventies. It is 
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said that the establishment of Islamic banks started with the 
accumulation of surplus oil reserve in the petroliuro producing 
countries. This may not be regarxJed as the sole reason for the 
emergence of Islamic banks. Firstly, a few Islamic bankShad 
already been established before 1973 when oil prices were 
increased and the 'so called* petro-dollars• started flowing 
in the Arab World, Secondly, Islamic banks are not confined 
to the Gulf region which has been the main recipient of petro-
dollars. On the contrary, the Islamic banks have been established 
even in the countries which have had no share in the oil-price-
hike prosperity, Egypt and Sudan, for instance, figure 
prominently among these countries as both of these have had 
not one but several Islamic Banks, Nevertheless, the view of 
linking the establishment of Islamic Banks with oil-price-
hike-induced-prosperity cannot be totally ruled out. 
Newly found prosperity in certain parts of the Islamic 
9 
region must have helped in the growth of some Islamic Banks, 
As one writer has pointed out the development of Islamic 
Banking is a recent phenomenon although the idea to establish 
an interest-free bank goes back to as early as 1940s, However, 
9 Cf,, Ausaf Ahmad, Developments and Problems of Islamic 
Banks^ (Jeddah i Islamic Research and Training Institute, 1987), 
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the conditions then were not ripe for actual establishment 
of an Islamic banks as not much thought had been given to 
technical details and actual operation of an Islamic Bank, 
In fact, the idea of an interest-free-bank remained a blue 
print for a long time, 
A pioneering experiment of putting the principles of 
Islamic Banking into practice was conducted in Mit-Ghamr in 
Egypt from 1963 to 1967, The experiment combined the idea oi. 
German saving banks with the principle of rural banking. The 
bank had started in modest way with one room and a staff of 
twenty five persons. The rural people in that region were 
religious and would not put their savings into any banks 
because interest is forbidden in Islam, Moreover, there was 
hardly any financial institution available to them. Under 
these cixx:umatances, the emphasis was given to educate the 
10 people about the use of banking,* T,W, Scharf describes the 
significance of Mit Ghamr experiment in the following words: 
"The majority of the population had 
never been dealing with the financial 
institutions. Because of this, capital 
10 R.K. Ready, "The Egyptian Municipal Saving Bank Project", 
International Development Review, Vol,9, No,2 (l967), pp. 2-5; 
in Development and Problems ojT^slamic Banks by Ausaf Ahmad, 
(Jeddah : Islamic Research and Training Institute, 1987), p,3 
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formation had been impairecl. Basically, 
rural and religious, they tended- to 
distrust bankers operating in western 
style and* what is more, there were few 
local branches they could patronize, 
since a substantial part of their income 
was not spent immediately, but put aside 
for social events, emergency and the 
like, this idle capital could not be 
used for productive investment, A pre-
condition, however, for any change of 
behaviour from hoarding and "real 
asset saving" to "financial saving" was 
the creation of financial institutions 
which would not violate the religious 
principle of large segeroents of popula-
tion. Only then could the rest majority 
of the population be integrated into the 
process of capital formation".^^ 
Thus, an attempt was made to integrate the rural population 
into financial system and the development nature of this 
12 
ejqjeriment made it very prominent. 
In the Mit Gharar project, the experiment met unesqpected 
success as saving deposits increased from 25 thousand Egyptian 
pounds to 125 thousand Egyptian pounds during 1963-1966. During 
11 T, Wholers Scharf, Arabs and Islamic Banks i New 
Business Partners for Developing Countries/ (Paris: OECD. 1983), 
pp. 79-80; quoted in Ibid., p.3. 
12 Volker Nienhaus, "A Western European looks at 
Islamic Banking", Middle East Business and Banking, Dec., l982, 
P.11. 
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the same period^ investment deposits, increased 35,000 Egyptian 
pounds to 75,000 Egyptian pounds. It also reported that 'the 
bank functioned on a cautious basis, rejecting, on the average 
6Cei of loan application in the first three years. The default 
13 
ratio was zero in economically good time. 
Although Mit Ghamr project made good start, it had to be 
abondoned due to certain political factors. Its importance is 
only historical novi. Nevertheless, it paved the way for other 
Islamic Banks. 
The first Islamic Bank in the urban setting was established 
in Caiio. Nasser social Bank, . was established in 1971 and 
started its operation in 1972. The Bank is a public authority 
with an autonomous status. Its purpose is mainly social such 
as granting of interest-free loans for small project on a 
profit-sharing basis, assistance to poor and needy and loans to 
needy students for University and higher education. Because 
of these social functions Nasser social Bank was granted 
exemption from the banking and credit law of 1957 in its 
13 Shahrukh R, Khan, Profit and Loss Sharingt An Economic 
Analysis of An Islamic Financial System, Ph.D Dissertation, 
University of Michigan, 1583, p.207; quoted in Ausaf Ahmad, 
« 
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initial stages. The bank vjas originally under the Ministry 
of Treasury but it is now functioning under the Ministry of 
social Affairs and Insurance, Its capital came from funds 
allocated by the President from extra budgetory resources, 
appropriation from the state budget and contribution of the 
Ministry of Awkaf etc, Uptill now, various reports on Islamic 
banking have come cut. The general conclusion dra\my regarding 
the experiments of these banks are rather optimistic. 
Currently some western agencies and scholars too, have 
conducted research in this area, and they have verified that 
Islamic banks are successful from the standpoint of both owners 
14 
and client. The records of Islamic banks show that these 
banks have proved profitable even though they have been offering 
depositors a higher yield than their interest paying rivals. 
However, this is not enough pfeint to prove the feasibility of 
these banks. As one author has pointed out "Before jumping to 
conclusions about the superiority of Islamic banking over 
traditional banking, one must consider that in the countries 
14 Ingo., Karsten, "Islam and Financial Intermediation", 
Staff papers. International Monetary Fund (Washington), vol,29, 
No,l QMarch 1982) and Cii) Wilson, R,, Islamic Businesst Theory 
and Practiqe. Economist Intelligence Unit, 2nd eds, 1985, andl 
Ciii) Iqbai, 2,, and A. Mirakhor, Islamic Banking (Washington; 
International Monetary Ftind, 1987), Occasional paper No, 49. 
(vi) Nienhaus Volker, "Banking on contact and co-operation", 
Arabia (London) July 1984, pp. 46-47, 
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involved both the dividens of Islamic banks and the interest 
rates offered by traditional banks are controlled by monetary 
authorities who may well be under special orders to enhance the 
15 
actractiveness of the Islamic banks, 
A related issue is whether the establishment of Islamic 
banks rnay^  as som^ Muslim economists claim, have provided a 
stimulus to aggregate savings. While there exists no reliable 
data on the matter, the claim is certainly plausible. This is 
so because in countries where Islamic oanks are in operation the 
stock market performs inadequately, and, because from the stand-
point of the individual saver investor, mudarbah account, serve 
the same function as stocks. The author thinks that the bulk of 
the individuals who have switched to Islamic banks are probably 
relatively less risk-averse savers who would, if the economy were 
more developed, be holding stocks. He thinks, "If this conjecture 
15 See for a critical analysis, Timur Kuran, 'The Economic 
System in Contemporary Islamic Thought s Interpretation and 
Assessment", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
Vol, 18, 1986, pp. 135-164, 'the author arrnjies that since 
Islamic banks run under the mudarbah^aid characterstically, 
mudarbah accounts yield greater returns th«^ interest-bearing 
accounts. Since iwudarbah accoxints are riskier, few people would 
attracted to them they provided higher yields. But it does not 
follow that every one would became better off all banks were 
force to offer any mudarbah accounts depositors with a strong 
preference for security, who currently choose to put their 
saving in regular accounts in spite of the higher expected 
earnings in mudarbah accounts, would became worse off it forced 
to hold a risky patiolio", p. 156, 
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is correct, one can infer that the establishment o£ Islamic 
bankes has stimulated savings by introducing a new financial 
service. This does not mean, however, that savings could be 
increased further by abolishing the traditional banking system, 
for, as noted earlier, the highly risk-averse customers of 
traditional banks may not feel comfortable with mudarabah" . 
For a successful Islamic banking, various suggestions, at 
various conferences, have come out till now. In November 1985 
London conference focussed on the different problems and pros-
pects at present fovmd in the Islamic banking institutions, A 
number of speakers referred to the existing murabaha types of 
purchase agreement in which the bank buys goods and sells them 
to the customer at a mark-up. One writer, for example, pointed 
out that murabalB accounts for around 80 per cent of Islamic banks 
assets. He said that 'this activity does not add much value 
to the existing trade financing by conventional banks. He argues 
16 There is a considerable disappointment at the way Islamic 
banks are operating. Professor Volker Vienihaus of Bochum 
University, West Germany, points out the disparity between the 
theory and practice of Islamic banking. He says that 'theory is 
centred on profit- and loss participations, while the practice 
shows a preference for transactions bringing set earning for the 
bank. He has highlighted some of the obstacles confronting 
Islamic banker, such as a shortage of instruments for the supply 
of working capital and for very short term placements of funds, 
and problems owes lender of last resort facilities. See The 
Middle East (London) November 1987, pp, 36-37. 
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that it adds to the pressure on the foreign exchange resources 
of Islamic countries, and accelerate consumption by importing 
goods which are most non-producing, Murabaha is still consi-
dered by many scholars to be the negative side of Islamic banking. 
Even during the second decade of its establishment. 
Islamic banking passed through severe criticism. Although it 
cannot be denied that the speed with which Islamic banking has 
spread in the past two decades has surprised many observers and 
confounded those who initially dismissed it as a passing 
phenomenon, 
The record of Islamic banking so far has proved that there 
is a great demand from Muslims for the institution where they 
can deposit their money and borrow in accordance with Shari'ah 
principles. But impressive though the growth of Islamic banking 
may be, in teirms of the number of institutions and the amount of 
capital at its disposal, serious doubts remain as whether it 
17 
will achieve all its aims. 
Islamic bankers face the challenge of finding ways in 
which their system can interact with the western system, dominated 
17 For a contiX)versial discussion of Islamic Bankers; 
see a report by Salim Hijazi and Susannah Tarbush, "Islamic 
Banking x A Crisis of Credibility", The Middle East (London) 
July 1984, pp. 10-14, 
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by interest (riba). Muslim writers believe that Islamic 
banking is still in its infancy. It needs to develop a more 
professional organizational network and a wider client base, 
especially amongst Muslim^. It needs to explain the Shari'ah 
principle of Islamic banking and finance more thoroughly and 
convincingly. However, inspite of its infancy. Islamic banking 
is not restricted to trade financing. Banks, in many of the 
Islamic countries offer most of the facilities including current 
account cheque books, and deposit account facilities, plus 
financial instruments ranging interest-free loan, venture 
capital, leasing and joint venture, partnership, all under 
Shari'aJi principle. Islamic banking, as some western press, 
sometimes cast doubts over its existence, is not the ' religious 
scruples of mullahs', but a genuine expression of muslim desire 
to invest their money according to their faith. However, the 
critics of Islamic banking point out that Islamic banking is 
being established to meet the religious scruples of Mullahs.They 
say that the Quranic divine threat has proved an adequate 
deterrent to interest-taking, as if muslim were perfect beings. 
They also point out that an authorative institution in Islamic 
banking is missing. In another article which appeared in the 
1984 Newsweek raference was made to Turkey's decisions to 
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allow Islamic banks to be set up in the country. The article 
implied the establishment of Islamic banks is an isolation of 
Turkey's secular constitution, and accused the Ozal government 
of forgoing an alliance with Islamic world "that is far too 
holy".^^ 
Types of Islamic Banks : 
The Islamic banks may be classified into different 
categories such as : 
(i) Development Bank 
(ii) Special purpose Islamic Banks 
(iii) Islamic Commercial Banks 
(iv) Ownership of the Islamic Banks 
It is argued that the main purpose of development bank is 
to foster the process of social and economic development amongst 
its members. Usually its clients include various governments. 
The example of such an Islamic bank is the Islamic Development 
Bank'. 
Some Islamic Banks have been created to fulfil some 
specific purpose as to serve some special classes of customers. 
Such banks may be termed special-purpose Islamic Banks and may 
further be classified as social banks, agricultural banks, 
industrial banks, etc. One example of such a specialized Bank 
amongst the existing Islamic Bank is the Nasser social Bank of 
Egypt which was established in 1971 and started its operation in 
1972, Nasser social Bank is a pviblic authority with an auto-
ncxnous status. The Bank performs certain traditional banking 
functions such as acceptance of deposits and promotion of saving 
habits but its main objectives are social, such as introduction 
of pension and insurance to certain class of people, the 
granting of financial assistance to persons facing hardship, the 
granting of interest-free loans to small industrial projects, 
leading to University and higher institute students etc. 
The special purpose Islamic Banks offer a wide scope of 
their application in the Islamic countries. They have the 
potential of transforming the social and economic life in muslim 
countries. For example there, could be a chain of small Islamic 
saving Banks whose primary function may be to promote small 
savings. Those Islamic Banks go a long way in mobilising 
resource for economic development. Similarly Islamic Banks with 
specific purposes could be established for different sectors and 
regions. The case of Islamic Bank of western sudan may be cited 
as an example. The full potential of this type of Islamic 
banking is yet to be realized. 
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Islamic Commercial Banks : 
The purpose of Islamic commercial Bank is to provide 
normal ccxnraercial banking services in accordance with the 
Shari* ah. The basic motive behind the operation of these insti-
tution conduct only those business activities which are permissi-
ble in Shari * ah. These banks offer alternative banking service 
to those who like to avoid Riba-based banking. Amongst the 
existing Islamic banks, most are of this type. 
Ownership of Islamic Banks : 
On the basis of ownership Islamic Banks may be classified 
into international Islamic BankS/ Government owned Islamic Banks, 
privately owned Islamic Banks, and co-operative Islamic Banks. 
Among the existing Islamic Banks, the Islamic Development Bank is 
an International Bank, The Nasser social Bank is a wholly 
government owned bank and most other banks are privately owned. 
Functions of Islamic Banks : 
The basic concept of modem Islamic banking is that since 
interest is forbidden in Islam but profit allowed, one should 
19 Ausaf Ahmad, Development and Problgns of Islamic Banks 
(Jeddah : Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic 
Development Bank,. 1987) . 
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develop investment in which one can be a full partner and 
therefore, obtain a share of the profit from the transaction. 
To make matters easy to handle, the partners pool their funds 
in a partnership which in turn invest the pool in various 
projects. The partners are also therefore, the depositors. In 
most Islamic institutions the depositors have the right to leave 
their funds in the pool far the length of time they desire 
(as in a traditional bank:-) but, naturally they can expect to 
receive a greater share of the profits the longer they leave 
their funds. The depositors in the normal course of business 
will come in or go out of the pool of funds. It is hoped that 
enough deposits will on the average remain sufficient to continue 
funding whatever project has been financed. The original capital 
of the funcing members can make up the shortfalls in deposits 
if any. Since the depositors are partners they can not have any 
assurance that their investment will be profitable as far that 
matter safe. Indeed, it could even be lost. 
The various Islamic financial institutions fionctioning 
today are carrying out a variety of banking, financing and invest-
ment operations on a competitive basis. Their banking systen 
handles current accounts, saving accoxints, fixed investments 
acoDxants and call investment accounts. Finance is being done in 
a variety of ways. On a short term basis it is being carried out 
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far trade acceptance and hire purchase. On medium term basi^ 
it covers loans, business development credits and lease 
financing, on the long term basis it is extended to mortgage, 
e<3uity financing. International banking services are also 
available with these institutions for foreign exchange transac-
tions, purchase and sale of currencies, purchase and sale of 
commodities, transfer of funds, export financing, letter of 
credits and letter of quamtees. There are sane other services 
also which include safe deposit boxes, security safe keeping 
services, management of private investment portfolios and trustee 
functions. 
The existing Islamic banks perform a number of functions. 
Seme of these fxinctions are normally performed by the commercial 
banks and some functions have been modified by Islamic banks 
because of the constraint that they have to operate in accordance 
with the Shari' ah. "Although there might be some difference in 
the performed functions amongs the Islamic bank, it would be 
difficult to provide a list of functions performed by each bank. 
The Muslim scholars have created out following important functions 
of Islamic bank's, 
i. Opening of accounts for individuals and companies 
and accepting cash deposits for safe custody and 
investment both in local and foreign currency. 
ii. Giving credit and loans in conformity with Sharl'ah. 
78 
iii. Purchase and sale of gold bullion. 
iv. Purchase and sale of foreign exchange on the 
spot rate only. 
V. Issue of guarantee, 
vi. Providing short term financing against collateral 
in the for form of commercial papers at agreed commer-
cial yield without interest. 
vii. Collecting and processing drafts, cheque, promisar^' 
notes, bills of lending etc. on ccxnmission. 
viii. Purchase and sale of shares, certificate of investment 
financial papers and bonds without interest. 
xi. Establishment and management of special funds for 
socially desirable purpose e.g. investment in trade, 
agriculture, industry or real estate. 
X. Providing finance on the basis of mudarabah. 
xi. Providing finance on the basis of Musharikah. 
xii. Providing finance on the basis of decreasing 
participation. 
xiii. Operating specified investment account. 
xiv. Direct investment by the bank. 
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XV. Leasing of machines , equipments , appara tus and t o o l s . 
x v i . s a l e and pu rchase of r e a l e s t a t e , 
xvi i . . Carrying out agency f u n c t i o n s by appoin t ing agents 
and vjorking a s a g e n t s , 
x v i i i , s a l e and purchase f o r o t h e r s on a p re -ag reed p r o f i t 
b a s i s (Murabahah), 
XX, To e s t a b l i s h s o l i d a r i t y and s e c u r i t y funds in o rde r 
t o cover d e f i c i t , i n conformity with I s l amic law of 
c o - o p e r a t i o n , 
x x i . To p rov ide t e c h n i c a l , economic, f i n a n c i a l , management 
and market ing consu l t ancy s e r v i c e s f o r t h e p r e p a r a t i o n 
20 
of f e a s i b i l i t i e s s t u d i e s of p r o j e c t , 
Scxne o t h e r f u n c t i o n s of I s l a m i c banks might i n c l u d e : 
f i nanc ing and e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d i f f e r e n t k inds of p r o j e c t s on 
behalf of o t h e r companies, and on t h e b a s i s of j o i n t v e n t u r e s t o 
under take t h e development, and promotion of investment in v a r i o u s 
s e c t o r s through t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of new p r o j e c t s o r development 
20 These f u n c t i o n s of I s l a m i c banks have been p repa red by 
conparing t h e s t a t u s of a number of banks . Since i t i s no t based 
e n t i r e l y on a c t i v i t i e s of any one bank, t h e name of banks a r e not 
c i t e d ; see , Ausaf Ahmad, Development and Problems of I s l a m i c 
Banks, op , c i t . 
so 
of existing projects, to mobilize financial resources from local 
and international money markets in accordance with Shari'cj-i. 
However, it is not necessary that each Islamic bank undertake 
all of the above functions. Working in divergent atmosphere, 
they may confine themselves to the function most appropriate to 
them. It must suffice to say, that in general Islamic banks 
undertake all banking services and all commercial and financial 
investment on the basis of techniques permissible by Islamic 
2i 
shari * ah. 
The survey on I s l a m i c banking by s e v e r a l s c h o l a r s has 
brought out v a r i o u s d imens ions , the problems and p r o s p e c t s . The 
exper iments a t such a p r i m a r i l y s t age , however, can convince a 
modem economist t o b e l i e v e i n t h e soundness of I s l a m i c banking . 
One f i n d i n g by Fahim Khan i n d i c a t e s t h a t none of t h e I s l a m i c 
banks h a s e v e r p rov ided on i n t e r e s t - f r e e constimption loan, and 
t h a t t h e banks a r e e x h i b i t i n g a marked p r e f e r e n c e f o r i n v e s t i n g in 
" p r o j e c t s which g i v e quick r e tu rns ' , 
21 I b i d . , p . 16. 
22 M, Fahim Khan, " I s l a m i c Banking as P r a c t i s e d Now in the 
World" i n Z, Ahmad Money and Banking i n I s lam, (Is lamabad : 
I n s t i t u t e of P o l i c y S t u d i e s , 1983TT 
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In their report prepared in 1981 under the chairmanship 
of the governor of the Saudi l-bnetary Agency, the Islamic Central 
Bank governors highlighted the following points: 
1, The establishment of Islamic banks WDUld reflect the 
sincere desire of the people of Islamic world to apply 
the Islamic Shari' ah in different walks of life, 
2, The Islamic banks would help attract deposits and savings 
for directing them towards productive investments, bene-
ficial to the people and economies of the Islamic countries. 
3, Simultaneously, with control and regulation the central 
banks are required to provide support and assistance to 
the Islamic banks, so as to nurture their growth and devel-
opment. It must be appreciated that Islamic banks will be 
at a considerable disadvantage in facing the competition 
with riba banks. It will be necessary to ensure that 
Islamic banks get the necessary financial assistance from 
the central banks. 
4, The central banks of Islamic cotintries should also foster 
the development of financial instruments which are interest 
free, so as to enable the Islamic banks to meet statutory 
liquidity requirements as also to place excess liquidity 
23 to profitable use, 
23 Arabia, (London) May 1984, p.48. 
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There i s general concensus t ha t banking i s the most 
iniportant sector of any f inanc ia l system. In t h i s regard, put t ing 
the enphasis on Islamic banking Mr, Muazzam Ali , who i s adviser 
to the pres ident of Pakistan on Islamic a f f a i r s and Vice-Chairman 
of the Dar al-Maal-al Is lami (DMI) and of the In te rna t iona l 
Association of Islamic Bank, says : 
"Unti l the ea r ly p a r t of the 20th century 
Islamic banking was more or l e s s an abst ract 
concept. Much of what was said and done in 
t h i s f i e l d remained hypo the t i ca l . I t was 
not poss ib le fo r a very long time to i n i t a t e 
a programme of p r a c t i c a l implanentation of 
Islamic banking on a sca le which could produce 
solution to economic problems confronting the 
contemporary world.24 
In December, 1970, when the second Is lamic conference of Foreign 
Ministers was held in Karachi, Pakistan and Egypt j o i n t l y 
sponsored a proposal which ca l l ed fo r a study fo r the es t ab l i sh -
ment of an In te rna t iona l Is lamic bank of Trade and Development 
together with a Federation of Is lamic Banks, Expert from 18 
Islamic countr ies examined the proposal and prepared t h e i r report . 
I t was reccMtmiended tha t the in t e res t -based f inanc ia l system should 
be replaced by a system of p a r t i c i p a t i o n scheme linked with p ro f i t 
and loss shar ing. I t was decided tha t a Federation of Islamic 
24 Muazzam Ali , ' I s lamic Banking Comes of Age', 
AraJpia (London) August 1985, p . 60 , 
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Banks and an I n t e r n a t i o n a l Islar; i ic 3anK should be e s t a b l i s h e d . 
The p r i n c i p l e on -which the proposed bank -was to be e s t a b l i s h e d 
vjere : 
1, to f inance commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s among I s l amic 
c o u n t r i e s , 
2 , t o f i nance the development and inves tment i n s t i t u t i o n as 
a p p r o p r i a t e a f f i l i a t e s , 
3 , t o under take the n e c e s s a r y t r a n s f e r , c l e a r i n g , and 
s e t t l e m e n t among t h e c e n t r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e I s l amic 
banks in Musliin c o u n t r i e s a s a beg inning towards b u i l d i n g up 
u n - i n t e g r a t e d I s l a m i c economy, 
4 , t o p r o v i d e c e n t r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s of Muslim c o u n t r i e s in 
pu r su ing t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s wi th in t h e framework of I s l amic 
d i r e c t i v e s , 
5 . t o a d m i n i s t e r and u t i l i z e zakat funds, 
6 , t o a d m i n i s t e r t h e s u r p l u s l i q u i d money of t h e s e c e n t r a l 
25 i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Muslim c o u n t r i e s . 
As a g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e I s l a m i c banks no longe r d e a l with 
money o r c a p i t a l on ly bu t a l s o with commodities, p r o d u c t s and 
s e r v i c e s ; they a r e no t on ly banks b u t t r a d e r s t o o . I t i s a l s o 
25 Arabia (London) August 1985, p„Gl , 
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imaginable tha t a number of spec ia l ized investment companies wi l l 
coroe in to being offering t h e i r se rv ices to Is lamic banks who could 
then dispense with t h e i r own spec ia l ized investment management. In 
o ther way, as Nienhaus th inks , these Is lamic banks by and large, 
w i l l become a kind of merchant banks ins tead of xiniversal commer-
c i a l banks. Therewith they would resume and continue as old 
banking t r ad i t i on of medieval Is lamic Near East tha t was broken 
not before the middle of the 19th century under the increasing 
influence of European ideas and power. The evolution of modem 
Islamic bank might r e su l t in f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s of a very 
s imi la r character to those old "roerchant-cum-banking en te rpr i se , " 
Islamic f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s have r e l i g ious advicers o r 
committees who give an opinion on the conformity of procedures 
with the Shar i ' ah , In p rac t i ce there are constant airguments 
over the very t ene t s of Islamic banking and the t r an s l a t i on of 
Shar i ' ah in to modem f inanc ia l p r a c t i c e s . Finding acceptable 
ou t l e t i s a major challenge for Is lamic i n s t i t u t i o n , blot sur-
pr i s ing ly , i t i s in the f i e l d of t rade tha t Islamic banking has 
made most headway - the Arabian peninsula i s h i s t o r i c a l l y a 
trading area and the Prophet was himself a t r a d e r . 
26 Nienhaus " P r o f i t i b i l i t y of Is lamic Bank", 
Journal of Research in Islamic Economics (Jeddah), vol I , wo 2, 
Writer 1984, p740. 
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I s l a m i c banks a r e c o n s t a n t l y t r y i n g to f i n d way to d i v e r s i f y 
t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s wi thout cont ravening the s h a r i ' a h . Dr , Ahmad 
a l -Naggar , S e c r e t a r y General of t he I n t e r n a t i o n a l Assoc ia t ion 
of I s l a m i c Banks. He summarises the main phi losophy behind the 
I s l a m i c banking system and t r i e s t o show how i t d i f f e r s from 
commercial banks which may perhaps n o t be occupied by many 
e c o n o m i s t s . "On t h e e t h i c a l b a s i s , he w r i t e s the I s l a m i c banks 
a r e governed by t h e r e s t r a i n t s of t he d i v i n e systQ:n whi le the 
t r a d i t i o n a l banks a r e governed by none o t h e r than t h e l o g i c of 
c o m p e t i t i v e market sys tem. On the b a s i s of aims and o b j e c t i v e , 
t h e I s l a m i c banks, wi th t h e i r dogmatic framework, a r e a p a r t of 
a community working i n harmony wi th t h e o t h e r p a r t of t h e r e a -
l i z a t i o n of t h e d i v i n e sys tems . Commercial banks, on t h e o t h e r 
hand, a r e an e n t i r e l y l i nked t o t h e i r community on ly f o r t h e 
r e a l i z a t i o n of p r o f i t . In p r a c t i c e , t h e I s l a m i c banks work in 
t h e employment of f i n a n c e s . Money t o thera i s a means f o r the 
f u l f i l m e n t of a fvinct ion. Hence they u s e i t i n t r a d i n g while 
the t r a d i t i o n a l banks work in buying and s e l l i n g i t . To then, 
money i s a commodity in i t s e l f and no t an i n t e r m e d i a t e means 
to p r o c u r e a commodity. These d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e I s l amic 
banks and n o n - I s l a m i c banks a r e bound to l e a d to d i f f e r e n c e s in 
the mechanism of work, work p rocedures , means and methods even 
i n t h e q u a l i t y , s p e c i f i c a t i o n , t r a i t s and ways of t h i n k i n g of 
27 
employees . 
27 Ahmad al-Naggar , 'Problems, Successes of I s l a m i c b a n k s ' , 
Arabia (London) June 1984, p . 4 6 - 4 8 , 
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Conventional banks are becoming increas ingly in t e res t ed 
in re la t ionsh ip with Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n , and a n\amber have set up 
\anits which spec ia l i se in providing investment and correspondent 
banking se rv ices . Islamic bankers have yet to show tha t they can 
develop frcxn t h i s success a t the g ross - roo t s level into breaking 
the mould of t r a d i t i o n a l banking on an in t e rna t iona l sca le , A 
pos i t ive step might be the crea t ion of an in t e rna t iona l Islamic 
banking society to enable Islamic f i nanc i a l i n s t i t u t i o n to 
exchange information and get over t h e i r suspicions of one another 
" I t would be a p i t y i f feuds are allowed to weaken the Islamic 
banking movement, for the world debt c r i s i s i s forcing a reeva-
luat ion of the western f inanc ia l system and Islamic banking might 
28 be able to offer a t l e a s t a p a r t i a l a l t e r n a t i v e . In west. 
Islamic banking has been looked upon r a t h e r with appreciat ion, 
some recent seminars have also been held, fo r example, in London 
and P ^ r i s , 
Professor Erik Trol le Schultz, who i s the general manager 
of the Islamic Bank In te rna t iona l of Denmark, says tha t t r ad i t i ona l 
banking system i s more than 100 years old and i s well-documented. 
Islamic banking i s only a decade o ld . Although there i s a 
consensus as to what are correct procedure, these are in 
continuous flux of change. Risk sharing and PLS system form 
the bas i s of Islamic banking - in e f fec t i t rodes the rock of 
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r i b a banking t h a t i s t h e dominant r o l e of t he bank and i t s 
29 i n t e r m e d i a t i o n . This i s what banking in t h e west f e a r mos t . 
Another wes te rn , Wnolers-Scharf says : 
" I s l a m i c banking i s one of t h e most 
o r i g i n a l and dynamic concep t s to emerge 
from t h e s o u t h . I s l a m i c bank cou ld p l a y 
a r a d i c a l new r o l e in t h e development 
of n o n - o i l deve loping c o u n t r i e s through 
p r o v i d i n g r i s k c a p i t a l , j o i n t v e n t u r e 
c a p i t a l and t r a d e f inanc ing on s h a r i ' a h 
p r i n c i p l e .30 
The c u r r e n t , major o b s t a c l e s in the growth of I s l a m i c 
banking as i t i s g e n e r a l l y f e l t are,, t h e s h o r t term l i q u i d i t y 
management and t h e i n a b i l i t y of I s l a m i c banks t o conve r t t h i s 
to medium and long- term inves tmen t . And t h a t . I s l a m i c banks 
and i n s t i t u t i o n s have h a r d l y developed any new i n s t r u m e n t s of 
investment and f i n a n c i n g . F u r t h e r , t he coopera t ion wi th t h e 
c e n t r a l banks in I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s i s s t i l l 
n o n - e x i s t e n t , a lmost a l l t h e I s l amic banks a r e working under 
30 A c t u a l l y t h e s e views were e:qpressed in t h e above 
mentioned seminars where Muslim and western bankers , i n t e l l e c t u a l s 
and academics exchanged views on t h e f u t u r e coope ra t i on of I s l a m i c 
banks; The seminar, under the a e g i s of t he I s l amic Development 
Bank and Franco-Arab Chamber of Commerce, a t t r a c t e d top French 
bankers and b u s i n e s s m«n, see t h e d e t a i l in Arab ia (London) 
June 1984, p . 46 . 
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special decrees and are thus obliged to operate under these ru les 
and regu la t ions . The dialogue between Islamic banks and cen t r a l 
banks has not developed. Dr. Yones a l Tamimi, who i s a group 
oo-ordinator of Al-Baraka Group, says in t h i s regard : 
"Our surviva l depends on co-operation 
, , . . I s lamic banks have qui te a few advantages 
over the t r a d i t i o n a l banks — for example. 
Is lamic banks by definat ion are a combination 
of commercial, merchant and development banks. 
This i s hardly to be seen in t r a d i t i o n a l 
banking. Is lamic banks also haye s t ruc tu r a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s and differences" .-^  ^ 
The main t h rus t of Is lamic Banks are the specif ic aim of combining 
high investment re tu rns with soc ia l r e spons ib i l i t y . But how to 
achieve t h i s objec t ive ? Is lamic banking i s also seen as an i n t e r -
nat ional banks, which means - i t w i l l cooperate with the local 
Islamic banks by offering in t e rna t iona l banking services - which 
of course includes i n t e r e s t - f r e e loans, i n t e rna t iona l investment, 
technology t ransfer , t rade , commodity and currency t rade, besides 
th i s — development funding — a l l based on Shar i ' ah p r i n c i p l e . 
But how to u t i l i z e i t s c o l l e c t i v e investment t a l e n t s and 
professional exper t i se to s t r i v e for goa l s . Upt i l now. Islamic 
banks have been viewed scep t i ca l l y in western banking c i r c l e s . 
3 1 "An expanding ^.l-Baraka mer i t s f a i t h of the Bank of 
England", Arabia (London) November, 1984, pp, 44-45. 
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But as the movement ga ins momentum and re spec tab i l i ty , many top 
western bankersand f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s are reappraising t h e i r 
a t t i t u d e and are no-w looking to work with Is lamic banks. There 
i s advantage of t h i s con t r ac t in the Middle East, growing confidence 
and expertise* and the resources of i t s parent ccxnpany. About the 
Euiropean banking, i t i s said, i s s t i l l very conservative and 
perhaps i t w i l l a l so be watching the new banks performance c lose ly . 
Although the main proble^ns are those of i n t e r e s t and deposi ts , 
European banking a l so concern i t s e l f perhaps too r^qorously with 
s ty le and p r e s e n t a t i o n . However, i t w i l l be in t e res t ing to see 
how long major banking cen t res — such as London, Zurich and 
Par is , which are extremely populus with Middle Eastern bankers, 
whether Islamic or not — r e s i s t the over- tures of Islamic banks. 
Now, most of the Is lamic bankers have found in t h e i r 
e:q)eriences tha t competition with conventional bank wi l l be healthy 
a t t i t u d e , but cooperation between Islamic banks should be 
strengthened. One of the coordinator of Al-Barakah group in Jeddah 
32 For example Denmark has become the f i r s t European 
country to grant a f u l l banking l icence to an Islamic bank. 
The Islamic Bank In t e rna t i ona l of Denmark (IBID), a subsidiary 
of the luxemburg based Is lamic banking systan In te rna t iona l Holding, 
was i t s o f f i c i a l s t a t u s from the Danish Central Bank in 1982; 
see a f u l l report in Arabia March 1983, p ,60 . 
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Mr, Younes a l Tamimi says t h a t coopera t ion i s a n e c e s s a r y 
c o n d i t i o n . This might help banks dea l wi th the problems of 
l i q u i d i t y s h o r t a g e s and su rp lus , f o r vjhich adequate i n s t r u m e n t s 
have n o t y e t been developed . 
I s l a m i c bank i s s t i l l weak, Tamimi views ' s p e c i a l l y when 
d i r e c t t r a d e r e l a t i o n s between I s l amic c o u n t r i e s a r e l i m i t e d , and 
a r e d i r e c t e d t o and conducted by i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l c e n t r e s " , 
33 Tamimi a l s o c r i t i c i s e s t h e lack of a t t e n t i o n t o t r a i n i n g . 
Inves tment and merchant banks could a c t as f i n a n c i a l 
a d v i s e r s , de f in ing p r o j e c t s , ana lys ing c o s t s and b e n e f i t s and 
a d v i s i n g on economic l i f e of p r o j e c t s . In r e t u r n they would 
r e c e i v e f i n d i n g s and management f e e s . I t i s sugges ted t h a t 
western banking systoti could coopera te wi th I s l a m i c b a n k s . 
"One of t h e most impor tan t ways i n which vjes tem and I s l a m i c 
i n s t i t u t i o n s could work t o g e t h e r i s in dev i s ing new banking 
i n s t r u m e n t s t h a t conform with I s l amic p r i n c i p l e s . Trading i n 
33 Some I s l a m i c bankers have c a l l e d f o r t h e c r e a t i o n of a 
U n i v e r s a l I s l a m i c Bank, which would seek c o l l e c t i v e s o l u t i o n t o 
some of t h e problems they f a c e . For example, i n a confe rence 
h e l d in London i n November 1985, some bankers had argued t h a t 
t h e r e should be an I s l a m i c f i n a n c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n r a t h e r than a 
bank, p e r h a p s under t h e a u s p i c e s of I s l a m i c Development Banks 
See Development And Problems of I s l amic Banks, op , c i t . 
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foreign exchange is at present restricted to spot transaction, 
with a prohibition or forward deals and swaps. Western banks 
could eventually reap the benefits of the expected huge foreign 
34 
exchange activity. The careful analysis of the literature on 
Islamic banking reveals that strong opinion exists over the 
invention of new instixunents and methods to incorporate the 
spirit of Mudarabah and Shirakah transaction. However, it is 
accepted that "Muslim Economists have been trying to present the 
interest-free economy in theoretical models but unless scwne 
successful working example is presented to both the businessmen 
and economists their logic, no matter how convincing, will remain 
,35 doubtful. 
3 4 This problem was discussed a t a conference on Islamic 
Banking and Finance held in London (3l October - 1 November) 1985, 
organised by the Business Research In te rna t iona l , 57/61, liartinier 
S t ree t , London, WIN TTD). Among the speakers were some top 
Islamic bankers who talked of need for dressing r iba banking xn 
Islamic banking terminology so tha t the ex i s t ing leve l of coope-
rat ion with western banks can be continued without m.uch p o l i t i c a l 
f a l l ou t . There were also some dedicated and seasoned Islamic 
bankers who outl ined the problems they were facing and the adopta-
t ions they were proposing to enhance the operat ional range of 
Islamic banking environment; see a f u l l report by M, Iqbal 'Banking 
on Islam' Afkar Inquiry (London) vo l ,2 , No. 12, December 1985; 
pp . 32-37. 
35 M. Fahim Khan "Islamic Banking as Prac t i sed Now in the 
World", in Ziauddin Ahmad, (ed.) Money and Banking in Islam, 
Op. c i t . , p . 259. "" • 
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Fjaiancial S t ructure of Is lamic Banks : 
In the Islamic system, the banking finance has some of i t s 
ovjn methods. For a long term finance loan may be obtained from 
the bank to finance a p a r t i c u l a r investment pro jec t or for an 
ove r -a l l investment in the company. Since the bank i s not 
e n t i t l e d to a fixed re turn , i t s re turn from the loan wi l l be 
ca lcula ted as a share of the company' p r o f i t based on the re la t ion-
ship between the funds supplied, the loan, and o ther funds in the 
company. If the banks loan i s made t o finance a p a r t i c u l a r project 
in the company, the bank's p r o f i t share i s ca lcula ted on the 
bas i s of the p r o f i t s achieved from t h i s p r o j e c t . The bank's 
p r o f i t share in such a case i s not necessa r i ly t i e d up with 
p r o f i t s Cor losses) from types of investment p ro jec t s in the 
company. In the case of losses , the company's reserves are used 
to absorb than f i r s t , and fu r the r ex t ra losses are deducted from 
the amount of loan, the p r inc ipa l , and in proportion to other funds 
supplied. Bank loans have a f ixed period at the end of which the 
p r inc ipa l , or what remains a f t e r deducing losses , i s paid back to 
the bank. 
Islamic banks d i f f e r g r e a t l y with usual commercial banks in 
t h e i r use of funds. They provide finance on the bas i s of f inancia l 
t ransact ion permitted by the Sha r i ' ah . These f inanc ia l prac t ice 
include : <midarabah, rousharakah. Deferred sa le , ttiurabahah. 
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i j a rah , lease, purchasing financing and Qard Hasan. These 
f inanc ia l operations are explained belov, 
'<audarabah i s a business contrac t between two p a r t i e s 
which own d i s - s imi l a r resources . One par ty prxsvides the cap i ta l 
and the other s k i l l and d e x t e r i t y of t r a d e . 
The cap i t a l provider s h a l l not involvet in actual and day 
to day operation of business but sha l l be free to s t i pu la t e such 
conditions as to ensure the bes t use of t h i s funds. After the 
expiry of period, which may be in fac t the termination of the 
project or t i l l the re turn are obtained from the t rade, the 
c a p i t a l provides sha l l get back h i s p r inc ipa l amount along with 
a share of p r o f i t , the r a t i o of which being determined at the 
time of agreement, before the beginning of p r o j e c t . In the event 
of loans, which makes the c a p i t a l provider e l i g i b l e for a share 
in p r o f i t . The r a t i ona l i s t h a t c a p i t a l provider i s es^osing h i s 
c a p i t a l to business r i sk and tha t makes e n t i t l e d to a share in 
p r o f i t . This i s in essence the p r i n c i p l e of »audarabah. 
As i t i s said, the <»aiudarbah agreement i s based on j u s t i c e 
as i t grants an equal pos i t ion to both p a r t i e s of the agreement. 
This i s a t l e a s t on three counts: f i r s t l y , both p a r t i e s have an 
equal pos i t ion in the determination of r a t i o in which p ro f i t 
sha l l be shared between them, Seconde ly, in case of loss , if the 
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p r o v i d e r of c a p i t a l s u f f e r s r educ t ion of h i s p r i n c i p a l amount, 
t he p r o v i d e r of l a b o u r i s depr ived of any regard-of h i s labour, 
t ime and e f f o r t s . Th i rd ly , bo th the p a r t i e s a re t r e a t e d e c ^ a l l y 
i f t h e r e i s any v i o l a t i o n of agreement . If t h e p r o v i d e r of 
labours v i o l a t e s any of t h e s t i p u l a t e d cond i t i on , does no t work 
hard o r i s i n s t r u m e n t a l in caus ing l o s s i n bus ines s due t o 
neg l igence and t h e poor management e t c ; he v i i l l have t o bea r t h e 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e sa fe r e t u r n of whole aniount in q u e s t i o n . 
If , on t h e o t h e r hand, t h e p r o v i d e r of c a p i t a l v i o l a t e s any of 
the s t i p u l a t e d c o n d i t i o n s ( e . g . he withdraws h i s money c a p i t a l 
before t h e s t i p u l a t e d t ime as any o t h e r such th ing ) he w i l l 
have to pay t h e i n v e s t o r a reward e q u i v a l e n t t o what he would 
36 
have earned i n s i m i l a r work. In g e n e r a l , Kuslim t h i n k e r s ' view 
on mudarabah i s t h a t of a main ccxnponent of p r o f i t - s h a r i n g system. 
In a r e cen t confe rence , a c o - o r d i n a t o r of banking a f f a i r s of t h e 
Al-Baraka Group, Mr. Younes al-Tamimi said t h a t mudarabah 
accounts f o r around 80 p e r c e n t of I s l a m i c banks a s s e t s . According 
t o him: 
" t h e l e a d i n g in s t rumen t of I s l amic banking 
should be mudarabah, in which t h e banks provide 
c a p i t a l t o a p r o j e c t manager and sha r e s in 
p r o f i t s . In t h e ca se of l o s s , t he bank b e a r s 
t h e whole l o s s , whi le t h e manager l o s s e s only 
h i s e f f o r t s . - ^ ' 
36 Ausaf Ahmad, Development and Problems of I s l amic Banks, 
o p . c i t . , Ch. 1 1 , 
37 See a f u l l r e p o r t of h i s s t a t ement i n The Middle Eas t 
(London) December 1986, p p . 2 2 - 2 3 . 
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Tamimi also referred to a third instrument, cQusharikah which he 
divided into two types. The first, equity financing should, in 
his view, have become one of the principal modes of Islamic 
banking, yet it accounts for less than five per cent of assets. 
Second, the provision of working capital is gaining ground and 
now accounts for about 10 per cent of asset. The use of lease is 
3 8 
also increasing and absorb five per cent of assets. 
Musharakah : 
: Islamic banks also provide project finance on the basis 
of Musharakah. One or two or more entrepreneurs approach the 
bank for finance and the bank along with other partners provides 
complete finance. All the partners, including the bank, have the 
right to participate in the management of project. Any one or 
all of them also have the right to abandon this right. The profit 
shall be distributed according to agreed ratios which need not be 
the same as capital proposition but loss shall have to be shared 
exactly in the same proportion in which different partners have 
provided finance. Wurabaha or (Bai Muajjal). 
'This is a procedure where a partner approaches the banks 
that certain items (be it commodity or otherwise) be bought for 
38 Ibid,, p.23. 
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hiiri and he agrees to pay the bank. Later on, upon the fulfilment 
of the ac tual buying, an agreed percentage of p r o f i t . In order to 
avoid any r iba element one of the banks provides tha t the agree-
ment of the banks and the actual execution of buying do not 
cont r ibute any legal obl igat ion ( according to Shar i ' ah) on the 
pa r tne r to buy. Hence the r i sk i s s t i l l t ha t of banks. Unti l 
the pa r tne r f u l f i l s h i s o r ig ina l promise of 'rebuying* the 
commodity, the r i sk remains with the bank: , which j u s t i f i e s the 
p r o f i t . There i s , hov;ever, a l so the p r ac t i c e of financing a 
mark-up with the binding on buyer to buy the goods. This type 
of operat ion i s most commonly being used in foreign trade and 
short- term t ransac t ions for purchasing raw ma te r i a l s e tc for the 
39 i n d u s t r i a l es tabl ishments . This method has the advantage of 
s impl ic i ty ; the provider of finance, which can be the bank, 
purchases a s s e t s , adds a mark-up to the purchase p r i ce and s e l l s 
i t to the enterpreneur . Although the method i s in conformity 
with the Shar i ' ah , i t i s received with g rea t caution by Islamic 
bod ie s . I t i s feared tha t the method might open the backdoor 
fo r dealing on a fixed i n t e r e s t b a s i s ; the mark-up which i s deter -
mined by the bank might be a mere replacement fo r i n t e r e s t . 
39 Ziauddin Ahmad, ed. Money and Banking in I s i an, 
(Islamabad; I n s t i t u t e of f o l i cy Studies , 1983;, pp . 259-275. 
9? 
While banks are authorized to change a mark-up within the l imi ts , 
they cannot charge mark-up on mark-up in the events of delays in 
repayment; mark-up m view as i n t e r e s t . 
While l i a b i l i t i e s of an Islamic bank are composed of e i the r 
current account deposi ts , on which no p r o f i t i s d i s t r i bu t ed by the 
bank, three broad ca tegor ies of non- in te res t modes of financing 
have been allowed to guide bank 's a sse t opera t ion . F i r s t , there 
i s financing by lending, t ha t i s , loans, not carrying any i n t e r e s t , 
on which the banks may recover a service charge, and also QaixL 
Hasan ( i n t e r e s t - f r ee loans on compassionate grounds). Second, 
there i s t rade re la ted financing, including mark-up, purchase 
of t rade b i l l s , lending on a buy-back ba s i s , leas ing, h i re 
purchase, and financing for development of property on the bas is 
of a development charge.. Third, lending can take place under 
investment financing including *»3.sharkah (partnership) equity 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n and purchase of shares, p a r t i c i p a t i o n term c e r t i -
f i c a t e , tiiudharabah c e r t i f i c a t e s and ren t shar ing . 
40 For d e t a i l ana lys is see Report of the Council of Islamic 
Idealogy on the Elimination of I n t e r e s t From the Economy 
(Islamabad: Government of Pakis tan, Council of Islamic Idealogy, 
June,1980). 
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The following primary financing instruments are novJ in use. 
part icipation Term Certificate (PTCs) 
This instrument could be used to finance long term 
investment. These cer t i f ica tes are transferable corporate 
instruments with a maximiira maturity of ten years and allow for 
temporary partnership or Cftusharakah. In th i s way PTCs may be 
viewed as financial arrangement betvjeen a financial insti tution 
and the business enti ty on the basis of prof i t and loss sharing 
over the maturity period of the ce r t i f i c a t e . Funds under a 
typical PTC arrangement may be obtained ei ther from a single 
financial ins t i tu t ion , including the specialized credit i n s t i -
tu t ion. The business ent i ty i s e5q?ected to pay to the financial 
ins t i tu t ion or bank, provisionally on a semiannual basis, an 
agreed percentage of anticipated prof i t s with a provision for 
f inal adjustment at the end of the financial year. In the event 
of loss, the financial ins t i tu t ion shall refund the share of 
prof i t that i t had received on a provisional bas i s . However, 
the loss sustained by an ent i ty in any accounting year will 
f i r s t be adjusted against the reserves of the company, and 
remaining loss, if any, shall be covered in the subsequent year 
by the two par t ies in agreed proportions. The financial dLnsti-
tution i s also permitted to convert upto 20 per cent of the 
principal amount of the PTCs into ordinary shares at par value. 
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so long as funds against PTCs are out-standing landing is 
secured by a legal mortgage on the fixed assets of the company. 41 
Leasing : 
The bank, in this case, purchases a physical capital/ 
equipment and rents it to its client. This procedure can be 
converted into a reduced renting procedure whereby the customer, 
by paying every year an instalment of the value of equipment/ 
physical capital, reduces the rent, till the whole equipment is 
owned by him and the rent is eliminated. To the lessor, leasing 
has the advantage of being less risky than other types of 
finance in that it provides him with a reasonable profit margin 
without having to follow the financial records of the lessee 
enterprise. The cost of usurance of leased assets has to be 
borne by the lessor in order to make the method acceptable to 
42 
Islamic law. 
Another method of banking f inance i s ' Inves tment and 
a u c t i o n i n g ' . In t h i s method, banks and f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
41 I q b a l , z . , and A, Mirakhor, I s l a m i c Banking, 
(Washington: I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary Fund, 1987); Occas ional 
pape r No.49, 
42 Ahmad Abde l -Fa t t ah El-Ashker , The I s l a m i c Business 
E n t e r p r i s e (London s Croc«n Helm, 1987), c h , 6 . 
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from a consortium and formulate investment project which are 
auctioned and ' s o l d ' to i n t e r e s t e d companies at the highest 
bidding p r i c e . In t h i s p ro jec t , the banks undertake the process 
of finance by guaranteeing the provision of the required p lan ts 
and machinery a t agreed spec i f ica t ion and in accordance with a 
time schedule. The buyer,- the in t e res t ed investor who may be a 
company, may be required to finance the working c a p i t a l ; labour 
exper t ise and enterpreneurship are the i nves to r ' s r e spons ib i l i ty . 
This method i s under c r i t i c i s m on the ground of legitimacy, and 
that the f ixing of a minimum auction p r i ce by the bank's consor-
tium, which may include a p r o f i t margin, implies the existence of 
i n t e r e s t which v i o l a t e s the Islamic p r i n c i p l e s . 
Hire Puixhase : 
Under t h i s method, banks and o ther f inancia l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
can provide funding for the purchase of f ixed a s s e t . In addition 
to the repayment of the o r i g i n a l cost p r i c e , banks receive a share 
in the r en t a l value of equipment ca lcula ted in proportion to the 
a s s e t ' s outstanding share in the company's cap i t a l employed; 
43 See fo r d e t a i l , M.N. Siddiqi , The Economic Enterprise 
in Islam (Lahore : Is lamic Publ ica t ion 197^7. 
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payments to the banks are made in instalment for a period 
mutually agreed upon at the end of which the title to the 
equipment is fully transferred to the hiring company. 
Business Practices of Islamic Banks : 
Keeping in line vith the standard practice, business 
practice of Islamic banks may be classified into two main 
categories, 
(i) Sources of Funds of Islamic Banks 
(ii) Uses of Funds by Islamic Banks 
(i) Soarces of Funds of Islamic Banks*. 
Like commercial banks. Islamic banks also obtain funds by 
operating certain type of deposits accounts which are explained 
below ; 
(a) Current Account: 
The Islamic banks usually accept deposits from individuals 
and companies for safe custody and for the convenience of custo-
mers. The bank requests the permission of customers to use their 
money so long as it remains with the banks at the bank's own 
capital. If any profits are generated by the use of money in the 
current account, they belong completely to the bank. The customers 
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are given the r igh t of vjithdraval for the par t of or -whole of 
t h e i r amount a t any time without not ice and the bank guarantees 
to honour a l l such r eques t s . The banks provide cheque books and 
44 
services usua l ly connected v;ith the current account. Thus, 
current account may be offered in the conventional banking owners 
of funds to do so , 
(b) saving Accounts: 
Although all Islamic banks operate saving accounts, there 
are significant differences in their implementation and operation. 
In this respect, the theoretical fornulation, vhich defines the 
saving deposits in the following way. 
The bank accepts deposits from its customers 
looking for safe custody of their funds and a 
degree of convenience in their use together with 
the possibility of some profits in the form of 
saving accounts on the principle of Al«-Wadiah. 
The Bank requests permission to use these funds 
so long as these funds remain with the bank. 
They can withdraw the balance at any time they 
so desire, and the Bank guarantee the refund 
of such balances. All the profits generated 
by the bank-from the use of such funds belongr 
44 In technical language of Islamic Jurisprudence, these 
deposits are Aroanah and the banks do not have authority to use 
them unless they obtain the specific permission of the banking 
tradition* Customers are supposed to give their explicit 
approval to the bank to use their funds, without any return. 
The bank however, should guarantee payment of these funds on 
demand. 
l O d 
t o t h e p o r t i o n of t h e Bank, Hov^ever/ in 
c o n t r a s t wi th c u r r e n t accounts the bank 
may a t i t s ab so lu t e d i s c r e a t i o n reward 
t h e custcaners by r e t u r n i n g a p o r t i o n of 
t h e p r o f i t s gene ra t ed from the use of 
t h e i r funds from time t o t i rae,45 
I t may be p o i n t e d out he re t h a t any r e t u r n t o money 
c a p i t a l i s I s l a m i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d only if i t p a r t i c i p a t e s in 
t h e r i s k . I f t h e saving d e p o s i t o r s a r e guaran teed t h a t amounts 
w i l l be refunded in f u l l , i f and when they want thon, they a re 
no t p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the r i s k s . Then how can a reward t o saving 
d e p o s i t o r s a r e n o t I s l a m i c a l l y e n t i t l e d t o any r e t u r n . If t h e 
bank refunds some p o r t i o n of i t s p r o f i t s genera ted tram t h e use 
of saving depos i t s# i t i s a b s o l u t e l y a t t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e 
46 bank and i t must be t r e a t e d a s g i f t ' . 
Saving Accounts s 
No r e t u r n i s expec ted in t h e s e accounts and cus tomers may 
draw t h e i r funds any t ime wi thout n o t i c e . The bank g u a r a n t e e s 
45 I have quoted t h i s from Ausaf Alimad's summary of Bank 
Is lam Malaysia , Berhadt Organ iza t ion and Opera t ion , p p . 11-12. 
46 C o n t r a s t t o t h i s , t h e Bahrain I s l a m i c Bank c a l l s i t 
saving account w i th a u t h o r i z a t i o n to i n v e s t . The d e p o s i t o r s 
p u t t h e i r money and p r o v i d e t h e bank wi th an a u t h o r i z a t i o n t o 
i n v e s t i t . The d e p o s i t o r s a r e al lowed t h e r i g h t of withdrawal 
bu t p r o f i t s a r e c a l c u l a t e d on t h e minimum ba lance main ta ined f o r 
a month. See "Bahrain I s l a m i c Bank, Goals and Funct ion" (Arabia) 
The Jordan I s l a m i c Bank h a s taken y e t ano the r way, i t i n c l u d e s 
t h e saving accoun t s i n t o t h e j o i n t investment a ccoun t . See 
Jordan I s l a m i c Bank; Annual Report , 1981, p , 2 5 ; Quoted from 
Ausaf Ahmad, o p . c i t . 
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the return of fund from these accounts on demand. However, 
since the bank can only keep part of these funds in cash to meet 
demands and use the rest in other activities, it may also render 
this service -without charge. 
Investment Accounts : 
The investment account in the Islamic banks is the counter-
part of fixed deposits. These accounts are meant for those 
customers who are looking for investment opportunities. Usually, 
the period of account is specific by the banks. Most Islamic 
banks accept fiinds for a specific period ranging from one month 
to five years. Generally speaking, the depositors do not have 
right of withdrawl in this type of account. However, withdrawal 
may be allowed in exceptional circumstances in which case the 
depositors will have to forego their shares of profit for the 
withdrawan amo\int. 
In some cases, investment accounts are accepted for the 
specified period only, which is decided by the mutual consent of 
the bank and depositors. The investment accoxonts are operated 
on the basis of teudarabah. In this case, the bank acts as the 
'entfrepreneure' toudarabah and the customer as the 'provider of 
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capital* (Rabbu al-mal). Both parties agree, interalia, on the 
47 proportion, in which profits are to be shared. 
These accounts reflect a departure frcxn the conventional 
banking system .Customer will be encouraged to deposit their funds 
in investment accounts on the basis of a pre-determined profit-
sharing ratio for a specified minimum period. The profit-sharing 
ratio is usually pre-determined according to the nature of 
deposits accounts, whether the distribution of profit is considered 
on a short or long-terra basis. The long term deposit accounts 
usually have higher profit-sharing ratio because they are more 
stable and the banks may use the funds for long-term investment. 
Although depositors (of short and long term) can demand their 
funds whenever they like, to share in the profits (or losses), they 
47 The Bahrain Islamic Bank and Kuwait Finance House have 
worked out yet another system of investment accounts. The invest-
ments deposits are classified into two categories i (i) Limited 
period deposit (ii) Unlimited period deposit. The limited period 
investment deposits are accepted for a specified period which may 
be determined by the mutual consent of depositor and the bank. 
The contract terminates at the expiry of the period; but profits 
are distributed and accounted at the end of the financial year. 
In the case of unlimited period investment deposits, the 
period is not specified. These deposits are automatically renew-
able xonless 3 months notice is given. The profits are calculated 
and distributed at the end of the financial year. No withdrawal 
or increase are permitted in this kind of account but customers 
are allowed to open more than one account. See Development and 
Problems of Islamic Banks, op, cit, "" ' 
lOo 
must keep their money in the bank atleast for the contracted 
period. So for example, nc profit-share -would be given for a 
six months deposit accounts if the depositors withdraw the funds 
after only five months. This feature exposes the bank to even 
higher liquidity risk if losses are expected/ and to alleviate 
this risk the bank may require that notices be given before with-
drawls are allowed. 
Cd) Special Investment Accounts : 
Islamic banks also accept special deposits for investment 
either from individuals or from companies corporation, or even 
frcxn governments. The purpose, terms, condition and mode of 
investments of these deposits may be decided by mutual consents. 
Investment in Islam is conducted in such a way as if reflects 
courage, tolerance and mercy, if it had to represent sincerely 
the humanistic views of Islam, That, however, should not violate 
the strict and serious principles of economy, that money should 
be invested in productive sectors and that investment should not 
run contrary to the well-being of the community. Money in the 
interest system remains uneffected and indifferent as to how it 
is used as long as the investor is certain that his money and 
profit will be paid back. Islamic investment that is based on 
profit, sharing does infact, result in reducing the final cost 
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of p roduc t ion t h a t i s because the c o s t , he r e , i s f r e e of i n t e r e s t . 
Goods produced under t h e I s l a m i c system would be cheaper f o r the 
consvimer than t h e same goods be ing produced under t h e i n t e r e s t 
sys tem. The producer on t h e o t h e r hand, i s no t d isadvantaged 
because he, in case of e x p o r t i n g , w i l l f i n d b e t t e r chances f o r 
p r o f i t s i n c e h i s p r i c e s w i l l be lower than h i s compet i t o r s . Thus 
t h e money s u p p l i e r , t h e consumer, and t h e p roducers a r e p r o f i t i n g 
48 i n an I s l a m i c n o n - i n t e r e s t economic system. 
Expansion of I s l a m i c Banks : 
I s l a m i c banks a r e no t conf ined t o any s p e c i f i c geographica l 
r e g i o n . They a r e l o c a t e d in t h e Arab World as we l l as i n the non-
Arab World, These a re I s l a m i c banks In t h e c a p i t a l su rp lu s 
economies as wel l a s l a b o u r - s u r p l u s economies . They a r e spread 
i n poor a s wel l a s in r i c h c o u n t r i e s . Thus, I s l amic banks a re 
49 
w e l l - d i v e r s i f i e d d e s p i t e t h e i r small number. 
There a r e e i g h t I s l a m i c banking I n s t i t u t i o n s which a r e 
l o c a t e d in non-Hisl im c o u n t r i e s . These c o u n t r i e s a r e Swi tzer land, 
48 " P r o f i t i n g a l l by t h e u s e of Non-r iba" Arabia 
(London) January 1985, p . 6 2 , 
49 For a coun t ry -wise numbers of I s l a m i c banks 
see appendix - 5 , 
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Luxembourg, Denmark, Fh i l l ipp ines , England, South Africa and 
Bahamas, All these countr ies have one Islamic banking I n s t i -
tu t ion except England which has two. Arab world has 17 Islamic 
banks, e ther banks are located in the non-Arab Muslim countries.. 
With the Arab world Sudan has the maximum nxomber of Islamic 
banks; (4) while Bahrain and Egypt each have three Islamic 
I n s t i t u t i o n s o Thus, Islamic banks are spread over muslim and 
ncan-muslim coun t r i e s . Two countr ies , Pakistan and Iran have 
not been included in t h i s category ag they have Islamised t h e i r 
economies and t h e i r banking system i s operat ing fu l ly under the 
50 Is lamic p r i n c i p l e s , " On the other hand, ixi Saudi Arabia, 
though the banking s t ruc ture i s s t i l l based on i n t e r e s t , but 
Al-Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation i s now converting 
from a money changer in to a f u l l service Is lamic banks. I t has 
the l a r g e s t number of branches of any bank in the Kingdom, and 
50 For comprehensive report see Iqbal z and A. Miiiakhor, 
Islamic Banking (Washington* In t e rna t i ona l Monetary Fund,1987} 
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now considered as the b igges t challenge to be faced by the Saudia 
51 banking system. 
Thus, t h i s br ief account holds a l together that recent spread 
of Islamic banks i s not merely a passing-phenomenon. There i s 
constant emphasis tha t the theoiry of Islamic banking should be 
understood within the general frame-work of money, finance and 
development. 
51 See, MEES (London), 20 June 1988. The Islamic f inancia l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s which were f i r s t s t a r t e d in the Middle East, quickly 
t r i e d to develop a c t i v i t i e s outs ide the Muslim world. Dar Al Mai 
Islami t r i e d to obtain a l icence to open in London and thus gain 
a ce r ta in degree of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y among the western f inancia l 
markets. However, the appl ica t ion was turned down by the Central 
Bank of England, The governor of the Central Bank was quoted by 
Arab Banking and Finance in November 1984 as saying: Although 
Islamic banking t ene t s provided a pe r f ec t l y acceptable mode of 
investments, they did not f ind within long-establishment, well 
understood definat ion of what c o n s t i t u t e s banking in U.K. The 
a r t i c l e want on saying t h a t ' t h e point he made was tha t western 
banking regula t ions i n s i s t e d on c a p i t a l based secur i ty for 
depos i to r s . Moreover, d ^ o s i t s were not regarded as l i a b i l i t i e s 
on an Islamic bank 's ba lance-shee t . The deposi tors had to take 
pa r t in a l l the r i s k s and p r o f i t s and losses of i n s t i t u t i o n s . The 
governor of the Central Bank of England did not mention the 
question which had been ra i sed in the f inanc ia l community about 
the managonnent and goals of the Dar-Al-Mal-group. 
IIU 
On the theoretical level. Islamic banking is faced by many 
problems that work together to hinder its realisation. Crucial 
among these problems is the fact that the implementetion of 
Philosophy is fer beyond the capacity of any one bank alone. 
There is a need for a comprehensive interaction of many Islamic 
institutions in fully fledged Islamic environment. Even if the 
Islamic bank is functioning on the national level, in a completely 
Islamic environment, its transactions with non-Islamic banks 
abroad would cause many headaches — for of course the Islamic 
economy cannot be a simple close one. To achieve this idea the 
Islamisation of the Islamic banks should go hand in hand with an 
over all Islamisation process. This is the only guarantee for the 
efficiency and viability of Islamic banking models. 
I l l 
CHAPTER - IV 
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
Ihe purpose of t h i s chapter i s to d iscuss some of the 
complex p2X)blQans which the Islamic banking system i s facing. 
Some of these problems are bank speci f ic such as the t h e o r e t i -
ca l i s sues r e l a t i ng to Is lamic banking are s t i l l unresolved. 
There i s another se t of problems which a r i s e s out of the fac t 
t ha t these banks are •Islamic• with an speci f ic aim; to promote 
soc ia l and economic development in Muslim coxintries. What i s 
important i s tha t most of these banks are p r iva t e ly owned, 
working along with the in te res t -based banking system. In t h i s 
regard, c r i t i c s argue tha t introducing i n t e r e s t - f r e e i n s t i t u t i o n 
in to the current c a p i t a l i s t system of finance i s not l e s s than 
a novel innovation within the system, 
•Hie aims and objec t ives of Is lamic banking system and how 
much these are d i f f e ren t f.raa\ the p reva i l ing system have always 
been the c e n t r a l debate among Muslim scholars . Some of than 
propose tha t an Is lamic f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n should be t rue ly 
• r evo lu t iona ry ' . I t should not t r y to manoeuvre with the system 
for maximum advantage but should t r y to a l t e r the whole systan. 
1 Ahmad Al-Naggar, "Problans, Successes of Is lamic 
Banks", Arabia (London) June 1984, p , 4 6 . 
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l!he development o£ Islamic banking in some Muslim countr ies i s 
facing some o ther obs t ac l e s . In some countr ies . Islamic banks 
have to keep a ce r t a in por t ion of t h e i r deposi t , with the cen t ra l 
banks. If t h i s r a t i o i s very high, i t may have adversely affected 
the expansions and development of these banks. Such a high r a t io 
in the c e n t r a l bank put a drain on the resource of Islamic banks 
in the sense t ha t i t could be used prof i tab ly i f i t remained in 
2 
the Is lamic banks. U p t i l l now various repor ts and s tudies done 
on the performance of Is lamic banking ind ica te tha t some of the 
problems and d i f f i c u l t i e s in i t s progress a re : f i r s t l y , the 
Is lamic banks s t i l l perform t h e i r du t ies in economic, administra-
t i v e , l ega l , c u l t u r a l and soc ia l s i tua t ions Where non-Islamic 
fea tu res prevai l* Secondly, Islamic banks follow a system, a 
philosophy and p r a c t i c e s which do not meet with nor run p a r a l l e l 
to the p r a c t i c e s of hundred of western banks surrounding th«n and 
l iv ing with them in the same community. Thirdly, there are legal 
problems such as the laws of those countr ies where Is lamic banks 
operate requ i re t h a t banking should not be the subject of any 
r i s k s . Their loans s t i p u l a t e cer ta in r e s t r i c t i o n s in t h i s respect , 
2 See the cur ren t survey done by an Indian economist, 
Ausaf Ahmad, Development and Problens of Islamic Banks', (Jeddah: Is lamic Research and Training I n s t i t u t e , T^S?) . 
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Fourthly, there are some theologica l d i f f i c u l t i e s where opinions 
diverge and unanimity i s d i f f i c u l t to a t t a i n . Thus there i s 
l i t t l e co-ordination among Islamic banks in t h i s respect . 
Final ly , the one pe r t inen t i s sue i s tha t the nature of invest -
ment a t present found with Is lamic banks. Scholars have 
cautioned tha t short-term p o r t f o l i o s adopted by Islamic banks 
i s dangerous for the system as a whole. They a lso fee l tha t 
there i s a problem of obtaining f a s t investment of l iquid cash 
3 
when ava i lab le and the prompt arrangement when needed. 
The mechanism of Is lamic bank i s based on investment 
through par tnersh ip and requ i res a cer ta in period of time for 
the study of the pro jec t to f inance . In a survey i t has been 
found tha t Is lamic banks inves t general ly in the p ro jec t with 
quick r e t u r n s , "This i s because the banks have to pay a s i ze -
able p r o f i t every year on the deposi ts and they cannot afford to 
have no p r o f i t for some time i f they are con5>eting with the 
in te res t -based banks. This means t ha t long p ro jec t s are not 
l i ke ly to be picked!-up by these banks. If t h i s i s t r ue then 
t h i s i s not only reducing the long run eff iciency of Islamic 
3Abbas Mirakhor, "Analysis of Short-term Asset Concen-
t r a t ion in Is lamic Banking", IMF Working Paper (Washington) 
In t e rna t iona l Monetary Fund, October 1987. 
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banks but w i l l a l so effect the growth in developing countr ies 
4 
i f there are no banks to finance such depos i t s . Hardly anyone 
disagrees tha t to sh i f t t o an i n t e r e s t - f r e e system, one of the 
c ruc i a l requirements w i l l be to develop an i n s t i t u t i o n a l frame-
work t h a t can provide adequate financing for long terra. 
Some economists in t h e i r s tud ies have found tha t there are 
two main tasks for the Islamic banks management* The f i r s t i s the 
pro tec t ion agains t "too op t imis t i c" e:q)ectation and iresulting 
damage in the bank 's pjx)ceed from pro f i t - sha r ing f inancing. 
Secondly, the opening up of new innovative oppor tuni t ies for high 
p r o f i t a b l e engagonents. According to them, an i n t e r e s t bank can 
often standaxxiise i t s c r e d i t inves t iga t ion and confine i t s e l f 
to an examination of the s e c u r i t i e s fo r c r e d i t . But an Islamic 
bank can hardly ever resign on addi t iona l examination of the 
p r o f i t ca lcu la t ion , since i t s revenues are not f ixed and indepen-
dent of entrepreneural p r o f i t but depend on them d i r e c t l y . The 
problan with these examination i s not so much one of ca lcula t ion 
techniques but one of well founded knowledge in those markets 
wherein the en t repreneur ia l pa r tne r s intend an engagement with 
4 M, Fahira Khan, "Is lamic Banking as Pract iced Now in the 
World", in Ziauddin Ahmad,ed. Money and Banking in Islam, 
(Islaroabadt I n s t i t u t e of Pol icy Studies , 1983), pp . 259-276, 
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5 
t h e i r investment p r o j e c t s , 
Ahmad El-lNajjar, the Secretary General of the In t e rna t iona l 
Association of Islamic Banks, mentions several obs tac les in the 
progress of Is lamic banks. According to him the major obstacles 
which the Islamic banks are facing can be removed by g r ea t e r 
cooperation and pers i s t ence to encoiJnter such problems. These 
d i f f i c u l t i e s steax from, f i r s t l y , the circumstances created by 
t h e i r ex is tence in p laces and regions where they operate in an 
economic, l ega l adminis t ra t ive , c u l t u r a l and soc ia l atmosphere 
of a non-Islamic n a t u r e . Secondly, t h e i r exis tence as a minority 
i n s t i t u t i o n in the s t a t e s where they ope ra t e . In a country where 
hundreds of o t h e r conventional banks exis t r the re may be only 
j u s t one, two o r a t l e a s t three Islamic banks. Thirdly, from 
following a unique p rac t i ce tha t n e i t h e r be coverage nor can be 
ass imi la ted within the system, philosophy or p r a c t i c e of hundred 
of won-Islamic banks, 
Naggar r i g h t l y tiiinks tha t Islamic banks have t h e i r own 
conceptual mainspring - defining the objec t ives , procedures and 
5 Volker Nienhaus, " P r o f i t a b i l i t y of Is lamic Banks", 
Journal of Research in Is lamic Economics (Jeddah) Vol . l , 
No.2, Winter 1984, p.14? Also by the same wr i t e r "Is lamic 
Banks - A shor t History", Islam and the Modem Age, (New Delhi) , 
Vol. X-IV, No.l^ 1983. 
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p r a c t i c e s in which they are involved. But there i s hardly 
any collis<»i with hundreds of non-Islamic banks which co-ex is t 
with them. However, he makes a d i s t i nc t ion between two systems 
of banking. Unlike the Islamic banks, the ex i s t ing non-Islamic 
banks o r i g i n a l l y germinated in Europe, with the prime concern 
to gain cont ro l over resources and l ivel ihood of people, through 
the u t i l i s a t i o n of funds. Hence, the r ea l i s a t i on of these two 
fac tors j u s t i f i e d the adoption of any means or methods a v a i l -
able serving t h a t purpose. Is lamic wr i t e r s ]put much enphasis 
on the object ive s ide of the Islamic banks. That i s , unl ike the 
Western commercial banking systan. Is lamic banks are "governed 
by con t ro l s derived from Allahi course ' , while conventional 
bankers are con t ro l l ed only by hard competit ion. In t h i s regard 
Ahmad El-Naggar be l i eves t h a t Is lamic banks cons t i t u t e an i n t e g r a l 
p a r t of socie ty , in harmony with i t s o the r c o n s t i t u e n t s ' on the 
march towards achieving ' A l l a h ' s course ' while commercial banks 
6 Is lamic w r i t e r ' s ' m a j o r objection towards ex is t ing 
commercial banking i s t h a t i"t depends on the philosophy of 
t rading in money based on regarding money as a ccwamodity. The 
commercial banks demand a p r i c e before funds render t h e i r func-
t ion and here l i e s , as they argue, the essence of the r iba or 
usur ious system and source of much of the flaws and mal-functions 
of the money system. For a de t a i l ed treatment of Is lamic concept 
of money and Banking see, M, Umar Chsqpra, 'Money and Banking in 
an Islamic Economy', in Monetary and F i s c a l EconoBaics of Islam, 
e d „ by Mohammad Ariff (Jeddah i In t e rna t iona l Centre fo r 
Research in Is lamic Economics, King Abdul Aziz Univers i ty , 1982), 
p p . 145-76. 
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are not re la ted to t h e i r ovm socie ty except through p r o f i t 
making. In p r ac t i c e . Is lamic banks work in the f i e l d of inves t -
ment as they hold the bel ief t h a t money i s but a means to an end. 
Hence they do not t rade in i t . Conventional banks work in buying 
and se l l ing money which they t r e a t as a ccxranodity and not as a 
medium of exchange. This gap between the two broaden^' dramati-
c a l l y when i t comes to t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . Contrary to t h i s 
object ive i s the f i na l goal of the conventional banks c rys t a l l i s ed 
in r ea l i s i ng p r o f i t even when i t i s gained a t the expense of man. 
These d i f ferences between Islamic and non-Islamic banks wi l l 
necessa r i ly lead to o the r var iances in r e l a t ion to operat ional 
7 
mechanism, methods adopted, s t y l e and procedures . Another problem 
Islamic banks face in t h e i r l o c a l i t i e s i s t ha t of a lega l na ture . 
Due to the regional o r loca l laws in the count r ies where these 
Islamic banks opera te . They may e:q>ose. to r i s k s in the course 
of under-taking i t s a c t i v i t i e s . Some of the problems faced by 
Islamic banks stem from the lack of a well defined legal system 
specifying the domain and l im i t a t i ons proper ty r i g h t s and 
con t rac t s tha t fu l ly correspond to the es tab l i shed banking system 
and Islamic law. This strengthen the envirxmment of unceirtanity. 
7 Ahmad El Naggar, "Is lamic Bankst achievements, 
and obstruct ion in focus", Arabia (London) March 1986, 
pp . 68-69. 
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l imi t long term investment, end force the banking system to con-
cen t r a t e i t s asse t po r t fo l i o s in short term t r a n s a c t i o n s . 
Similar problems r e l a t i n g to legal framework i s the Is lamic 
jur isprudence which lacks consensus, A recent study by IMF says: 
• tha t these problens ' appear in d i f ferent form in two countr ies 
±^€i, Pakistan and I r an , In Pakistan as i s mentioned, i t has 
forced the government to e s tab l i sh specia l banking t r ibuna l s to 
deal -with cont rac t on Islamic modes, since the regular court 
system, as well as ex i s t ing cont rac ts and corporate laws cannot 
handle I s lamic based c o n t r a c t s . According to the study t h i s i s 
a short term renedy, and problem wi l l continue to p e r s i s t and 
become more complex u n t i l l the lega l system and the underlying 
corporate and con t rac t laws have become more attuned to -Oie legal 
requirement of the new banking system, I r -n in the Islamic 
Republic of I r an , where l e g a l system i s fundamentally based on 
Is lamic law, the d i f f i c u l t y l i e s in the absence of a l e g i s l a t i v e 
def inat ion of r i g h t s and l imi ta t ions of p r iva te proper ty which 
would e3q) l ic i t ly determine the extent and i n t e n s i t y of the 
8 p r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e a c t i v i t i e s an the econoiny. 
8 For a b r i l l i a n t repor t on Is lamic banking in I ran 
and PaldLstan? Zxabair I ^ a l and Abbas Mirakhor, I s lamic Banking, 
(Washington! I n t e r n a t i o n a l itonetary Fund 1987), Occasional 
paper No.49, 
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Liquidity problem is also a big hindrance to be over-
come by Islamic banks. Because the operation of Islamic banks 
is mainly based on financing through Musharikah (participation) 
an adequate span of time is required during which the study of 
the project is finalised, and funds are naturally highly 
illiquid. Now the challenge for the Muslim writers is to develop 
a programme for the study of Islamic finance >Aiich relies only 
on the Qur'an and the Sunn ah. So far Muslim writers have merely 
borrowed empty economic boxes from the West and filled them with 
ideas which are Islamic in appearance, 
Ghaisem Salehkhow, the executive director of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund finds sane pertinent obstacles that are 
on the way of Islamic banking. He says that most difficult 
obstacle for the Muslim writers is the diversity of political 
syst&n adopted by Muslim countries, Muslim regimes are so diverse 
that they cannot ev&a present a united front to their enemies. 
This, more than any other difficulty, binders the task of intro-
ducing an Islamic social system* Islamic measures are intro-
duced merely to serve political exigencies, and are not the 
result of a considered Islamic philosophy. 
An obstacle in the progress of Islamic banks is wholly 
psychological, Najjar says that usurious mentality is still 
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controlling the a t t i tude of roost people. The depositors esqject 
a yield/ at least equal to the usurious interest if not more. 
The financed c l ient i s also e3<pected to pay a yield equal to or 
more than usurious in teres t r a t e , Oily a minority will commit 
to the pr ior i ty of religious legal i ty and a l t e r obstinance from 
prohibitions fev only real ize the pioneering role rendered by the 
Islamic financial ins t i tu t ions of banks for the application of 
•Allah^^oourses' in an investment completely conflicting with the 
principles they are based on. According to Ahmad El-Najjar: 
•There are no barr iers or obstacles, 
no matter how complex and multifarious, 
that can obstruct noble fa i th and un-
fai l ing persistance in applying Allah's 
course. Secondly, that a l l banks aire 
called upon to exer-t more case, a t ten-
tion and moral responsibil i ty to the 
future development of Islamic banking. 
Ihirdly, both Islamic banks and the i r 
associations are responsible for pay-
ing more concern to the publication of 
Islamic banks and to the classif icat ion 
and esqplication of the i r objectives and 
a c t i v i t i e s . Fourthly, that public media, 
in Islamic countries should be urged to 
give more attention to right csnlight-
mait with regard to the goals of Islamic 
banks and the sole they under-take in 
real is ing the development of our Islamic 
communities and las t ly , that government 
of a l l Islamic countries should be 
requested to devote more attention to 
Islamic banks and in par t icular with 
regard to the organisation of the 
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connection of Is lamic banks with 
c e n t r a l banks and monetary autho-
r i t i e s . ^ 
Another common obs tac le i s the misunderstanding tha t the 
abol i t ion of r iba w i l l e s t a b l i s h an Is lamic banking system. 
Even then a successful Is lamic banking system would not i nev i t -
ably usher in a new Islamic soc ia l o rde r . The existence of any 
type of i n j u s t i c e in the name of economic or social progress 
i nva l ida t e s any claim to be t r u e l y I s l amic , Some even go so f a r 
as to deny tha t the d is rupt ion of ooromeix:ial banking has never 
been the aim of Is lamic banking and t h a t to l i b e r a t e the banks 
from i n t e r e s t r a t e s i s Is lamic ob jec t ive . They even claim tha t 
i t would be in the i n t e r e s t of commercial banks to allow Islamic 
10 banks to f l o u r i s h . 
I t i s a common complaint among some Islamic wr i t e r s t ha t 
Muslim count r ies have developed esqpensive l i f e - s t y l e which are not 
9 Ahmad £1-Naggar« "Is lamic Banks s achievements and 
obs t ruct ions in focus", Arabia (London), March 1985, p , 6 8 . 
The author h i n t s t h a t Is lamic banks have achieved a l o t of 
progress h i t h e r t o , having offered several p r a c t i c a l models to 
ensure and emphasise the v a l i d i t y of Is lamic ^ p l i c a t i o n in the 
f i e l d of f inanc ia l t r a n s a c t i o n . The establishment of the I n t e r -
na t iona l Association of Is lamic Banks, and the higher body of 
Fatwa and Shar i ' ah supervision can also ise counted among t h e i r 
achievem^ats. On the t c^ ot t h a t they have rea l i sed tha t the 
establishment of a niunber of spec ia l i zed i n s t i t u t e s and t ra in ing 
cen t res for the study and appl ica t ion of Is lamic p r i n c i p l e s in 
the economy, 
10 Is lamic Banking « the theory behind the p rac t i ce" , 
Arabia, (London), Sept«nber 1986, p . 4 3 , 
12^ 
keeping with t h e i r values as t h e i r resource endovsnents and 
cx)nspi.cuDus consuraption leads not only to corruption but also 
unhealthy monetary expansion, in f l a t ion , balance of payment 
d e f i c i t s and a heavy debt servicing burden. In t h i s regard 
M. Umer Chapra says : 
An important refoim in the ireduction 
of governments wasteful spending without 
t h i s reduction they cannot f ight corrup-
t ion o r minimise t h e i r in t e rna l o r ex te r -
na l borrowing and d e f i c i t f inancing. 
However, the problem i s tha t when govern-
ments a re able to r e sa r t to in te res t -based 
borrowing they are under no ccxnpulsion to 
reduce t h e i r spending. The abol i t ion of 
r iba should force them to explore a l l 
poss ib le ways of economising so tha t they 
r e a l i s e maximum benef i t s with minimum 
spending. 11 
An i n t e r e s t - f r e e economy i s prone to a n\amber of problems. 
The adverse piiblic react ion to losses suffered by f i nanc i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n ; the a v a i l a b i l i t y of very short-term loans not 
ameaable to p r o f i t and loss -shar ing; instalment c r e d i t ; and 
government borrowing needs . These problems are of domestic 
na ture but even a t i n t e rna t iona l level most countr ies are 
11" Banking Prac t i ce and l i f e - s t y l e " , Arabia (London) Novenbcr 1985, p . 6 5 . 
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burdened by a heavy foreign debt . They have to continue to 
service t h i s debt and to borrow in order to finance t h e i r 
d e f i c i t . 
Some ejqpooents of Islamic i>anking be l ieve tha t banking 
system cannot succeed unless a l l the p o l i t i c a l and socio-economic 
forces of an Is lamic country are made to converge in t h i s d i rec -
t i o n . Given t h i s convergaice, the banking system can be reformed 
to make a r ich con t r ibu t ion . The r a t iona le behind the idea i s 
tha t since the depos i t s held by the banks belong to the ptiblic, 
c r ed i t should be a l loca ted in such a way tha t i t he lps r e a l i s e 
general soc ia l welfare . This can be a t t a ined by ensuring tha t 
•Credit a l l oca t ion leads to an optimum production, import and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of goods and services needed by the majori ty of 
society, and t h a t benef i t of c r e d i t goes to an optimum number of 
b u s i n e s s e s ' . These wr i t e r s advocate socio-economic reform and 
give much eaiphasis to the moral u p l i f t of Muslim soc i e ty . They 
argue t h a t "To t a l k of Is lamisat ion without moral reform would be 
absurd. This does not mean t h a t we should not abolish r iba t m t i l l 
socie ty has been morally reformed; the two can be under-taken 
simultaneously. This w i l l , however, n e c e s s i t a t e a gradual move-
12 
m&at towards I s l amisa t ion . 
12 ' I s l amic Banking F i l e ' , interview to Arabia (London) 
November 1985, pp . 65-66, According to author, another impor-tant 
reform i s to incu lca te people with the hab i t s of simple l iv ing 
and the moreover, the reduction of government's wasteful spending, 
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They are in continuous search to find out vays and 
means to achieve an i n t e r e s t - f r e e economic system, A number 
of books have been wri t ten on i n t e r e s t - f r e e banking; but the 
economy as a whole, has been given l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n . There i s 
a view tha t operation of an i n t e r e s t - f r e e economy i s f a r more 
complex than the operation of individual i n t e r e s t - f r e e banks, 
Umar Chapra, a leading Pak i s t an i eaqjonent of Islamic banking 
says tha t imp lamentation of Is lamic economy i s ra ther a complex 
i s sue , because complexity a r i s e s from the necess i ty of r ea l i s ing 
the socio-economic goals of Islam, This cannot be rea l i sed 
unless there i s an equ i t ab le d i s t r i bu t i on of income and wealth, 
and in f u l f i l l i n g the needs of a l l individuals in soc ie ty . The 
conventional banking system has been a major cause of the 
concentrat ion of income and weal th. I t has also contr ibuted 
s ign i f i can t ly to an expansion of necessary wants and the diversion 
of scarce resources towards t h e i r sa t i s fac t ion , thus leaving 
i n s u f f i c i a i t resource fo r need fu l f i lment . The Islamic syston 
should, in sharp con t ra s t with t h i s , r e f l e c t the e th i c , values 
and goals of Is lam. 
13 His book Towards a Jus t Monetary Systao discusses the 
impact of prohib i t ion of i n t e r e s t on the economy, and a t t « a p t s to 
find answers to the problems possed by the creat ion of a fu l ly 
Islamised economy, Thsi book answers a number of questions about 
an i n t e r e s t - f r e e economy t h a t have not been adequately answered 
so f a r . Some of these questions, fo r example, are* what i s the 
r a t i ona l e behind the proh ib i t ion of riba? Can an economy run 
e f f i c i e n t l y without i n t e r e s t ? What w i l l be the impact of the 
abo l i t ion of r iba on resource a l loca t ion , savings and investment, 
economic s t a b i l i t y and economic growth? Vftiat are the changes tha t 
w i l l have to be introduced in the na ture and operation of cen t ra l 
and commercial banks? What are the aux i l i a ry i n s t i t u t i o n s which 
wi l l need to be e s t ab l i shed in an Islamic economy? How wi l l 
monetary pol icy be conducted? What are the new too l s of monetary 
pol icy t h a t w i l l have to be developed? What reforms would have to 
be intzx)duced in the soc ia l and economic l i v e s of Muslim cotintries 
to enable the Islamic system to function e f fec t ive ly and to help 
to a c t u a l i s e the socio-economic goals of Is lam. 
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When there i s a question of changing the whole system, these 
i s sues have to be s e t t l e d in advance. One burning i s sue i s tha t 
of service charge by Islamic banks. There i s s t i l l a debate 
whether a service charge be levied on pure loans . I f the answer 
i s in a f f i rmat ive ' how t h i s i s to be ca lcula ted and what d i r e c t 
and i nd i r ec t co s t s need to be calculated in the ca lcula t ion of 
t h i s charge. How to envisage the cost in future without 
involving the i n t e r e s t e lanent . This i s a problem which both the 
Islamic Development Bank and the Islamic commercial banks w i l l 
have to face when they advance pure loan. Another i ssue tha t 
rauslim w r i t e r s r a i s e i s 'how to decide a margin of p r o f i t in 
t rading i . e . i f a bank i s supplying money to buy some merchandise, 
should i t o r should not i t charge any p ro f i t on i t and i f the 
answer i s in aff i rmat ive , what should be the ra t e of p rof i t ? In 
many cases such purchase may be a r i s k l e s s . If t h i s i s t rue then 
can the mark-up charged by the bank be considered as p r o f i t and 
not r iba ? "How should the rent of physical c a p i t a l be calculated 
14 
so t h a t i t does no t include the i n t e r e s t element ? 
14 M, Fahira Khan, ' I s lamic Baiking as Prac t i sed now 
in the world ' , Ofp, c i t . , p . 274. 
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Use o£ Funds by Is lamic Banks : 
Some of the Islamic banks a re facing the problem of 
surplus l i qu id ftinds. The exact magnitude of t h i s problem i s not 
known with ce r t a in ty , but i t i s bel ieved in the Is la«dc banking 
c i r c l e s t ha t the problem of excess l i q u i d i t y i s qui te se r ious . This 
problem i s in f ac t the r e s u l t of the s i tua t ion t h a t construction 
loan in which some of the Islamic bank p a r t i c i p a t e d through 
Murabahah operat ions and rea l i zed "quick" p r o f i t s i s over and 
there are no more avenues fo r productive investment in the economy. 
The growth in the resources of Islamic banks and reduction in the 
demand for c r e d i t due to recession of the Gulf region have been 
i den t i f i ed as two main reasons fo r excess l i q u i d i t y problem in the 
15 Islamic Bank, 
15 In 1980, the Islamic Development Bank introduced an 
investment deposi t scheme whose main purpose was to r a i s e resources 
of the Bank and to o f fe r an investment scheme to prospect ive 
inves tors t ha t functions in conformity with the Shar i ' ah and pro-
vides reasonable return to Inves to r s , The proceeds of investment 
deposit scheme are invested in the foreign t rade financing scheme 
which i s short-terra by i t s very n a t u r e . The investment deposit 
scheme became very popular and a number of Is lamic banks deposited 
t h e i r surplus l iqu id ftinds with the IDE in t h i s scheme. The t o t a l 
deposit in the investment deposi t scheme grew a t a f a s t r a t e . 
Consequently IDB had to refuse some of the deposi t s under t h i s 
schane. In the present circumstances, the capaci ty of IDB to 
absorb deposi ts i s constrained by i t s very l iqu id p o s i t i o n . There-
fore, a number o£ a l t e r n a t i v e s are being explored a t the IDB as 
well as a t the level of Islamic banks. One suggestion i s t ha t 
foreign t rade financing operation in which IDB bears a l l the r i sk , 
should be modified in such a way tha t deposi tors (Islamic Banks) 
also share the r i sk of foreign t rade f inancing. In e f fec t , the 
proposal i s tha t cont rac t between IDB and depos i tors of investment 
deposit scheme should be modified from Mudarabah to Musharkah in 
which a l l p a r t i e s share r i s k s . This wi l l increase IDB^ capaci ty 
to absorb depos i t s . For d e t a i l s see, Ausaf Ahmad, Development and 
Problems of Islamic Bank; op , cit.,^ P ,65 . "* 
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I t has been pointed out tha t areas o£ poss ib le cooperation 
between non-r iba banking and western banking i s the growing 
surpluses of some Islamic coun t r i e s . For the l a s t three hundred 
years, the process of c a p i t a l money flow has been v i r t u a l l y 
dominated by Western i n s t i t u t i o n s . As entrepreneurs and govern-
ments in t h i r d world countr ies obtain money c a p i t a l from banks. 
The banks are in a pos i t ion to influence the a l locat ion of 
resources in the soc ie ty . Thus the more v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of 
socie ty - r e l a t ed to the level of economic a c t i v i t y , a l loca t ion of 
resources and the value of money - are l i a b l e to be handled e i t h e r 
for the goods of the society or to i t s determinant by in t e rna t iona l 
banks. This i s t rue even though loca l banking i s cont ro l led by 
indigenous banks. Therefore, because of the large surpluses of 
Islamic oi l-producing countr ies , t h e i r economic fu ture came to be 
viewed as dependent upon the way Western f i nanc i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
performed t h e i r main functions as f i nanc i a l in termediar ies and 
keepers of depos i t s . His to r i ca l ly , commercial banks have per-
formed t h i s function on the bas i s of f i x e d - i n t e r e s t payments; 
therefore , i n t e r e s t payments formed the b a s i s upcai which the 
banks dea l t with deposi tors as well as the entrepreneurs to whan 
i t advanced money c a p i t a l . 
16 Khalid Abdullah Tariq al-Mansour, "The Inpact of 
Islamic Economics", Arabia (London) November 1984, p . 5 9 , 
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Every society needs a mechanism through which savings 
and surpluses can be channelled to inves tors on the bas is of 
some xinderstanding regarding payments and r e tu rns , Vfhen society 
was r e l a t i v e l y hojanogenous, the knowledge and communication 
between i t s members in respect to preference r e l a t i ng to r i sks , 
l i qu id i t y and repayment per iods made b a r t e r or d i r ec t t ransact ions 
sa t i s f ac to ry . As socie ty became more complex aid communication 
l e s s e f f i c i en t , the ©mergence of banks and insurance companies 
as f inanc ia l in termediar ies became both na tu ra l and log ica l . 
Accordingly, f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s continued to evolve u n t i l 
services such as safe depos i t s , checking f a c i l i t i e s , easy t r ans -
f e r s , overdraft , guarantees end agency fianctions in respect of 
purchase and sa le , payment and r ece ip t , and management and t r u s t 
deposi ts became an i n t e g r a l p a r t of modem banking. At the same 
time, as modem governments and p r i v a t e savers discovered tha t 
they need only a f rac t ion of t h e i r a s s e t s a t any one time, they 
opted to re ta in the balance with se lec ted f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
TSiese i n s t i t u t i o n s on the o t h e r hand found i t des i rable and 
p ro f i t ab le to re ta in a f rac t ion of the deposi ts as a reseirve, and 
advanced the remainder to o t h e r p r i v a t e and publ ic borrowers who 
desired money c a p i t a l f o r var ious per iods of t ime. As borrowers 
used t h i s money, new incomes were generated, bank deposit 
increased, and the same process s t a r t e d again. The r e s u l t s were 
the "creat ion of money" and an increase in money supply. 
12S 
Some of the macto-econoinic b a i e f i t s are v i sua l i sed in titie 
Islamic systan, A large niunber of ftmds, which a t present ranain 
inunobilised in Muslim ooxintrles would become avai lab le for pro-
ductive investment. The a b i l i t y of small and medium entrepreneurs 
to obtain financing would br ing to the services of nation a large 
reservior of en t repreneur ia l s k i l l which would otherwise remain 
dormant for lack of resources . And the pa r t i c ipa t i on of banks in 
the losses of business financed w i l l make them more careful in 
evaluating loan appl ica t ions through the pa r t i c ipa t ion of banks 
in the success of business , g r ea t e r information, s k i l l and esqper-
. t i s e should become ava i lab le to bus iness , thus making them more 
17 
e f f i c i en t and product ive . 
17 In an interview, a Muslim apologetic discusses the 
problems posed by the crea t ion of a f u l l y Islaroised economy. 
He emphasises t h i s po in t s t h a t in an Is lamic economy there wi l l 
have to be subs tan t i a l changes in the l i f e - s t y l e of Muslim 
countr ies and also in the na tu re and opera t ions of commercial 
and cen t ra l banks. He pu t s h i s argumentt "We wi l l have to change 
our l i f e - s t y l e s , reduce our claims on resources and our 
dependence on borrowing. Moreover, we w i l l have to introduce 
changes in monetary pol icy, we w i l l also have to e s t ab l i sh a 
number of aux i l i a ry i n s t i t u t i o n s to help the commercial banks 
and f inanc ia r l e s in t h e i r task of evaluat ing p ro jec t s and 
audi t ing , "Banking Prac t i ce and Li fe S ty le" , Arabia (London), 
November 1985, p . 6 6 . 
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A survey made about Islamic banks ind ica tes tha t a t 
present , the Islamic banks have a narrow and ra the r l imited 
sphere of ope ra t ions . Their por t fo l io s t ruc ture i s not well 
d ive r s i f i ed . In the beginning of ea^eriment with Islamic banking, 
i t was necessary fo r the banks to choose " l e s s r isky and quick 
re turns" type of investment p ro jec t s for a va r i e ty of reasons. 
I t would br ing back the p r i n c i p a l amount, generate p r o f i t and 
give access to resources for fu r the r expansion. I t was also 
ins tnimentai in br inging confidence among the managers and 
succeeded in showing to the general publ ic the over a l l f e a s i b i -
• l i t y and v i a b i l i t y of Islamic banking. Consequently, the Islamic 
banks concentrated investment in traide^ rea l e s t a t e and cons-
t ruct ion e t c , so -ca l l ed "sof t -areas* of c r e d i t . Although some 
of the Is lamic banks have been vindertaking equi ty pa r t i c i pa t i on 
in ag r i cu l t u r e and indust ry , the number of such banks i s very 
small . The problem i s t h a t the Islamic banks should come out 
of safe pos tures of " so f t - i n vestment" and invest in soc ia l ly 
18 des i rab le Icmg-tezm investment p r o j e c t . 
According to quest ionnaire prepared by the wr i te r . Is lamic 
banks have made s a t i s f a c t o r y progress in the l a s t few yea r s . All 
the banks s ingled out providing a l t e rna t i ve s to in t e res t -based 
18 Cf,, Ausaf Ahmad, o p . c l t .« P . 14. 
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banking, e f f ic iency and honesty as three roost important reasons 
for t h e i r success; support of government and o f f i c i a l agencies 
was mentioned by only th ree banks and only one bank referred 
19 to higher r a t e of return to investment. 
19 Ausaf Ahmad, a defender of Islamic Banking wri tes tha t 
a l l except one bank which i s in western Europe' was ambitious to 
open branches in ru ra l areas and agreed with the statement that 
Is lamic bank in r u r a l areas could serve a useful functions by 
mobilizing resources fo r economic development. Five banks f e l t 
t ha t t h e i r investment p o r t f o l i o s was wel l -d ivers i f ied while three 
banks accepted t h a t t h e i r ' s was n o t . Six bank reported tha t they 
had a problem of excess l i qu id i ty , the o ther two said tha t they 
had no such problem. Amongst the s ix banks which have excess 
l i q u i d i t y problem, one bank tlKDught i t to be very serious, two 
described the s i t ua t i on to be ser ious and for three banks i t 
was not a source of se r ious concern. Excess o£ deposi ts , shortage 
of investmssit avenues, absence of long term investment opportu-
n i t i e s , po l i cy of c e n t r a l bank, and absence of very short term 
f inanc i a l instrument e t c , were pointed out as the f ac to r s r e s -
ponsible fo r the excess l i q u i d i t y s i t u a t i o n . For pa r t i c ipa t ion 
in productive ventures . Is lamic banks were presented four a l t e r -
n a t i v e s * (1) involv«nent in management ( i i ) pa r t i c ipa t ion in 
supervision ( i i i ) pa r t i c i pa t i on in equi ty (iv) provision of 
t echn ica l a s s i s t a n c e . Only one Islamic bank i , e , Fa i sa l Islamic 
bank of Egypt reported to use a l l the four methods; see Ausaf 
Ahmad, op , c i t „ p , 6 9 . 
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At present Islamic banks are mostly established e i ther 
as a Joint Stock Company or a public limited company. Their 
financial structure reveals a complex and diversified pat tern . 
The Islamic banks perform a number of banking fxonctions. These 
functions range from opening of account for individuals and 
companies to undertaking direct investment and floating of subsi-
diary investment and trading ccxnpanies. I t i s imperative for 
Islamic banks to conduct a l l their ac t iv i t i es and perform a l l 
the i r functions in s t r i c t conformity with the Shari 'ah, The 
business practice of Islamic banks includes: opening of current 
account, saving accoiant, investment accounts and special invest-
ment account. 
The structure of deposits has also vmdergone significant 
changes in Islamic banks. The relat ive significance of current 
account has declined and that of investment account has increased. 
The ra te of growth of dqposits showed that to ta l deposits have 
increased at a fas te r rate in the i n i t i a l period and at a slower 
rate in the l a t e r years. Similar tr«ids could be observed about 
the growth of to ta l asse t s . The structure of asset also exhibited 
changes over time. During the i n i t i a l stages cash holding consti-
tuted a large pori:ions of to ta l asse ts . As bank matures, piro-
portion of f inancial investment in to ta l assets grows and that 
of cash holding decl ines. 
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One r e s t r i c t i o n i s t h a t t h e n\araber of p r o j e c t s which 
can be f i nanced by p r o f i t and l o s s shar ing p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s 
l i m i t e d ; b u t supposing t h i s number i s l a r g e enough t o employ 
a l l t h e fimds of an I s l a m i c bank, then o t h e r problems becomes 
o b v i o u s . One i s t h a t i t would v i o l a t e sound banking p r a c t i c e s -
and p robab ly a l s o t h e n a t i o n a l banking laws and r e g u l a t i o n s -
i f s h o r t - t e r m d e p o s i t s were used f o r long- term f i n a n c i n g . The 
h i g h e r t h e p e r c e n t a g e of s h o r t - t e r m d e p o s i t s , t h e lower must be 
t h e amount which an I s l a m i c bank can employ in long- te rm p a r t i c i -
p a t i o n and inves tment f i n a n c i n g . 
Another l i m i t a t i o n fo l lows t h a t i f t h e bank h a s to employ 
t h e fvinds i n such a way t h a t an o v e r a l l p r o f i t w i l l r e s u l t and 
which can be d i s t r i b u t e d to t h e c a p i t a l owners and d e p o s i t o r s 
e v e r y yea r , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e f i r s t y e a r . Therefore , t h e bank 
cannot i n v e s t a l l long- term funds in newly e s t a b l i s h e d e n t e r p r i s e s 
even i f t h e y promise h igh p r o f i t s in t h e long-rxon; t h e sho r t - t e rm , 
new f i rms u s u a l l y have n o t on ly no p r o f i t s b u t c l o s e wi th l o s s e s 
i n t h e f i r s t y e a r . Thus t h e young I s l a m i c banks have t o channel 
some of t h e i r long- term d e p o s i t s i n t o inves tments which earn 
p r o f i t s immediate ly , t h a t i s wi th in t h e p e r i o d dur ing which t h e 
20 bank has to c a l c u l a t e and d i s t r i b u t e p r o f i t s . 
20 See Arabia , (London) J u l y 1984, p .47 
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Islamic banks perform a l l commercial, industr ial , agri-
cul tural , transport, storage, mutual insurance ac t iv i t i es , and 
so on. The capi ta l in an Islamic bank i s an essent ial guarantee 
to protect the deposits in the short-term and long-term. I t i s , 
therefore, necessary to impose s t r i c t conditions by stipulating 
a minimum of capi ta l for Islamic banks, which i s higher than the 
minimum for other banks. For the same reason, i t i s also 
necessary to be s t i c t e r in the ratio between capital and deposits 
in Is lanic banks; for example; if the minimum for other banks i s 
$ 20 m capi ta l , i t should be $ 30 m for an Islamic bank. If the 
rat io in other bank, between capital and deposit i s 10 per cent, 
i t should be 15 per cent in an Islamic bank. Most banking law 
required that the banks keep a part of the l iquidity they are 
required to maintain in the form of deposits (with or without 
interest ) treasury bonds or specified quali t ies, with the central 
banks. As Islamic banks are not operating on an interes t basis 
i t i s necessary, while applying the res t r ic ted requirements of 
l iquidi ty to allow the l iquidi ty reserve required from th«n to be 
composed of elem^its in which Islanic banks are dealing, such as 
trade b i l l s , shares and participating cer t i f ica tes of deposits, 
21 provided that i t i s negotiable according to special c r i t e r i a . 
21 Ganunal Attia, **How the Central Banks can acccMomodate 
Islamic banking", Arabia (LondonJ, November 1984, p , 5 l . 
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The b a s i c i d e a s of banking laws f o r p r o t e c t i o n s of d e p o s i t s i s 
the rniniinisation of r i s k . I s l a m i c bank do n o t c o n t e s t t h i s 
p r i n c i p l e a l though i t i s wide ly known t h a t t h e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e of 
I s l a m i c banks i s t h e expose r of r i s k . Th is i s n o t p r e c i s e l y the 
ca se and t h e r e f o r e needs some d e t a i l and p r e c i s i o n . The r u l e 
has been e s t a b l i s h e d by many r e l i g i o u s t e x t s , 
1, The y i e l d ( r e t u r n ) i s commensurate 
wi th t h e r i s k u n d e r t a k e n , 
2 , The p r o f i t i s j u s t i f i e d on t h e b a s i s of 
a l i k e l y l o s s , 
3 , The y i e l d ( r e t u r n ) on c a p i t a l n o t exposed to 
r i s k i s n o t p e r m i s s i b l e . 
I t i s ev iden t t h a t any income from an i n t e r e s t - b a s e d 
t r a n s a c t i o n , where c a p i t a l and y i e l d a r e t o t a l l y secured, i s 
p r o h i b i t e d because of t h e l ack of r i s k e lement on t h e p a r t of 
22 t h e owner of t h e c a p i t a l . 
22 On t h e o t h e r hand, b e t t i n g and gambling, whether they 
r e s u l t i n ga in o r l o s s e s , a r e p r o h i b i t e d o p e r a t i o n because of 
t h e t o t a l r i s k i n v o l v e d . Between t h e two extr<enes of 100 p e r cen t 
s e c u r i t y and 100 p e r cen t r i s k i s l o c a t e d t h e a r e a of allowed 
p r o f i t , c a r r y i n g a p o r t i o n of r i s k , i b i d . , p ,52 
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I t i s up to the investor to choose the degree o£ risk, 
he opts to expose himself to, end naturally, the higher the risk, 
the higher the profi t and, on the contrary, the lov»er risk 
involved the lower the p ro f i t . Consequently, the banking formula 
kno-wn as "security, l iquidi ty and profi tabi l i ty" i s also knovjn 
in Islamic banking, though in different pract ical forms. Conven-
tional banks take the principle of 100 per cent security in their 
transaction which can not be adopted by Islamic banks. 
According to an Egyptian economists 
"The formula adopted by conventional 
banks to follow the 100 per ceot security 
did not prevent them from getting into 
d i f f icu l t ies , the least of which i s bank-
ruptcy of scne banks which hc^pends from 
time to time. The real lesson we should 
learn from the dilemma of third world debt 
i s that depending on the creditor -
debtor relationship not being the real 
expression of the 100 per cent security 
principles, i t could even lead to the 
to t a l loss of both capi tal and in te res t . 
The solution would l i e in a formula 
where the security on the face i s less 
than 100 per cent but where the creditor 
par t ic ipates in the manag«nent of the 
funds and shares the resul t of his invest-
ment, carrying the real security for both 
capi tal and yield," 
Since the depositors in an Islamic banks share in i t s 
profit and loss, while the relationship of depositors to the 
conveitionai banks i s one of debtor and creditor, i t i s 
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recomrnoidecl, whi le e l a b o r a t i n g s u i t a b l e system f o r t h e a c t i v i t i e s 
of I s l a m i c banks , to g i v e d e p o s i t o r s a k i n d of supeirvisioiis, ove r 
t h e a c t i v i t i e s of I s l a m i c banks, which could t ake the form of a 
d e p o s i t o r ' s , 'Gene ra l Assembly' , e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the 
d i s c u s s i o n s of inves tment accounts and t o e l e c t t he a u d i t o r s . 
At tending such a d e p o s i t o r ' s General Assembly could be l i m i t e d 
to those d e p o s i t o r s who have a minimum of $ 1, QO, 000, f o r i n s t a n c e 
23 
and whose p e r i o d of d e p o s i t i s one y e a r minimum. 
Deposi t M o b i l i z a t i o n : 
The I s l a m i c banks so f a r have done an i n t a i s i v e r e sea r ch 
i n d e v i s i n g n o n - u s u r i o u s procedujces t o u t i l i z e t h e i r f unds . Very 
l i t t l e r e s e a r c h h a s been done in d e v i s i n g t h e t o o l s to a t t r a c t 
d e p o s i t s . Th i s may be so because they have n o t y e t faced t h e 
sho r t age of d e p o s i t s . But i f they do n o t pay a t t e n t i o n t o dev i se 
t h e n o n - u s u r i o u s t o o l s to compete wi th t h e i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g t o o l s 
of r a i s i n g d e p o s i t s , then t h e s e banks a r e l i k e l y t o f a c e problems 
in t h e i r growth p a r t i c u l a r l y when they a r e working s i d e by s i d e 
wi th t h e modem b a n k s . So f a r I s l a m i c banks have t h e fo l lowing 
types of d e p o s i t s which d i f f e r from t h e d e p o s i t s in o t h e r banks . 
23 I b i d . , p , 5 2 . 
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On saving accounts they are not obliged to offer any 
rewaixl because the amount of the savings is guaranteed and the 
holders of these accounts are not liable for any losses that the 
bank incurs. This accoxint, therefore, can attract only those 
customers who have money to save but do not vant to take a risk 
and also are not keen to earn profits on their savings. Though, 
the investment accounts have the attraction of getting a higher 
rate of return than the current rate of interest this account will 
attract only those people who have the money to save, want to 
earn money and are willing to take a risk. For these two t3fpes of 
people, the Islamic banks have to ccanpete with two institutions* 
(1) interest based banks (2) stock market. The third category 
of people, those who have money and want to earn profit on their 
savings without taking any risk, are not available to Islamic 
banks. 
Ir is a general feeling that, as far as the tools to 
attract the depositors are concerned, very little research has 
been done in this area. This may be so because they have not yet 
faced the shortage of deposits. But as one writer points out 
that, 'if these banks do not pay attention to devise the non-
usurious tools to compete with the interest-bearing tools of 
raising deposits, then these banks are likely to face problans 
in their growth. There has been a lot of theoretical discussion 
on the literature on Islamic banking as to how to save the 
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d e p o s i t o r s of investroesnt accounts from t h e r i s k of t h e l o s s e s 
t h a t t h e bank might i n c u r . I s l a m i c w r i t e r s , in s ea rch of a 
v i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t o i n t e r e s t - b a s e d banking, have sugges ted 
a number of schones such a s b u i l d i n g r e s e r v e s by t h e bank out of 
t h e i r good t ime e a r n i n g s t o compensate l o s s e s i n bad t ime o r 
launch d e p o s i t s i n s u r a n c e wi th t h e backing of t h e C e n t r a l bank 
and t h e c o o p e r a t i o n s of a l l coiranercial banks and t h e i r 
24 d e p o s i t o r s . 
The slow growth i n t h e d q p o s i t s may n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be 
r e f l e c t i n g t h e f a i l u r e of I s l a m i c banks t o a t t r a c t d e p o s i t s b u t 
t h e f a c t remains t h a t i n a s o c i e t y where i n t e r e s t based banks 
a r e a l s o a l lowed t o e x i s t . I s l a m i c banks s t and a t a d i sadvan tage , 
How they a r e going to s u c c e s s f u l l y compete t h e i n t e r e s t - b a s e d 
bank i s n o t c l e a r from t h e i r c u t r e n t programme. 
24 M, Fahim Khan, " I s l a m i c Banking a s p r a c t i s e d Now 
in t h e world", i n Ziauddin Anraadled) Money and Banking in Islam, 
op , c i t . , p . 269; Fahim Khan p o i n t s ou t t h a t 'none of t h e s e 
schene a r e so f a r o p e r a t i n g and t h e d e p o s i t o r s i n t h e investment 
accounts s t and l i a b l e t o l o s s . None of t h e bank so f a r have 
undergone such a p o s s i b i l i t y . According t o him 'an e f f o r t c»i 
a l a r g e s c a l e i s needed t o dev i se non -usu r ious t o o l s (going 
beyond c o n v e n t i o n a l dev ice ) of banking t h a t can r a i s e t h e d e p o s i t s 
f o r I s l a m i c b a n k s . The e x i s t i n g I s l a m i c banks w i l l have t o do 
t h i s r e s e a r c h on ly i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t b u t a l s o i n t h e g r e a t e r 
i n t e r e s t of t h e I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s who a r e I s l a m i s i n g t h e i r 
s o c i e t i e s . 
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I t ha s been p o i n t e d ou t t h a t I s l a m i c banks In Muslim 
c o u n t r i e s f ace c e r t a i n s p e c i a l s i t u a t i o n which I s no t shared by 
t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t s i n t h e c a p i t a l - r i c h c o u n t r i e s . The I s l amic 
banks i n poor ooxintr ies w i l l have t o make an e x t r a e f f o r t f o r 
r esource m o b i l i s a t i o n . Hence, i t s h a l l be nece s sa ry f o r them 
t o under take r e g i o n a l d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n so t h a t I s l a n i c banking 
does n o t rana in c o n c e n t r a t e d on ly i n urban c e n t r e s . Large 
masses of popu la t i on a r e c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e r u r a l a r e a s i n poor 
Muslim c o u n t r i e s . I n t h e e v e n t of r e g i o n a l d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of 
I s l a m i c banking, i t might become p o s s i b l e t o u t i l i s e the hidden 
and p o t e n t i a l s a v i n g s i n t h e r u r a l s e c t o r of t h e s e economies. 
Once t h e p o t e n t i a l s av ings of t h e r u r a l s e c t o r s a r e r e a l i z e d 
through I s l a m i c banks , t h e y could be i n v e s t e d in t h e p r o j e c t 
which would be s o c i a l l y p r o d u c t i v e . The cho ice of t h e s e bankable 
p r o j e c t s w i l l have t o be c a r e f u l l y made. I t should be based 
upon t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t l o c a l r e s o u r c e s must be used f o r l o c a l 
development. Hence, p r i o r i t y must be g iven t o small and mediiim 
s i z e p r o j e c t s , cover ing a g r i c u l t u r e , i r r i g a t i o n , h a n d i c r a f t s , 
small s c a l e i n d u s t r y and ag ro -based i n d u s t r i e s i n which l o c a l 
r e sou rce s bo th f i n a n c i a l and r e a l , p h y s i c a l a s we l l a s human, 
25 
could be u t i l i z e d f o r p o t e n t i a l u s e . 
25 Ausaf Ahmad, o p , c i t . , p . 
1 4 1 
Delays in PaYinent t 
One problem which the Is lamic bank faces i s how to deal 
with cases of delay in pa3^ent . In the in t e re s t -based bank i t 
i s e a s i e r to handle t h i s problem as i n t e r e s t ge t s acctunulating 
and sometimes the r a t e s are increased i f the debt i s not paid 
promptly. Payments f o r f inancing techniques t ha t are used by 
Islamic banks a lso become due a t a spec i f ied t ime. Since Islamic 
banks do not charge i n t e r e s t , delay in due payments may cause a 
number of problems for them. One way t o solve t h i s problem i s 
to s e l l the "co la t e ra l " against which finance i s provided by the 
Islamic bank. However, i t may not solve the probl«n completely. 
Hence, Islamic banks have been e^qploring the ways and means to 
impose a f ine fo r delay in payment. The main problem i s tha t 
i t should be done in such a way t h a t i t should not resemble 
i n t e r e s t payment charged by t r a d i t i o n a l ccxnmercial banks in 
s imi lar circumstances. Hence, i t i s suggested tha t Islamic 
bank may impose some penal ty on d a f a u l t e r s fo r delay in payment 
in accordance with the s t i pu la t ion of agreement in anyone of 
the following ways : 
i . Claiming p a r t of the p r o f i t which customers might 
have made during the per iod of defau l t , 
i i . claiming the p r o f i t which the banks could have 
made i f the held up funds were returned promptly 
i , 3 , , opportunity cos t of these funds. 
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Exchange of Deposits : 
With the expansion of i t s network in d i f fe ren t countr ies 
the Islamic i>anks face another problem of exchange of deposit 
v^ich need to be solved in confoooity with the Sha r i ' ah . The 
problem may be s ta ted as followss The Islamic bank A may have 
a surplus of US d o l l a r s and be in need of pound s t e r l i n g . While 
Islamic Bank B in a d i f f e r en t country may have a surplus of 
pound s t e r l i ng but might be in need of US d o l l a r s . The following 
solution to t h i s problem has been proposed: 
1, "Agreement should be reached on the kind of two 
currencies fo r which exchange of deposi ts i s to 
be made among the Is lamic banks and value of 
each deposi t i s t o be ca lcula ted a t the prevai l ing 
exchange r a t e , 
i i . Each pa r ty s h a l l depos i t with the other par ty 
the agreed amount as deposi t which may be used 
and had t o be re turned on an agreed t ime, 
i i i . The same date s h a l l be f ixed for returning both 
amount so t h a t each pajcty sha l l return to the 
other what he would have taken in the form of 
an exchange of depos i t . 
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i v . Agre«nent may be reached t h a t each par ty en te r s 
the deposi t from the o the r pa r ty in h i s inves t -
ment account, i t may a l so be agreed tha t both 
depos i t s be considered as a non-prof i t current 
account, 
V. If both p a r t i e s agree t h a t each purchases from 
the o thers the currencies deposited vdth him 
by o the r par ty , t ha t may be poss ib le on the date 
of re turn a t the r a t e of exchange preva i l ing on 
t h a t d a t e , 
v i . No agreement may be reached t h a t any p a r t y gain 
more benef i t frcwn the o t h e r except the r igh t of 
use which i s a mutual r igh t fo r both p a r t i e s . 
There i s a need to inves t iga te the Islamic j u r i d i c a l , 
economic and opera t iona l aspects of t h i s p roposa l . This problem 
i s s t i l l being studied from di f ferent angles and no spec ia l solu-
t ion has been adopted so f a r , 
'The s t ruc tu re of deposi ts has a lso undergone s ign i f ican t 
changes in Is lamic banks. The r e l a t i v e s ignif icance of current 
26 Ti;ase proposals have been quoted froca Ausaf Ahmad's 
Development and ProDlons of Islamic BanK, op , c i t , , p , 6 6 . 
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accounts h a s d e c l i n e d and t h a t of Inves tment accounts has 
i n c r e a s e d . The r a t e of growth of d e p o s i t r showed t h a t t o t a l 
d e p o s i t s have i n c r e a s e d a t a f a s t e r r a t e i n t h e i n i t i a l p e r i o d 
and a t a s lower r a t e i n t h e l a t e r y e a r s . S i m i l a r t r e n d s could 
be observed about t h e growth of t o t a l a s s e t s . The s t r u c t u r e of 
a s s e t s a l s o e x h i b i t e d changes o v e r t i m e . During t h e i n i t i a l 
s t a g e s cash ho ld ing c o n s t i t u t e d a l a r g e p o r t i o n of t o t a l a s s e t s . 
As the bank matures , p r o p o r t i o n of f i n a n c i a l inves tment in t o t a l 
27 
a s s e t s grows and t h a t of cash h o l d i n g s d e c l i n e s . 
In I s l a m i c banks , n e i t h e r t h e p r i n c i p a l d e p o s i t , n o r a 
p rede te rmined y i e l d on i t , a r e gua ran teed , in theo ry , by t h e 
banks . In t h i s way I s l a m i c banks do n o t s t and a s an o r i g i n a l 
p a r t y i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between bo th d e p o s i t o r s and u s e r s of 
funds, b u t performs, i n s t e a d , t h e r o l e of a proxy of d e p o s i t o r s 
v i s - a - v i s t h e u s e r s of f u n d s . Th i s proxy h a s two k i n d s , f i r s t , 
a proxy i n c l u d i n g d e l e g a t i o n from d e p o s i t o r s t o i n v e s t t h e i r 
d e p o s i t s i n any p r o j e c t , c a l l e d "Genera l D e p o s i t s , where I s l amic 
banks i n v e s t wi th nvimerous u s e r s of funds and c o n s i d e r a l l t hese 
g e n e r a l d e p o s i t s a s one p o o l . P r o f i t s of i nves tmen t s a r e p laced 
in t h i s poo l and then r e d i s t r i b u t e d among d e p o s i t o r s on the 
b a s i s of a p o i n t s p roduc t systei i (each amount m u l t i p l i e d by 
number of days) a f t e r deduc t ion of management f e e s . 
27 I b i d , , p .75 
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Second^ the proxy where the delegation from depositors Is 
specified to investment of deposits in pa r t i cu la r project after 
e^proval and acceptance of the r isks involved. The prof i ts of 
these projects are distributed among depositors af ter deduction 
of management fees of the bank. This i s cal led in Islamic 
banking terminology 'specified depos i t s ' . I t i s clear that in 
these t<wo kinds of deposits and specially the second, the banks 
perform, the fxinctions knovn in the banking terminology as the 
"fiduciary function". I t i s also assumed that in both cases the 
depositor i s aware of the risks to which t h i s deposit i s exposed. 
This principal of capital risk i s an Incentive for him to deposit 
h is funds in th i s kinds of account and avoid depositing than in 
the pre-determined interest system. The principle of autonomous 
free-will of the par t ies where i t i s not contradictory to public 
order and public morale - i s the suitable legal basis for 
allowing th i s kind of deposit. 
The legal basis of the depositors' share in the bank's 
prof i t i s the agreement of the banks share-holders (who are the 
only ones ent i t led to the bank's prof i t ) to surrender a part 
of the i r prof i t to depositors. This legal analysis leads us to 
the problem of subjecting the yield, dis t r ibuted among deposi-
tors , to taxes. I t i s knovm that the in te res t on deposits, 
paid by the conventional banks, i s an es^ense, and i s therefore, 
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deducted from income b e f o r e a r r i v i n g a t t h e n e t p r o f i t , vh ich i s 
s u b j e c t t o t a x e s . The n e t , a f t e r t a x e s , and r e s e r v e s a r e t o be 
d i s t r i b u t e d a s d i v i d e d t o t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s . 
In t h e case of I s l a m i c banks, t h e account ing fo l lows t h e 
same t r e n d . The y i e l d d i s t r i b u t e d t o d e p o s i t o r s ( a s opposed 
t o divi.dends d i s t r i b u t e d to sha re -ho lde r ) i s c o n s i d e r e d an e3q)ense 
on t h e p r o f i t s of t h e bank, t o be deducted b e f o r e a r r i v i n g a t the 
n e t p r o f i t s of t h e bank, sub j ec t to t a x e s . The t r e a t m e n t of t he 
y i e l d on d e p o s i t s of I s l a m i c banks on t h e same b a s i s a s t h e 
t r e a t m e n t of i n t e r e s t on d e p o s i t s i n c o n v e n t i o n a l banks i s normal 
28 
a s bo th a r e r e t u r n s on money, 
Co»operat ion Among I s l a m i c Banks t 
There can be c l o s e coqpera t ion between v a r i o u s I s l a m i c 
banks because t hey sha re t h e same i d e a l o g y . I s l a m i c banking in 
d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s and coninxinities a r e t r y i n g t o o r g a n i z e t h e 
banking b u s i n e s s , which i s backbone of modem economic and 
i n d u s t r i a l system i n consonance wi th t h e p r i n c i p l e of I s l a m i c 
S h a r i ' a h , so t h e s e banks a r e o p e r a t i n g a t t h e same i d e a l o g i c a l 
p lane and sha re a common v a l u e system. 
28 See Gamal A t t i a "How the c e n t r a l bank can accommodate 
I s l a m i c banking**, Arabia , (London) November 1984, p p . 4 8 - 5 1 . 
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At the opera t ional level* the i dea log i ca l operation of 
I s l a n i c banks may take several foxtuns. For example, i t may take 
the form of exchange infonnation and ideas , several Islamic 
banks hold seminars, symposia conferences frc»Q time to time and 
publ ish information b u l l e t i n , magazines and books several Islamic 
banks have a Shar i ' ah board and economic research section attached 
to them. I t i s imperative fo r Is lamic banks t o pool t h e i r 
i n t e l l e c t u a l resources t o f ind I s l amica l ly acceptable solution 
of the pjcoblans confronting Muslim Umroah in i t s soc ia l and 
economic t ransformation. 
One e^^ression of the cooperation of Is lamic banks a t the 
i dea log ica l leve l i s i n t e rna t iona l Association of Islamic Banks set 
up in 1977• According to i t s s t a t u t e the Association aims a t 
" t ightening the r e l a t i o n s among Islamic banks, paving the way for 
cooperation among them coordinating t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s , and ensuring 
t h e i r Islamic i d e n t i t y to achieve the Jo in t i n t e r e s t . 
The associat ion undertakes a number of a c t i v i t i e s and has 
p a r t i c i p a t e d in the establishment of Fa i sa l Islamic Bank in Sudan, 
Egypt* Jordan, and Bahrain, I t has undertaken various steps in 
the f i e l d of technical consul ta t ion among the Islamic banks. The 
purpose of t h i s i n s t i t u t e was to prepare necessary technica l and 
profess ional manpower required for the growth of Islamic Banks, 
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Unfortunately, the I n s t i t u t e closed down a f t e r a couple of 
years of opera t ion . 
Is lamic banks are in a pos i t ion to undertake pro jec t 
financing, not only in the count r ies where they are located but 
in o the r Muslim count r i es as we l l . Since experience has shown tha t 
scane Islamic ccmmercial banks are re luc tan t t o finance p ro jec t s 
in countr ies where they a re n e i t h e r located nor represented, i t 
would be in the bes t i n t e r e s t of Muslim countr ies themselves to 
have a t l e a s t one Is lamic bank in t h e i r country. This would not 
only pave the way fo r cooperation between Islamic banks and lead 
to growth of Is lamic banks but could a l so be s t a r t i n g poin t for 
resource t r a n s f e r from resource- r ich countr ies to resource-poor 
coun t r i e s . The mechanism of cooperation between Is lamic banks 
can be Mudarabah and Musharakah and lending etc,depending upon 
the nature of p r o j e c t . Some of the Islamic banks are a lso holding 
equity c a p i t a l in o the r Islamic banks a lso keep deposi ts with 
each o t h e r . Such p r a c t i c e s would increase with the increase in 
the nxiraber of banks. 
There a r e a l so people who hold the view tha t Islamic 
bank should have a f u l l support from the Islamic Development 
Bank which i s based in Jeddah. In t h i s regard various e f f o r t s 
149 
29 have been made. For example, IDB proposed tha t there should be 
the involvement of Is lamic banks in foreign t rade operation of 
Is lamic Development bank on the bas i s of r i sk - shar ing . Also 
the involvement of Is lamic banks in leas ing operation of IDB 
where IDB bears a l l r i sk or shares i t with Islamic banks. The 
other proposal inc ludes t 
1, extending l i n e of learning f a c i l i t i e s t o Islamic 
banks which are a t present extended to na t iona l 
development banks by the IDB; 
2 , co-financing of equi ty with Is lamic banks; 
3 , IDB's pa r t i c i pa t i on in equi ty of Is lamic banks. 
However, to what extent these co-opera t ional proposals are 
rea l i zed w i l l depend not only on the IDB but a l so on the response 
of Is lamic banks. However, i t must be kept in mind tha t Islamic 
29 At the time of the annual conferences of the Islamic 
Development Bank, Board of Governors, r epresen ta t ives of various 
Islamic banks are inv i ted as observe-rs and a separate meeting 
of IDB and Islamic bank i s held to discuss ways and means of 
mutual co-opera t ion . The IDB a lso convenes j o i n t meeting a t other 
l e v e l s to exchange pro jec t information witxi the Islamic banks. 
Some of Is lamic banks are involved in the investment deposit 
scheme of IDB, Which keeps some d ^ o s i t s with scxne of Islamic 
banks. The attempt to i den t i fy fu r the r areas of cooperation 
between Is lamic banks and IDB i s a continuous process . See 
Development and Problems of Islamic Banks, o p . c i t , 
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Development Bank i s an i n t e rna t i ona l f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n having 
specia l concern fo r economic and soc ia l development of msnber 
countr ies vh i l e Is lamic banks are CCTwnercial banking i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Therefore, regional co-operation between these two types of 
i n s t i t u t i o n i s cons t ra in led by t h e i r d i f fe ren t n a t u r e . The 
object ive of Is lamic Development Bank i s to fo s t e r economic 
development aad soc i a l progress of member coant r ies and Muslim 
communities as well as j o i n t l y in accordance with the p r inc ip l e of 
the Shari * ah. In t h i s regard, both Islamic banks and IDE carry 
the same idealogy. The p ro jec t and a c t i v i t i e s preferred by the 
IDB may not be the same as those preferred by any Islamic bank. 
So, i t has t o be seen, in term of day-to-day working, t h a t to 
what extent the Is lamic banks can come forward to finance long-
term p r o j e c t s . Thus, I s lamic banks can play a useful ro le in 
socia l and economic transformation of Muslim soc ie ty . 
The roost common form of Islamic finance t ransac t ion i s 
trade finance, where the re has to be some element of r i s k . The 
Islamic i n s t i t u t i o n s buy those mater ia ls f rcxn a s e l l e r and pay 
the s e l l e r and then s e l l those mater ia ls to the persons who r e a l l y 
need. 
30 These views were expressed by Ausaf Ahmad, I b i d . , p , 7 2 
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Another factor that puts the Islamic banks at a d i s -
advantageous position In composition with Interest-based bank I s 
that the Islamic banks have to supervise and In some cases 
manage the operation of the projects that they are financing. 
This problem i s serious in developing countries where the 
business enterprises, generally, do not maintain proper accounts 
or keep different se ts of accounts for different purposes. 
The extra management burden of the Islamic Banks also put 
i t at a disadvantageous, position L. vis-a-vis the interest-based 
bank. Islamic banks have to supervise and in some cases manage 
31 "Flexible, Liquid and benevolent; but confused", 
Arabia. (London) Decenber 1984, p,44? Trrance Calson, an 
American Lawyer, deals primarily with Islamic financing and 
more generally with international business transactions such 
as acquisitions, mergers, jo int ventures and licencing arrange-
ments. Talking about the wea3cness and stra:igth of Islamic banks 
he says : that the strength are f i r s t f lex ib i l i ty , second, great 
l iquidi ty none of the Islamic Inst i tut ions I know of have d i f f i -
culty in a t t rac t ing deposi ts . I t i s not very l ikely that there 
i s going to be a shortage of cash on that part of an Islamic 
ins t i tu t ion . The thi rd strength i s that I think they do tend 
to look for pjDojects that have a beneficient purpose and of tea 
will take more risk or perhaps take a lower rate of return if 
the project has a good purpose — if i t i s going to help people. 
Building hospital i s one example. 
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t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t t h a t they a r e f i n a n c i n g . I t i s 
c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h i s problem i s s e r i o u s in developing coxantries 
where t h e b u s i n e s s e n t e r p r i s e s , g e n e r a l l y , do n o t main ta in p r o p e r 
account o r keep d i f f e r e n t s e t s of accounts f o r d i f f e r e n t p u r p o s e s , 
Fahim Khan, a f t e r surveying a number of banks w r i t e s t h a t t h e 
p re sence of such m a l - p r a c t i c e s w i l l r a i s e the c o s t of I s l a m i c 
bank ing . According t o him u n l e s s such foo l -p roof d e v i c e s a r e 
developed t h a t do n o t e n t a i l t h e s e e x t r a - c o s t of I s l a m i c bankers , 
the growth of I s l a m i c banking a c t i v i t i e s a r e l i k e l y t o be cons -
t r a i n e d c o n s i d e r a b l y . The I s l a m i c banks have dev i sed c e r t a i n 
s t r i c t r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n so t h a t they s e l e c t on ly sound p a r t i e s 
bu t t h e s e p rocedu re s n o t on ly d i s c r i m i n a t e them i n f a v o u r a b l y 
a g a i n s t b ^ k s bu t a l s o do n o t gua ran tee t h a t t h e i r cus tomers w i l l 
be o b l i g e d t o d e c l a r e a c t u a l p r o f i t of t h e i r e n t e r p r i s e . None of 
t h e banks so f a r seems t o have faced t h e problom p e r h a p s , because 
e i t h e r t h e I s l a m i c banks have n o t expanded t h e i r b u s i n e s s t o t h e 
e x t e n t where they cou ld f e e l t h i s problem o r because so f a r t h e s e 
banks have been d e a l i n g on ly i n t h e i r e a l - e s t a t e and t r a d e 
32 b u s i n e s s where such raanagemcjnt problem may n o t be s i g n i f i c a n t " , 
i ^ a r t from i n t e r n a l and l o c a l problems of I s l a m i c banks, 
t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s in i n t e r n a t i o n a l market 
32 M, Fahim Khan, o p , c i t . , p . 273 
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have r a i s e d many problems s t i l l t o be r e s o l v e d , Rodenry Wilson 
p o i n t s out t vo major problems* F i r s t pi^ablom concerns t h e banking 
r e g u l a t i o n s i n most v ies tem coxin t r ies which s t i p u l a t e s d e t a i l e d 
r e se rved requi rements f o r a l l l i c e n s e d banks and d e p o s i t t a k e r s . 
The view t h a t t h e so le l i q u i d a s s e t must be cash o r i n t e r e s t 
bea r ing t r e a s u r y b i l l s , does n o t c o n f e r s wi th t h e I s l amic p r i n c i p l e : 
I s l a m i c banks of ten h o l d commodities such a s p r e c i o u s me ta l s o r 
even c e r t i f i c a t e s of ovmership of commodit ies a s p a r t of t h e i r 
l i q u i d a s s e t s . The a s s e t s which t h e bank a c q u i r e f o r r e s a l e 
tonder t h e murabaha ( p r o f i t - s h a r i n g ) scheme a r e u s u a l l y counted as 
p a r t of t h e i r r e s e r v e s , ixit wes tern banking r e g u l a t i o n s do no t 
33 
recognise t h i s . 
Another problem i n t h e i r e l a t i o n s h i p between I s l a m i c banks 
and conven t iona l banks bo th in term of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in c l e a r i n g 
arrangements and d e a l i n g s in t h e i n t e r - b a n k m a r k e t s . If an 
I s l a m i c bank a r r anges cu r r ency exchange wi th Western banks, o r 
even a r r anges acceptance of cheques drawn on o t h e r banks, i t 
becomes involved wi th i n s t i t u t i o n s which p r o f i t s frcau i n t e r e s t 
t r a n s a c t i o n s , and i t may even end-up ho ld ing i n t e r e s t bear ing 
a s s e t s i t s e l f , 
33 See Roodeny Wilson, "The I s l a m i c Banking and 
Finance" , The Middle E a s t and Nor th Af r i ca , (Europa Pub l i ca t i on 
Limited, 1988), p p , 16 0-16 4 . 
154 
The e^qperiment of Islamic bank, in so far as the i r 
resul ts are concerned, have brought out something like t h i s . 
At present, the Islamic banks have a narrow and rather limited 
sphere of operations. Their por t fol ios structure are not well 
diversif ied. In the beginning of eBq)eriment with Islamic banking, 
i t was necessary for the banks to choose " less risky and quick 
return" type of investment projects for a variety of reasons. 
I t would bring back the principal amount, generate prof i ts and 
give access to resources for further expansion. I t was instru-
mental in bringing confidence among the managers and succeeded 
in showing to the general public the overfall feas ibi l i ty and 
v iab i l i ty of Islamic banking; consequently. Islamic banks 
concentrated investment in trader real es ta te and constructions 
e t c . - Although same of the Islamic banks have been undertaking 
equity part icipations in agriculture and industry, the nximber of 
such banks i s very small, Now the i n i t i a l v iab i l i ty being 
established. Islamic banks need to come out of safe pastures of 
"soft-investment" and invest in social ly desirable long term 
investment projects . 
The financing of long term projects by Islamic banks 
have certain pre-re qui s i t e s not required by interest-based banks: 
The Islamic banks will have to identify projects, carry-out 
technical feas ib i l i ty studies, estimate expected stream of profi ts 
and only then they shall be able to invest in a project . Moreover, 
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t h e y w i l l have t o develop a long term inves tment s t r a t e g y . The 
i n t e r e s t - b a s e d banks u s u a l l y a r e n o t concerned wi th macro-
economic e f f e c t s of t h e i r f i nanc ing o p e r a t i o n s . The I s l a m i c 
banks a r e expec ted t o show more s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h i s 
34 
r e g a r d by ensur ing s o c i a l l y p r o d u c t i v e u s e of t h e i r r e s o u r c e s , 
i '^sl im proponen ts b e l i e v e t h a t I s l a m i c banks as compared 
t o o t h e r i n t e r e s t based banks a r e o p e r a t i n g a t a r e l a t i v e l y small 
s c a l e . I t i s argued t h a t t h e expension of I s l a m i c banks has t o 
t ake p l a c e on two l i n e s * f i r s t . I s l a m i c banks need t o be e s t -
a b l i s h e d in t h o s e muslim coxintr ies where t h e r e a r e no I s l a m i c 
b a n k s . The number of such muslim coxuxtries a r e 2 8 , I t i s neces sa ry 
t o t a k e a c t i o n s f o r e s t a b l i s h m e n t of I s l a m i c banks i n t h e s e 
c o u n t r i e s so t h a t movement of I s l a m i c banking does n o t remain 
l o c a l i s e d one bu t beccxnes u n i v e r s a l in I s l a m i c wor ld . Secondly, 
more and more I s l a m i c banks need t o be e s t a b l i s h e d in t h e c o u n t r i e s 
34 A r e c e n t conference on I s l a m i c banking h e l d ''n 
London in A p r i l l988 a t London U n i v e r s i t y ' s school of o r i e n t a l 
and Afr ican S t u d i e s (SOAS) focused on t h e s e p r o b l o n s . P ro fe s so r 
W i l l i a n Ba l l an tyne a b a r i s t e r s p e c i a l i s i n g i n Middle E a s t law 
s a i d t "pe rhaps what i s r e q u i r e d in t o d a y ' s c l i m a t e i s n o t j u s t 
a. r e s t r u c t u r i n g of t h e S h a r i ' ah t o f i t wes tern economic concepts 
bu t some r e s t r u c t u r i n g of those concep t s i n o r d e r t o meet the 
S h a r i * a h . See "Banking Ph i l o soph i e s eye one a n o t h e r " . The Middle 
E a s ^ ( L o n d o n ) , p , 3 0 . " 
156 
where they a r e a l r e a d y f u n c t i o n i n g . The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of new 
I s l a m i c banks would s t r eng then t h e a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g banks . In 
t h a t even t , t h e r e would be more scope f o r i n t e r - b a n k d e a l i n g s 
among t h e I s l a m i c b a n k s . Slowly, one cou ld expec t t h e emergence 
of an I s l a m i c banking system wi th in each n a t i o n a l economy which 
would complete wi th t h e i n t e r e s t - b a s e d commercial banking system 
and may r e a l l y e f f e c t t h e d i r e c t i o n i n which i n v e s t i b l e iresources 
a r e u s e d . There i s a n o t h e r dimension of e s^sns ion of I s l a m i c 
b a n k s . They roust d i v e r s i f y t h e i r l o c a t i o n r e g i o n a l l y . At p r e s e n t , 
most of t h e I s l a m i c banks a r e l o c a t e d i n major urban c e n t r e s . They 
should be ready t o t ake I s l a m i c banking t o r u r a l a r e a s by opening 
more and more b ranches i n t h e v i l l a g e s . The r e g i o n a l d i v e r s i f i -
c a t i o n of I s l a m i c banks might he lp t o develop saving and banking 
h a b i t s among t h e r u r a l segment of p o p u l a t i o n and promote resources 
35 
m o b i l i z a t i o n f o r economic development . 
I s l a m i c Bank v i s - a - v i s C e n t r a l Bank : 
I n some c o u n t r i e s , c e n t r a l banks p r o h i b i t t h e involvement 
of commercial banks in t r a d i n g and inves tment a c t i v i t i e s . This i s 
normal ly done t o p r e v e n t i n d u s t r i a l houses from s e t t i n g up, 
commercial banks and then t o use them to t h e i r advantages in o t h e r 
35 Development and P r o b l a n s of I s l a m i c Banks, 
op. c i t . , p , 6 4 . 
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i n d u s t r i e s . Th is i s a b i g h ind rance i n t h e develc^ment of 
I s l a m i c banks a s t h e s e banks cannot f u n c t i o n wi thou t i ndu lg ing 
ii> t r a d e and inves tment d i r e c t l y , Hance t h e c e n t r a l bank v i l l 
have t o g r a n t I s l a m i c banks some s p e c i a l concess ion i n t h i s 
r e g a r d . 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between I s l a m i c banks and c e n t r a l bank , 
was, and s t i l l i s , r a t h e r t e n s e . I s l a m i c banks s t a r t e d i n 1970s 
in Muslim c o u n t r i e s which were dominated by conven t iona l banking 
systems and governed by W e s t e r n - s t y l e banking l a w s . Commercial 
banks in t h e s e c o u n t r i e s , as wel l a s c e n t r a l banks could n o t accept 
t h e i d e a of banking sys t an n o t based on i n t e r e s t . I s l a m i c banks 
were re fused a u t h o r i s a t i o n t o o p e r a t e . Responding t o t h e p r e s s u r e 
of p u b l i c op in ions however, t h e o n l y way was t o promulgate s p e c i a l 
laws exempting I s l a m i c banks from t h e e x i s t i n g banking r u l e s and 
even from t h e contix»l of t h e c e n t r a l bank . Some I s l a m i c banks 
were s e t - u p xander t h e pa t ronage of governmental a u t h o r i t i e s , 
36 
which were, by n a t u r e , f a r f rcxn t h e o r d i n a r y banking system. 
36 "How t h e c e n t r a l banks can accommodate I s l a m i c banking" 
Arabia (London) November 1984, p , 4 8 . Examples a r e t h e Min i s t ry 
o^ S o c i a l A f f a i r s f o r t h e Nasser S o c i a l Bank in 5gypt (Re l ig ious 
Endowment) f o r the F a i s a l I s l a m i c Bank of Egypt and Bahrain 
I s l a m i c Bank, The I s l amic banks p r epa red , as an a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Assoc ia t ion of I s l a m i c Banks such as t h e I s l amic 
Development Bank of Jeddah , These p r o p o s a l s were n o t p r a c t i c a l . 
The o f f e r of, such an i n s t i t u t i o n cou ld be c o o r d i n a t i o n s and 
c o o p e r a t i o n s and i t would n o t cover any of the f u n c t i o n s of c e n t r a l 
b a n k s . C e n t r a l banks pursued t h e s u b j e c t , d i s c u s s i n g i t twice 
dur ing t h e meeting of the c e n t r a l banks of I s l a m i c coxint r ies , he ld 
under t h e a u s p i c e s of the o r g a n i s a t i o n of t h e I s l a m i c confe rence . 
The d i r e c t i o n of t h e d i s c u s s i o n was s t e e r e d towajrds promulgat ion 
of such laws, o rgan i s ing I s l a m i c banking o r a t l e a s t , a change in 
banking laws t o i n c l u d e a s p e c i a l s e c t i o n on I s l a m i c banking 
a c t i v i t i e s — in bo th ca se s vmder t h e c o n t r o l of C e n t r a l banks . 
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With the success of Islamic banks some rose within a few years 
to watch the rank of well-established conventional banks. Conse-
quently, the central banks were forced to ask the legis la t ive 
authorit ies to put th i s "unwelcome quest* under the i r control . 
The central banks play a key role in supervising the 
coraraercial banking sectors . Therefore, a close central bank/ 
Islamic bank i»iationship i s v i t a l for the prcxootion of the 
Islamic banking and financial system. In most Islamic countries, 
the banking, licensing and regulatory laws are modelled on 
western systans designed to regulate rlba banks. Their laws and 
regulations have been foxmulated to supervise and control the 
t radi t ional banks whose objectives and functions are basically 
different from the Islamic banks. The principal differences 
arise from the fact that the Islamic banks are based upon pa r t i -
cipation principles while the conventional bank's deposits 
are protected through the mechanism of central bank under i t s 
existing regulations. The contractual relationship between an 
Islamic bank and i t s c l i en t s , and the types of asset held by i t , 
makes i t pract ica l ly impossible to to ta l ly abide by the central 
bank's legal irequirements. Therefore, exemption or amendments 
to the existing central banking regulations are called for which 
would enable the Islamic banks to fu l f i l the statutory recpairements. 
Since the Islamic banks need extra help and assistance from the 
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c e n t r a l banks i n a r e a s such as m o b i l i s a t i o n of d e p o s i t s , f i n a n c i a l 
a s s i s t a n c e and l i q u i d i t y suppor t , i t i s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e c e n t r a l 
bank t o make arCf f i n a n c i a l p r o v i s i o n s f o r r ender ing a s s i s t a n c e 
t o t h e I s l a m i c b a n k s , 
Hhe i d e a of c e n t r a l b a n k ' s c o n t r o l over t h e I s l a n i c banks 
has been emphasised in o r d e r t o p r o t e c t t h e i r d e p o s i t o r s a s >»ell 
a s f o r t h e r e g u l a t i o n s of a l l t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . The c o n t r o l w i l l 
be i n t h e form of i n t e i3 i a l r e g u l a t i o n s , c o n t r o l , mechanism, 
coope ra t ion between I s l a m i c bank in t h i s r e s p e c t and an exchange 
of e x p e r i e n c e among them - e s p e c i a l l y between t h e newly 
e s t a b l i s h e d ones and t h e o l d e r o n e s . Moreover, t h e r e should be 
n e i t h e r t o t a l exenpt ion of I s l a m i c banks frcm c o n t r o l , n o r t h e i r 
complete submission t o t h e same r u l e s governing o t h e r b a n k s . 
I n s t e a d t h e r e should be d i f f e r e n t r e g u l a t i o n s s u i t a b l e t o t h e 
33 
n a t u r e of I s l a m i c banking, implemented by t h e c e n t r a l b a n k s . 
I f t h e r e a r e more than one I s l a m i c banks i n each count ry , 
i t would be p o s s i b l e t o persuade the c e n t r a l banks t o adopt 
d i f f e r e n t p o l i c i e s towards I s l a m i c banks . C e n t r a l banks roust 
be pe r suaded t h a t they accept a lower p r o p o r t i o n of t o t a l d e p o s i t s 
i n c a s e of I s l a m i c banks ; and t h e I s l a m i c banks may be a l lowed 
t o borrow f rcxn t h e c e n t r a l banks a g a i n s t t h e i r d e p o s i t s on an 
37 "How t h e C e n t r a l banks can accommodate I s l a m i c banking", 
Arab ia (London), iMOVsnber 1984, p , 4 8 . 
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in teres t - f ree bas i s . Similarly, t i l l the banking systen in a 
Muslim country i s Islamised completely, the Islamic banks and 
interest-based banks would continue to exis t simultaneously . 
So long as the Islamic banking sector const i tutes a rather small 
par t of the to t a l banking sector, the central bank's credit 
control tools are expected to be the same what they are at 
present . However, if the Islamic Banking sector grows and becomes 
a significant portion of banking sector in the national economy, 
caatral banks shall be compelled to take Islamic banks into 
account and develop new techniques of ciredit control to deal with 
them, Muslim economists also think that the central banks must 
make legal and financial provisions for Islamic banks, including 
the fostering of interest-free f inancial instruments, to enable 
them to function successfully with the existing international 
banking system. The role and functions of the central banks v i s -
a-vis the Islamic banks would have to be substantial ly different 
in areas of banking prcwnotion, lender of l a s t resort and credit 
control and regulations. 
The central banks also need to accord at least equal t rea t -
ment of Islamic banks so far as the fulfilmait of the requirements, 
voting r ights, licensing and establishment of new branches of 
Islamic banks. One of the major d i f f i cu l t i es to the promotion 
of Islamic banks i s the lack of in teres t - f ree financial instiruraents 
to enable th«ti to meet the statutory l iquidi ty requirement of the 
161 
cent ra l banks, as >»ell as to p lace excess l i q u i d i t y in p r o f i t -
38 
able ven tures . 
The promotional aspect of the c e n t r a l bank's ro le in the 
Islamic banking development i s extJ?emely important and i t w i l l be 
an addit ional r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the cen t r a l banks in an Islamic 
society not to f a c i l i t a t e and a s s i s t the growth of new banks. 
Mutual sharing of experiences and know-how of cen t r a l banking and 
Islamic banking opera t ions , s e t t i n g up of specia l ized departments 
in cen t ra l banks would help Is lamic banks. 
The progress of the Is lamic banking systan wi l l depend 
on the help and support t h a t government aad t h e i r cen t r a l banking 
au thor i t i e s are prepared to p rov ide . In order to develop a 
market for i n t e r e s t f ree f i nanc i a l instruments, the cen t ra l 
banks may explore var ious p o s s i b i l i t i e s . These may include: 
allowing the Is lamic banks to invest funds in 
instruments which may be issued by government 
corporat ions and agencies Is lamical ly , on a divided 
bas i s , and to t r e a t such investments fo r s t a tu to ry 
reserve requirements. 
Opening Is lamic investment accounts in the books 
of the cen t r a l banks and paying p r o f i t s to the 
Islamic banks for investment made by them in these 
accounts . 
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Issuing p a r t i c i p a t i o n term c e r t i f i c a t e s which 
would be yet another avenue for Islamic banks 
to inves t on Sha r i ' ah p r i n c i p l e s , 
purchasing frcm the Is lamic bank some obl igat ions 
such as murabdh of customers of the Islamic bank 
and the p r o f i t s accrued through such purchase can 
go to the c e n t r a l bank, 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g in p r o f i t / l o s s sharing accounts 
of Is lamic bank through investment in these 
39 
accounts. 
The cen t r a l banks a lso needs of the Islamic banks. Studies 
may be i n i t i a t e d for the c rea t ion of such markets where Islamic 
banks can place t h e i r surplus fxonds. In the areas of cash 
reserves and l i q u i d i t y r a t i o s , the regula tory measures by the 
39 The organisat ion of the Is lamic Conference took o f f i c i a l 
awareness of t h i s important i s sue and set -up, under the aegisi 
of Governors of Central Bamks and Monetary Author i t ies of the 
Islamic countr ies , a high loca l committee to examine the whole 
range of re la t ionsh ips between the cen t r a l banks and the Islamic 
banks. The committee met in Riyadh in March 1981 under the 
chairmanship of the Governor of the Saudi an Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
and prepared an exhaustive report on the "promotion. Regulation 
and supervision of Is lamic Banks", The report reaffirmed tha t the 
establishment of Is lamic banks would r e f l e c t the sincere des i re 
of the people of the Is lamic world to apply the Islamic Shari 'ah 
in d i f ferent f i e l d s of l i f e . See Arabia,London, Feb, 1986,p.62, 
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cen t r a l bank v i s - a - v i s Is lamic banks need spec ia l t reatment . 
In the cases where the c e n t r a l bank pays i n t e r e s t on cash 
reserves, the r a t i o s fo r Is lamic banks need to be su i tab ly 
zQduced to compensate them. 
The dialogue between the cen t ra l banks and Islamic banks 
i s an ongoing pj:x)ce5s. On behalf of the Islamic banking system, 
the In t e rna t iona l Association of Is lamic Banks has already stepped 
in to e s t a b l i s h and coordinate contacts with the cen t ra l banks and 
also to xindertake fu r the r s tudies and rissearch in Islamic banking 
f i e l d s with the help of eminent esqperts. Some countr ies have 
already amended t h e i r banking and o the r r e l a t ed laws and i n t r o -
duced new l e g i s l a t i o n s where necessary, to enable the establishment 
and functioning: of Is lamic banks. Given the circumstances \ander 
which Is lamic bank works, they are a t a considerable disadvantage 
compared with conventional banks. The Islamic f inanc ia l system 
needs to be supported na t i ona l l y by well developed and sophis t i -
cated Islamic monetary regula t ions se t by cen t r a l banks. 
Central banks, being the guardian of the banking communities 
in t h e i r respect ive count r ies , have a r e spons ib i l i t y to exer t 
e f fo r t s to promote Islamic banks. They have to set-up adequate 
guidel ines for the regula t ions , supervisions and promotion of 
Islamic banks. Scxne of the areas where cen t ra l banks can provide 
support may be suimiarised as follows: 
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Is lamic banks cannot have access to noney markets whether 
na t iona l ly or i n t e rna t i ona l l y , vhereas conventional banks can 
e a s i l y r e so r t to the cen t r a l bank or o the r banks in case of a 
l i q u i d i t y c r i s i s . Therefore, the c e n t r a l bank zs w i l l have to 
make provis ions , in i t s regula t ions t o extend ass i s tance to 
Islamic banks on bas i s of confoiOTing to Islamic laws. 
Since Is lamic banks cannot deal with conventional 
f inanc ia l instxtoments which a re usua l ly i n t e r e s t -bea r ing , centra l 
banks w i l l have to look in to ways and means of developing 
f inanc ia l instrtunents which a re i n t e r e s t - f r e e . This w i l l enable 
Is lamic banks to make p ro f i t ab l e use of ftmds they place with 
cen t ra l bank to meet s t a tu to ry l i q u i d i t y requirements. 
Solution to these problems requi res a thorough understanding 
of the workings, technique and philosophy of Islamic banks by the 
monetary a u t h o r i t i e s . A specia l organ JLn the c e n t r a l bank has to 
be created to look a f t e r Islamic banks. This could provide a 
fomm fo r exchange of views and experiences which could b e t t e r 
place Islamic banks in t h e i r s o c i e t i e s t o p lay t h e i r role in f u l l . 
At the end we may conclude tha t the severe in te rna t iona l 
economic recessions of the ea r ly 1980s pQsed a big t e s t to the 
v i a b i l i t y of the Is lamic banks which had grown under the favourable 
economic condit ions of the ea r ly decade. With the economic recessic 
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the Islamic banks came under pressure from tvo sides. Firstly 
recession at home led to a squeeze on their source of finance. 
This v»as partially the case for the large multinational banks 
vhose main source of finance, both share capital and the deposits, 
came from the surplus oil economies of the Middle East, The 
second source of pressure was the squeeze on the profit resulting 
from the surplus in the world trade and the decline in the return 
on real investment which comprised the main sphere of activity 
of Islamic banks. Despite such pressures the Islamic banks 
appear to have successfully passed through this difficult phase. 
To pass through the recessions of the early 1980s many of 
the Islamic banks had to undertake major restructuring measures, 
if the 1970s was the decade of youthful growth and multiplication, 
the 1980s was one of maturity and consolidation for the Islamic 
banking movements. 
On both front the Islamic banking movements have made 
major strides. Serious pitfalls have been overcome and valuable 
experiences accumulated. Though these past achievements are 
reassuring the future path of development of Islamic banking is 
by no means an easy one. An important factor which can help ease 
the future progress of Islamic banking is to build upon the 
accumulated experiences of the past. 
1G6 
At a t ime when t h e growth of t h e world economy i s being 
s h i f t e d by t h e a p p a r « i t i n e q u a l i t i e s of i t s f i n a n c i a l sys t^n , 
t h e e ^ e r i e n c e s of I s l a m i c banking movement may even have v a l u a b l e 
40 lesson f o r t h e d e b t - r i d d e n t h i r d world economies. 
An i n t e r n a t i o n a l seminar on I s l a m i c banking (he ld in Dacca 
March 1985) d i s c u s s e d t h e l i q u i d i t y problems of e x i s t i n g I s l amic 
banks and t o f a c i l i t a t e s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of I s l a m i c monetary 
and c a p i t a l m a r k e t . The i s s u e s d i s c u s s e d were t h a t I s l a m i c banks 
p o s s e s s i n g c o n v e r t a b l e s u r p l u s funds could channel t h e i r money t o 
o t h e r I s l a m i c banks with fo re ign exchange d e f i c i t f o r p r o f i t a b l e 
and mutua l ly b e n e f i c i a l i n v e s t m e n t s . Fur thermore , banks fac ing 
excess l i q u i d i t y cou ld i n i t i a t e c o n t a c t s w i th p o t e n t i a l i n v e s t o r s 
and p r o v i d e them wi th n e c e s s a r y f i n a n c e , r a t h e r than wa i t ing t o 
41 
be opposed. 
40 The l a t e s t r e s u l t s of I s l a m i c f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n 
confirm t h a t in t h e e r a of economic d i f f i c u l t i e s due t o f a l l i n g 
o i l revenues , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e Arab Gulf s t a t e s , most of I s l a m i c 
banks have shown remarkable r e s i l i e n c e because i t ha s a b i l i t y 
t o absorb t h e shocks of economic r e c e s s i o n than Western banks . 
For a f u l l r e p o r t s e e ; " I s l a m i c banks-recessionproof**, 
The Times of I n d i a (New Delhi ) 15 Janua ry 1988, p , l 2 . 
41 See t h e r e p o r t i n d e t a i l . I n q u i r y (Loudon) May 1985,p.24, 
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There I s a general fee l ing t h a t Is lamic banXs should 
develop new f inanc ia l instruments, to help nob i l i ze medium and 
long-terra savings to bring them i n t o l i n e with medium and long-
term investment. The bank could also promote small and medium 
sized p ro j ec t s to encourage mass involvement and to share in 
the economic development of Is lamic c o u n t r i e s . Banks should 
t r y to develop incent ives and f a c i l i t a t e s to a t t r a c t business 
from c l i e n t s . All these i s sues mentioned in t h i s chapter, 
however, r e f l e c t tha t Islamic banks a re not in t o t a l f a i l u r e s . 
But desp i t e the obstac les in t h e i r opera t ions and lack of proper 
instruments , they may perhaps, overcome scHne of the problems 
through experiments. 
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CHAPTER - V 
MONETARY SYSTEM AND ISLAMIC BANKING 
One o£ t h e coioplex I s s u e s f a c e d by t h e I s l a m i c bank i s 
t o %«ojdc out t h e monetary system based on I s l a m , The ques t ions 
d i s cus sed a r e t I s t h e r e any gti idance from s h a r i ' a h regard ing 
monetaip^ and f i s c a l p o l i c i e s of I s l a m ? What i s unique in 
I s l a m i c monetazry p o l i c y ? To v*xat e x t e n t does i t d i f f e r from the 
p r e v a i l i n g caxe, es^pec ia l ly from t h e monetary p o l i c y fol lowed in 
t h e c a p i t a l i s t w o r l d . How w i l l t h e a b o l i t i o n of r i b a i n f l u e n c e 
the monetary p o l i c y of a c o u n t r y ? W i l l the absence of the r a t e 
of i n t e r e s t a s an i n s t r u m e n t of monetary p o l i c y s e r i o u s l y hand i -
cap an I s l a m i c economy ? I s a s u b s t i t u t e f o r bank r a t e o r o t h e r 
i n s t rumen t s of monetary p o l i c y f e a s i b l e o r d e s i r a b l e ? What 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o o l s of monetary p o l i c y can be developed ? What w i l l 
be t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between monetary and f i s c a l p o l i c i e s in an 
I s l a m i c banking system ? These q u e s t i o n s have been r a i s e d by 
many Muslim w r i t e r s in v a r i o u s seminars and confe rences . But 
t h e i r s u f f i c i e n t answers a r e no t fo r thcoming . They g e n e r a l l y 
come t o t h e vague c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t \p*iat i s r equ i r ed i s ' a fionda-
mental reform of the e n t i r e economic system inc lud ing i t s money 
and banking framework. The reform of t h e l a t e r would inc lude 
the a b o l i t i o n of r i b a and t h e reform of banks t o minimise t h e i r 
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f i n a n c i a l power and t h e i r ro le in skewed income d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
I t would a l so include a change in the s t ra tegy and instruments of 
roonetajTf po l i cy aimed a t regulat ing the expansion of over a l l 
c r e d i t in accordance with the non-inf l a t ionary needs of the 
economy as well as the value or iented a l locat ion of c r e d i t to 
a t t a i n the des i red socio-economic goals of Islam, 
As regards the na ture of monetary p o l i c y , i t i s argued 
tha t in an Is lamic economy i t s object ives and too l s must be 
d i f f e ren t because of the differences in the goals and nature of 
two systems and because of the prohibi t ion of i n t e r e s t in Islam. 
Moreover, the monetary po l icy in an Is lamic economy should not 
only be in conformity with the ethos of Islam but should a lso 
help r e a l i s e the socio-economic goals tha t Islam emphasises. 
The proponents of I s lamic banking mention the following .are the 
chief ob jec t ives of the Islamic monetary pol icy: 
• 1, Economic well-being with f u l l employment and optimum 
r a t e of economic growth. 
1 See An o u t l i n e of Research Proposal in F i s c a l and 
Monetary Pol icy oS Isl^Jn^TJeddah; In te rna t iona l Centre '^or 
Research in Is lamic Economics, 1982) . 
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• 2, Socio-economic j u s t i c e and equi tab le d i s t r i bu t ion 
of income and wealth; and 
* 3 , S t a b i l i t y in the value of money to enable the medium 
of exchange to be a r e l i a b l e un i t of account, a Jus t 
standard of d i f fe red payments and a s table s tore of 
va lue . 
According t o them the c a p i t a l i s t i c o r s o c i a l i s t i c 
economy cannot be in conformity with Islam, although there may 
appear some apparent s i m i l a r i t i e s between these systems. In a 
c a p i t a l i s t eccxiomy the monetary pol icy a f fec t s the r ea l sector 
only through the r a t e of i n t e r e s t . In an Islamic economy, i t i s 
claimed, the r a t e of i n t e r e s t w i l l be replaced by the r a t e of 
pix>fits. The r a t e of p r o f i t s , however, depend on the business 
condi t ions . The investment decis ions in an Islamic economy would 
not depend on the r a t e of i n t e r e s t but only on the esqpectations 
about business p rospec t s . The proposi t ion tha t an Islamic eco-
nomy -is inherent ly s tab le appears to be some what f a r fe tched. 
The main i s sue , however, i s not whether an Islamic economy i s 
inherent ly s tab le but whether i t i s p o t e n t i a l l y s table in the 
sense of having access to var ious s t a b i l i s a t i o n pol icy i n s t r u -
ments. But as the c r i t i c s f ee l the only orthodox pol icy 
2 M. Umar Chapra, "Monetary Policy in an Is lamic 
Economy", in Money and Banking in Islam (ed,) by Ziauddin Ahmad, 
(Islamabadx Inst3rtute of Pol icy Studies , 1983), p .27 . 
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instrument still available to the central bank in an Islamic 
economy will be'moral suasion and power to change the deposit 
ratios for regulating the lending activities of the commercial 
banks. They believe ; that these policy instruments will not 
provide a really effective handle to the central bank for control 
of the money supply# particularly when excess liquidity exists 
in the banking system. In this way, as they point out, an 
Islamic central bank would not have too many 'degree of freedom' 
in exercising a decisive control cm money supply through 
indirect means for the lack of sufficient number of policy 
^ 3 
instrument . 
I t i s argued tha t the absence of the i n t e r e s t - r a t e 
instrument w i l l not c r i pp l e the monetary pol icy in an Islamic 
economy, since i n t e r e s t r a t e s as an instrument of monetary policy 
i s not a l l t ha t powerful even.: in a c a p i t a l i s t set up. However, 
the scope fo r monetary po l i cy in an Is lamic economy i s somewhat 
l imited, not because of the n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y of i n t e r e s t r a t e 
ins tmments , but 'because of the neu t r a l i s i ng changes in the 
4 
ve loc i ty of money c i r c u l a t i o n ' . 
3 S.N.H. Naqvi, E th ics and Economics, (The Islamic 
Foundation,U.K., 1981), p7l34."' 
4 Muhammad Ariff . ed . Monetary and F i sca l Economics 
of Islam (Jeddah: ICRIE, King Abdul Aziz Universi ty 1982), p , l 3 . 
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What I s noticeable Is that how In the absence of 
speculative free stock exchange and 'market r i g i d i t i e s ' , the 
Islamic economy works. How Inflationary trend would be checked 
where profit-sharing will play an Important ro le . Again, the 
danger of monopoly and oligopoly cannot be ruled out since 
privat isat ion will go hand to hand In an Islamic economy which 
will run on the market forces of supply and danand. 
Monetary policy may be defined as any deliberate action 
undertaken by the roonetairy authority to a l t e r the quantity 
avai lab i l i ty and cost ( i . e . Interest rate) of money. I t then 
becomes clear that Interest rate i s only a part of the stoi^f. 
Although Interest rate changes apparently and Influences the 
demand for and supply of money. But i t i s also conceivable 
that changes in the quantity and avai labi l i ty of money even 
without the interes t r a te . Be that as i t may, monetary policy 
based on in te res t rate manipulation suffer serious shortcomings/ 
which have severe implications for the efficiency of monetary 
policy. 
Islamic economists, while c r i t i c i s ing the Western concept 
of monetary policy, feel that monetary policy in modem times 
seems to have regained the respectabili ty i t had lost under the 
keynesian assaul t . Friedman and his disciples, in asserting the 
potency of monetary policy, have emphasized that the crucial 
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variable i s ttie stock of money* and not the rate of inteirest. 
This message of new monetarism has far-reaching implications 
for the role of monetary policy in an Islamic economy i^ere 
interes t rate i s to t a l ly prohibited. 
But how the mechanism of the Islamic monetary system 
will work ? According to i t s proponent* 
"The volume of money can be varied for 
example, through the sale/purchase of 
government secur i t ies to/from financial 
i n s t i t u t ions and through adjustments in 
the statutory ra t io of such securi t ies in 
the "advance" por t fo l ios . In inflationary 
times, a r i se in t h i s ratio will siphan off 
a large proportion of the excess money 
which has been deposited with financial 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . In addition, the central 
Bank may give directions to financial i n s t i -
tut ions regarding the volume and caonposi-
tion of t h e i r f inancial cororaitments. All 
such r e s t r i c t i ve measures may effectively 
cu r t a i l the avai lab i l i ty of funds for 
investments. But in times of depression, 
•funds unlocked through the government 
purchase of i t s bonds may not necessarily 
stimulate investment ac t iv i t i es if c 
permissit ic business e3<?>ectation prevai ls ' . 
I t i s further argued that the financial ins t i tu t ions , in an 
Islamic economy, being essent ia l ly profit-sharing and equity-
5 Mohammad Ariff, "Monetary Policy in an Interest-free 
economy - nature and scope", in Ariff ed. Monetary and Fiscal 
Economics of Islam (Jeddahj International Centre ?or Research 
in Islamic Economics, 1982), p,299. 
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seeking ins t i tu t ions can play an active role in contrast vith 
the passive role of conventional financial ins t i tu t ions outside 
the Islamic set-up. The Islamic financial ins t i tu t ions can 
therefore lead the business commiinity and influence the business 
outlook by injecting confidence and stimulating investments in 
time of economic recessions. 
The airgument that the establishment of Islamic bank 
wi l l pirovide a stimulus to aggregate saving, has been doubted 
by a nximber of wri ters . In th i s connection Timur Kuran points 
out that in countries where Islamic banks are in operation the 
stock market performs in inefficiently, and, because from the 
standpoint of individual saver and investor, mudarioah accounts 
serve the same function as stocks. The bulk of the individuals 
v*io have switched to Islamic banks are probably re la t ive ly less 
risk-averse savers who would, if the economy were more developed, 
be holding stocks. If t h i s conjecture i s correct, one can infer 
that the establishment of Islamic banks has stimulated savings 
by introducing a new financial service. This does not mean, 
however, that savings could be increased further by abolishing 
the t radi t ional banking system, for, the highly risk averse 
6 Ibid. , p . 299 
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customers of t r a d i t i o n a l banks may not f e e l comfortable with 
7 
mudaraba. i^ t h i s regard, as we have e a r l i e r mentioned 
* t h e o r e t i c a l ana lys i s has not provided a c l e a r - c u t t e s t a b l e 
hypothesis , and i t becomes an empir ical cuestion whether saving 
wi l l increase or decrease in an Islamici iO.system. Since 
consumption i s always placed on a r e l a t i v e l y low-key ba s i s in 
an Is lamic socie ty , the marginal propensi ty to consume i s 
scMnewhat low, and a low consvimption propensi ty implies a r a the r 
weak mu l t i p l i e s mechanism which does not permit economic 
dis turbances to be magnified. This considerably reduces the 
g 
chances of economic fluctuations. 
As mentioned above,the usual objectives of monetary 
policy are stability, balance of payments, growth of the 
economy and distributive justice. 
As far the policy issues are concerned, one may feel that 
too much emphasis on distributive justice in the Islamic monetary 
7 Timur Kuran, "The Economic System in Contemporary 
Islamic Thought i Interpretation and Assessment", International 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,(U.S.A.), Vol. 18, No.2, 
May 1986, pp. 135-164, 
8 See Waqar Masood Khan's. Towards an Islamic Economic 
System, (Leicester: The Islamic FoundatlonJ 1985TI 
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pol icy raay adversely a f fec t i t s over a l l e f f ic iency and 
ef fec t iveness in obtaining o the r g o a l s . In a seminar held in 
Islamabad in 1982 Muslim economists gave a t t en t ion to monetary 
pol icy instruments t h a t could be used in an Islamic economy to 
achieve the s ta ted po l icy ob jec t ives . The general fee l ing was 
t h a t abol i t ion of i n t e r e s t , and n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y of bank ra te 
weapon to the cen t r a l bank would not c o n s t i t u t e any ser ious 
handicap t o monetary roanageocient in an Is lamic economy. I t was 
pointed out t ha t control over the volume of money supply i s a 
c ruc ia l f ac to r in monetary management. Adequate control could 
be exercised on money supply in an Is lamic economy by regulat ing 
high powered money, defined a s currency in c i r cu l a t i on and 
reserve asse t s of banks. Besides, use could be made of various 
in cash reserve r a t i o , l i q u i d i t y r a t i o and c r e d i t ce i l i ng to 
bring about desired che^iges in money supply. Apart frc»n control l ing 
money supply, monetairy pol icy i s a lso capable of being used to 
influence the a l loca t ion of resources . In the in te res t -based 
system, va r i a t ions in i n t e r e s t - r a t e s and policy-induced 
d i f f e r e n t i a l s in i n t e r e s t r a t e s perform an important a l loca t ive 
funct ion. This role could be performed by changes in p r o f i t -
9 
sharing r a t i o s in an Is lamic systen. 
9 see the report on Money and Banking in Islam, o p . c i t , , 
P . 7 , 
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How w i l l the proposed monetary pol icy overcome i t s 
problems ? Doxibts have been ra ised regarding the e f f ic iency 
of a c e n t r a l bank in Is lamic economy. We have mentioned t h a t 
lack of f i nanc i a l inatsuments and the absence of var ious too l s 
l ike open market operat ion, and deposit r a t i o s are the main 
obstac les in the fvinctioning of cen t ra l bank proposed by Islamic 
economists. There i s every p o s s i b i l i t y t ha t monetary pol icy 
wi l l be weakened as there i s no c l e a r cut answer to stop the 
i n f l a t i on and ^ uneniployment. In f ac t , the defec ts of cap i ta -
l i s t monetary system cannot be seen in the context of i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s , only, o r t h a t roudarigah system i s the u l t ima te answer 
to these problems. Many Is lamic economists are s t i l l not 
s a t i s f i e d with the p r o f i t and loss sharing. After a l l , an 
Islamic economy cannot be created in vacume. All t he soc ia l 
behaviours and norms of human being cannot be dismissed. So f a r 
as the Is lamic economic system i s concerned, t he r e are many 
wr i t e r s who question the soundness of the arguments regarding 
the effect iveness of the Islamic norms. F i r s t of a l l , the 
impl ica t ions of these norms are unclear in most of the context 
where they are expected to opera te . 'A pious Muslim eager to 
* follow them may be confused as to what wage i s j u s t and what 
p r o f i t r a t e i s normal. Likewise, he may be unclear about the 
meaning of "moderation" in consumption and of the p r a c t i c a l 
i i rpl icat ion of the injunction against harm to o the r s through 
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productive a c t i v i t i e s " . This vagtiners, as c r i t i c s argue >K)uld 
threaten the legit imacy of the Is lamic economic system. One 
wr i te r , fo r example, f tnds t ha t the fundamental fea tures of the 
proposed Islamic economic system^ r a i s e s ser ious doubts about 
the claim t h a t t h i s framework provides a funct ional a l t e rna t ive 
to e x i s t i n g system. He says: 
• "The suggested behavioural norms are not 
only r iddled witb ambiguity, but a l so un-
l i k e l y t o enjoy widespread adherence in a 
l a rge soc ie ty . In pr^KS^ice, many of them 
would have to be t r e a t e d as s ta te-enforced 
laws. There i s no way of ensuring, moreover, 
t h a t s t a t e o f f i c i a l s would behave in an 
I s lamica l ly "correc t" manner. These c r i t i c i sms 
are borne out by the f a c t t h a t throughout 
most of the pas t fourteen cen tu r i e s , members 
and o f f i c i a l s of Muslim communities have bad 
a tenuous l ink with I s l am ' s behavioural norms, 
even when they have more o r l e s s agreed as to 
what these norms means", 10 
Ciredit Control and Credi t Operation of Is lamic Banks; 
Credit ccxitrol in the contenporary f inanc ia l world i s 
of g rea t s ign i f icance . I t a f fec ts the consumers, business and 
governments/ ^nsumers borrow ti> buy the goods and services they 
want now. Business borrows to finance investment p r o j e c t s . Like-
wise, the government borrows for meet i t s various needs. I t 
10 Tirour, Kuran, op. c i t . , p , 134. 
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borrows for defence spending, socio-economic pj^ogranmes, 
payment of the i n t e r e s t old debt . The go-vemment borrows funds 
through the cen t r a l bank, and then lends to small business^ 
fanners, low-income groups and o t h e r s . Keeping t h i s i a mind 
economists have given much at tent i rajs t o the problem of c red i t 
regula tor . In c a p i t a l i s t economies money market occttpies a 
cen t r a l p l a c e . Change in c r e d i t po l icy and t rends has i t s 
inpact on the Gross National Product, When c red i t i s p l e n t i f u l , 
banks are more generous i n making loans f o r the bui lding of 
inventor ies , construct ion of new f a c t o r i e s and r e s i d e n t i a l 
housing. Thus a rapid growth in money and c r e d i t accompanies 
booms, and a reduction in money and ciredit i s often followed by 
recession or worse, 
A bank, having received some cash from custcxners vAio 
have brought funds to the banks i s therefore in a pos i t ion to 
make loans o r investments. A bank, say bank A, s t a r t i n g out with 
deposi ts in currency and coins of Rs. 100,000, might f ee l safe to 
lend Rs, 80,^00. In a check-using commxanity, the bank would make 
i t s loan by giving the borrower the r igh t to draw checks against 
i t . In fact the procedure of c r e d i t c rea t ion comes thjDough the 
11 James S Duesenberry, Money and Credit i Impact and 
Control, 3rd ed, ?New Delhi: Pr^vEIce,-HSIT~onnB3:a, Priva'fe 
Limited, 1979) . 
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vhole set of banks. These banks would create an amount of inoney 
in the foxsn of dex>oslts equal to several times the amount of the 
original deposits , Conmercial bank deposits const i tute a s igni -
f icant part of money supply. These d ^ o s i t s may be divided into 
two parts; f i r s t l y , primary deposits' which provide the banking 
system with the base money (cash in values plus deposits with 
the central bank) and drivative deposits* which in a proportional 
reserve syst&n represent money created by commercial banks in the 
process of credit extensions and constitute a major source of 
monetary e^qpansion in economies with well-developed banking habits, 
Since deriat ive deposits lead to an increase in money supply 
in the saone manner as currency used by the government de f i c i t s , 
i t hag the potential of being inflationary in the absence of 
offsett ing growth in output, * 
The relation between credit created by the commercial 
banks and resulting output i s the major problem that muslim 
economists argue in the case of in f la t ion . Contrary to conven-
tional systens, they say that Islamic concept of profit-sharing 
system i s more stable . I t i s argued that : 
12 Ibid, , Ch,3 
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"Bank's mudaaraba advances could s t i l l 
be a multiple o£ the ir saving deposits , 
but the ir return accrue as a percentage 
of prof i t actually real ised \ih&a these 
advances results In creation of additional 
social wealth. These returns are then 
shared by the bank with the depositors 
according to an agreed percentage. Accruals 
of prof i t s on deposits In t h i s case devolves 
on exposer of risks Involved in productive 
enterprise . The magnitude of these prof i ts 
i s determined by the conditions of market 
and the two ratios of profit-sharing which 
are the subject to the forces of demand 
and supply. The power of real savings to 
acquire additional resources with the mere 
passage of time i s completely destroyed. 
Instead they have the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
acqalring additional resources to the 
extent that their u t i l i s a t i o n in produc-
t ive enterprise actually resul t s in the 
creation of additional wealth". 13 
The present system as i t i s pointed out prompts the 
banks to patronise speculators, other f inancial intermediaries 
and the government who are ideal short-term borrower. The u l t i -
mate investors figure in their port fo l ios only marginally and 
often indirect ly . The unusually lengthy chain of intermediaries 
between the ultimate investor i s largely a product of case with 
%*iich credit instrtiments can be created and handled, thanks to 
in teres t . They bear very l i t t l e relations to the structure of 
production. To jus t i fy th i s proliferation of f inancial inter-
mediaries and credit instruments with reference to the variety 
14 M.isi. Siddiqi, Issues in Islamic Banking, (Leicester* The Islamic-Foundation, lySJ;, pp, 55-57. 
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of t a s t s , regarding l i q u i d i t y , r i sk , s i z e of holding and time 
period involved prestunes a s a n c t i t y f o r t h e s e t a s t e s \<hich i s 
h igh ly doubtful . To a very great ex tent they are the product 
» 14 
of high powered propaganda and psycho log ica l manipulation. 
The arguments against c r e d i t creat ion by Muslim wri ters , 
have centred around the i s s u e of i n f l a t i o n a r y t r e n d s . They 
say that i n f l a t i o n i s - •• . . p a r t l y due to c r e d i t expansion by 
oommercial banks. According ' ^ 9 the current U t e r a t u r e 
t o the only e f f e c t i v e means of curbing i n f l a t i o n a r y trends, 
i s that conmercial bank should not be empowered t o create 
add i t iona l c r e d i t and t h i s job would be done by the Central Bank. 
This i s s u e begs numerous quest ions %Aitic(h Is lamic wr i ters have 
d i scussed in various conferences and seminars. 
The question of c r e d i t contro l in Is lamic f i n a n c i a l system 
i s a major i s s u e which i s s t i l l a t d i scuss ion l e v e l . How the 
centra l bank w i l l control the money supply s ince there i s no 
element of rate of i n t e r e s t in i t s func t ion ing . This question i s 
much re la ted t o the goal of p r i c e s t a b i l i t y and rapid rea l growth. 
As in conventional systan, we see that centra l bank's monetary 
p o l i c y work through the contro l o t monetary expansion. The 
mechanic of the system i s that when the centra l Bank wants to 
14 I b i d , , p . 57 . 
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control the money supply, i t cut do%ni on the reserves a v a i l -
able to the bank. The Central Bank change t h i s reserve through 
the "open-xoajdcet-operation", In t h i s way the reduction in the 
bank reserves forces a mul t ip le contrac t ion in t o t a l bank money. 
The contract ion in the money sxapply tends a t f i r s t to make 
money ' t i gh t* - t ha t i s more e ^ e n s i v e and l e s s a v a i l a b l e . The 
reduced quanti ty of money, in ottier words, r a i s e the cost of 
money ( i . e . i n t e r e s t ra te ) and reduce the arooiuit of c r e d i t 
ava i lab le to people . With i n t e r e s t r a t e s higher, and with c red i t 
hard to ge t r e s u l t s in the reduction of wealth of the people 
and companies. There are a l so e f f e c t s in p r i v a t e and publ ic 
pending , vdiich reduces the investment, A reduced supply of 
money tend to reduce aggregate danand, income, output , jobs and 
i n f l a t i o n , ^ This long process of c e n t r a l bank in conventional 
system makes an impact on money and c r e d i t con t ro l . As fo r the 
Islamic f inanc ia l system i s concerned, we f ind tha t the ro le of 
cen t ra l bank, i s r a t he r weak, because i t would be xinable to a l t e r 
thd reserve reqxiirements. In t h i s way, the s t a b i l i z a t i o n t a rge t s 
would have to be rea l i zed through the cont ro l of the monetary 
• base r a the r than c r e d i t , A recent study, regajcding t h i s i s sue , 
shows tha t the monetary au tho r i t i e s operating in an Islamic 
frame-work continue to have the power t o regula te banking and 
f inanc ia l operation in the economy. To achieve i t s po l icy 
15 See Pai>l A. Sanuelson, Economics^ l2th ed , (Mc Graw-
Hi l l Book Co, 1985), Ch , l5 . 
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objective; the central bank has the control over the sijpply of 
'high powered* money (that i s curirency plus deposit l i a b i l i t i e s 
of the central bank to consnercial banks)« the reserve rat ios 
on the different types of l i a b i l i t i e s , and the maximum amount of 
assets that bank can allocate to the ir profit-sharing a c t i ^ t i e s , 
A further control i s available to the central bank through i t s 
purchase of equity shares of banks and other f inancial inter-
mediaries. Though performance of i t s regulatory, supervisory 
and commercial fxinctions, as well as i t s lender of l a s t resort 
role, the central bank can continue to make influence on the 
f inancial system. Moreover, opportunities may e x i s t to direct 
investing in the real sector on a profit-sharing b a s i s . The 
a b i l i t y to buy and s e l l securi t ies representing real asset in 
the f inancial market, that i s , open market operations, would 
s t i l l be permitted as long as these secur i t ies do not have 
par value features and a non-zeix> coupon rate. The suggestion 
has been made that central bank could regulate profit-sharing 
ratio between the banks and borrowers on the one hand and the 
banks and depositors on the other. Variations in these 
rat ios would a l ter the rates of return and could have the same 
impact as changes in interest rates on the other a l l and 
sectoral flows of financial resources. 
16 Mohsin S, Khan and Abbas MiraJchor, "The Frame Work 
and practice of Islamic Banking", Finance and Development, 
September 1986, pp. 32-36. 
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We may not siniply over-look the western f i nanc i a l 
system as being ' i n f l a t i o n a r y ' o r t ha t c r e d i t c rea t ion of 
commercial bank can not be con t ro l l ed . The conteaaporary banking 
systan which i s governed by the Central Banks of the governments 
have t h e i r own t o o l s to control the c r e d i t supply, and hence 
check the money expansion in to the economy, Hansen t e l l s us 
t h a t under the f r a c t i o n a l reserve system i f the banks keep a 
reserve r a t i o of one-tenth ( tha t i s , if they keep t h e i r cash 
reserve a t about one- tenth of t h e i r t o t a l depos i t ) , i t follows 
t h a t f o r every addi t iona l cash d o l l a r obtained by the bank they 
c rea te ten d o l l a r s of bank money or depos i t . As ths banking 
business i s concerned, the roodem banks do not keep 100 pe r cent 
reserve f o r t h e i r deposit , on the contrary, banks are required, 
by law to keep a small f r ac t iona l reserve fo r each $ l of 
depos i t s . These deposi ts can be held in cash on hand o r in 
n o n - i n t e r e s t bearing deposi t a t the c e n t r a l bank. I f bank kept 
100 p e r cent cash reserve against a l l depos i t s , the re would be no 
mul t ip le c rea t ion of money. There would be only a I - t o I 
17 exchange of one kind of money fo r another kind of money. 
17 Alvin H, Hansen, Monetary Theory and F i s c a l Pol icy, 
(Mc, Graw-Hill Book Conrpany, Inc . , 1 9 ^ T . Ch,2. 
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Is lamic wr i t e r s favour imposit ion of a 100 p e r cent 
reserve reqaireroeats on coBmercial banks . I t i s j u s t i f i e d 
18 
on three grounds t F i r s t l y , they blame t h a t f r ac t iona l reserve*^ 
causes the nonetary system to suf fer from an "inherent 
uns tab i l i ty* because any switch over from "high powered money to 
"deposi t money" and vice-verca changes the sxjpply of money. 
But with 100 per cent reseirve, as they claim, such a switch 
wi l l change only the composition of money, leaving i t s t o t a l 
supply constant , Seccmdly, changes in money supply ar is ing 
from deposit creat ion o r r e su l t i ng from subs t i t u t i ng deposit 
and cash make i t more cos t ly to maintain the exis t ing stock 
of r ea l balance . Thirdly, money c rea t ion i s a soc ia l pirerogative 
and hence the benef i t of the process of money creat ion should 
accure to the whole socie ty which can bes t be achieved through 
19 100 per cent reserve system, * 
One wr i te r ou t l i nes a model with 100 per cent reserve 
system in which the l i q u i d i t y and f i nanc i a l requiranents of the 
18 Fract ional reseirves banking means modem system of 
banking where only a f rac t ion of depos i t s are held as reserves, 
the r e s t are used for loans and inves tments . Their v i t a l 
function i s to enable the cen t r a l bank t o cont ro l the arooiint 
checking deposi ts o r bank money- t h a t banks can c r e a t e . By 
imposing high fixed l ega l reserve requirements, the cen t ra l 
bank can l imi t the growth of bank money to i t s desired t a rge t , 
19 See Money and Banking in Islam, op , c i t , , p , 5 . 
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pr iva t e business sec to r %*ill be n»et by the Central bank ' s opening 
d ^ o s i t and investment account in ooraroercial banks and o ther 
f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s which in turn w i l l inves t these deposi ts 
in the r e a l sec tor and share the p r o f i t with the c e n t r a l bank, 
va r i a t ions in the c e n t r a l bank ' s deposi t accounts with the 
commercial banks w i l l have the e f fec t of bringing about the 
20 desired changes in money supply. This concept however, leads 
to the r ea l i za t i on t h a t commercial bank w i l l be reduced to safe-
keeping i n s t i t u t i o n l i k e the goldsmith 's establishment of the 
bank which was the bas i s of the evolut ion of modem banking 
21 
system. This a lso means t h a t coninercial bank cannot even 
invest the funds deposi ted with them. However, Muslim w r i t e r ' s 
argument about c e n t r a l bank ' s role makes one to think t h a t 
cen t ra l bank ' s e f fec t iveness w i l l diminish e spec i a l l y in the 
matter of monetary p o l i c y . 
Is lamic economists in t h i s way, think t h a t with the 100 
per cent reserve requirement there would not be any major change 
in the v i t a l irole of the c e n t r a l bank. I t ' s regulatory power 
over the supply of money by denying or granting loan to the 
20 Money and Banking in Is lam, o p , c i t , , p , 7 . 
21 Commercial banking i s sa id to have began with the 
goldsmith, who developed the p r ac t i c e of s tor ing peop le ' s golds 
and valuables f o r safe-keeping. At f i r s t , such establishments 
were simply l ike warehouses. Depositors l e f t gold f o r safe-
keeping, were given a r ece ip t , l a t e r presented the rece ip t ,pa id 
a small fee fo r the safe-keeping and got back t h e i r gold. 
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commercial bank i s recognized. They, hoviever, accept that in 
an Islamic system, central bank's loan to commercial banks are 
supposed to be l imited, as f inancial assets in general are 
l ike ly to be risk bearing and central bank's involvement in risk 
financing may reduce i t s status as the regulatory authority. 
Hovever, loans may be sanctioned against reserves with the 
central bank. What they find injust ice in the present system 
i s the charging interes t by commercial banks while their money 
i s laying id le with the central bank in the form of reserve. 
In t h i s regard, another question related to t h i s i s asked 
as how the commercial banks in the Islamic system would utilisse 
their current account balances. If the balance i s u t i l i z e d for 
short-terro profit-bearing a<^ances, then the depositors wi l l 
have to bear risk which they may not be wil l ing to do. I f 100 
per cent cash i s maintained, the cost of transactions on current 
22 account may be too high for smooth commercial functioning. For 
this purpose i t i s proposed that a service charge on such 
transaction wi l l compensate the cost of mainting these transac-
t ion . The concept of service charge, however, i s highly contro-
versial* A good nxambers of writers find i t as similar to interest . 
22 Ibid . , p . 64 
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According t o an a u t h o r ' s vlew^the claijns t ha t t h i s i s 
d i f fe ren t faora charging i n t e r e s t since i t i s not t i e d to the 
length of time within a month o r t o the size of loan, T h i s l s 
a misleading argiiment, ? i r s t # though the r a t e i s not t i e d to 
the length of time within a month, i ts upper l imi ted i s a month, 
thus the re i s a time dimension. I t i s analogous to an annual 
r a t e which i s not t i e d t o the time period within a year . Second* 
the re i s an upper bound on the s ize of such lo^^s s ince these 
loans , . • •# can not be more than the average pas t l iqxiidity 
pos i t ion of a borrower with the bank, Iherefore, we safe ly con-
clude tha t t h i s charge i s s imi la r to i n t e r e s t paid on a bank 
, 23 loan. 
I n f l a t i on and Islamic Economy s 
A survey of Muslim l i t e r a t u r e on money and banking i n d i -
catefi t h a t question of i n f l a t i o n has occupied the minds of many 
proponents of Islani banking -rlv. . as to what extent an Islamic 
economy could bear the e v i l s of recession, depression and i n f l a -
t ion ? I s a long-run i n f l a t i ona ry t rend poss ib le or des i rab le 
in an Is lamic economy? 
Even i f i t i s poss ib le to cont ro l i n f l a t i on in an Islamic 
economy, w i l l i t be poss ib le to overcome a recession? What i f 
23 Waqar Masood Khan, Toway^^ an IpJSgjast-free Islamic 
Economic SystemS op, c i t „ p ^ v 
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prospects axe dim and the cominercial banXs and the associated 
p r i v a t e sec tors are not wi l l ing t o expand t h e i r mudazfaah 
Investment? However, t h i s hypothesis may be doulyited on the 
groxind Ifaak monetary po l icy alone cannot solve these problems 
unless o ther government p o l i c i e s a lso work in the same d i rec t ion . 
I t i s ccinraon e^qperiences of the i n d u s t r i a l countr ies tha t ef fects 
of monetary pol icy are often negated by \anduly 'expansionary 
f i s c a l po l i cy , I t i s - s a i d ; t h a t mul t ip le c r e d i t creat ion by 
banks a lso leads to i n f l a t i o n . I t i s , however, argued tha t 
some kind of indexation would be necessary a t l e a s t during 
^ t r a n s i t o r y period to p ro tec t c a p i t a l from erosion" 1, The 
suggestion of indexation in the time of i n f l a t i o n cannot be 
ruled out, because, in p r a c t i c e , t he money value of a loan would 
be increased in l ine with the r i s ing i n f l a t i o n so tha t the borrow-
e r would have" to repay the loan in r e a l term. In the sbsence 
of indexation, rapid i n f l a t i on , by eroding the r ea l value of 
loans, sh i f t s resources from lenders to the borrowers and 
therefore d is rupts the c r e d i t mechanism and c a p i t a l roarketi» Some 
economists, however, consider t ha t indexat ion i s not a cure for 
i n f l a t i o n . Because i f i t was so, the e n t i r e economies of western 
would have adopted t h i s method. In t h i s way, they would have 
ignored in f la t ion and concentrated on reducing uneitploynient.This 
sovinds l ike a good idea . But on c l o s e r look i t tu rns out that 
more you pro tec t the economy from i n f l a t i o n by indexation, the 
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more u n s t a b l e dLnf l a t l o n b e c o n e s . 
A c a u t i o u s sunsnary of tbJLs d i s c u s s i o n viould be t h a t an 
I s l a m i c economy cano t overcome t h e miseiry of i n f l a t i o n simply 
by adopt ing t h e i n d e x a t i o n method,Today ' s i n f l a t i o n s come i n 
through v a r i o u s ways. Economists today t h ink t h a t t h e r e i s 
n a t u r a l r a t e of unemployment which b r i n g i n f l a t i o n i n t o t h e 
economy. This phenomenon i s bound t o h ^ p e n even i n an I s l amic 
economy. 
Demand f o r Money i n I s l a m i c Ecopomy; 
I t i s c la imed t h a t i n t h e I s l a m i c economic system t h e 
concept of money i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t from o t h e r p r e v a i l i n g 
system. Though Muslim w r i t e r s acknowledge t h a t b a s i c concept 
of money as e x p l a i n e d i n t h e economic t h e o r i e s w i l l n o t be ve ry 
d i f f e r e n t from t h e p r e v a i l i n g one . Quest ions have been r a i s e d as • 
what should be t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of money in an I s l a m i c economy. 
26 Paul A, Samuelson, Economics Twelfth Ed i t i on (Mc Graw-
H i l l Book Company 1986); The a u t h o r i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t i ndexa t ion 
may be temporary dev i ce t o check i n f l a t i o n . But assuming t h a t 
whole economy i s t o be indexed, then problom w i l l a r i s e . Foi 
exanple , suppose t h a t wages, r e n t s , i n t e r e s t r a t e s and p r i c e s 
9XB a l l 100 p e r c e n t indexed t o t h e consxaner p r i c e index (CPI)* 
say a bad h a r v e s t d r i v e s food p r i c e s up enough t o i n c r e a s e the 
CPI b \ 10 p e r c e n t . The shock w i l l rage through t h e economy 
l i k e «»n ep idemic . Every th ing indexed t o the CPI goes up 10 p e r 
c e n t . But s i n c e a l l c o s t s a r e indexed , t h e next month CPI 
goes up almost 10 p e r c e n t a g a i n . And t h e t h i r d month, p r i c e 
r i s e almost 10 p e r c e n t a g a i n . And i n t h i s way p r i c e would be 
up many t imes ( p , 2 5 5 ) . 
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Do t h e v a r i o u s p r e s e n t day fonns of money f u l f i l t h e s e 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ? I s t h e r e any room o r scope f o r a r i s i n g p r i c e 
l eve l ? Would such a t r e n d be i n harmony wi th a riba-f r e e 
I s l a m i c economy? Keeping i n view t h e main o b j e c t i v e of an 
I s l a m i c economy^is i t n e c e s s a r y t o have f u l l r b o d i e d o r f u l l y 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e money i n an I s l a m i c economy? What i s t h e scope 
f o r * f i a t money* ? Hovi does ' f i a t money' w i th a d e c l i n i n g r e a l 
va lue f i t i n t o a r i b a - f r e e I s l a m i c economy? Would t h e c e n t r a l 
bank dLn an I s l a m i c economy have t h e p r i v i l e g e t o p r i n t money 
wi thou t t h e l ack ing of r e a l r e s o u r c e s ? I f t h i s p r i v i l e g e i s 
t o be recognised* can some gu id ing p r i n c i p l e s be p rov ided i n 
t h e l i g h t of gj^^arl' ah t o p r e v e n t government from e :q ) lo i t ing 
t h i s p r i v i l e g e and t o save t h e economy from t h e e f f e c t s of 
i n f l a t i o n r e s u l t i n g from r a p i d l y expanding f i a t money. What i s 
t h e scope f o r d e p o s i t money in an I s l a m i c economy, and i n t h e 
l i g h t of s h a r i ' a h i s i t p o s s i b l e t o say s p e c i f i c a l l y whether 
any i n d i v i d u a l o r i n s t i t u t i o n h a s t h e r i g h t t o l end money which 
he o r i t does no t h a v e . I s i t p o s s i b l e f o r an I s l a m i c s t a t e t o 
make i t s money immune from t h e monetary, f i s c a l and fo re ign 
27 
exchange p o l i c x e s of o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . 
27 See Ar i f f , o p , c i t . , p . 381 
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All the above I s sues make a complex s i tua t ion fo r Muslim 
v r i t e r s t o reach a d e f i n i t e conclusion as to what would Jae the 
r e a l pos i t i on of an Is lamic economy. Since there i s not any 
rea l I s lamic economy. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o say anything with 
c e r t a i n t y on the above i s s u e s . Some wr i t e r s t r y to point out 
tha t in an Is lamic economy* the demand fo r money w i l l a r i s e 
b a s i c a l l y from the t ransac t ion and precautionary needs which are 
determined l a rge ly by the leve l of money income and i t s d i s t r i -
bu t ion . The abo l i t i on of i n t e r e s t and the levy of gakab a t the 
r a t e of two and half p e r cent w i l l tend to minimise the specu-
l a t i v e demand fo r money, 
Muslim w r i t e r s have presented t h e i r arguments in the 
context of c a p i t a l i s t economy where demand for money have always e 
engaged the a t t en t ion of economists. According to modem eco-
nomic concept the demand for money a r i s e s from the need for 
a medium of exchange, t h a t i s , from a t ransact ion demand. People 
hold currency to buy goods and pay for o ther se rv ices . As the 
incomes r i s e , the value of the goods goes up and therefore people 
need more money fo r t r ansac t ions , and in t h i s way, the demand 
fo r money r i s e s . The denand for money d i f f e r s from tha t of o ther 
commodities. I t i s so because money i s valued for i t s use as 
i n d i r e c t l y and not fo r i t s d i r e c t u t i l i t y . At the same time 
money holdings a re l imi ted because money has an opportiinity cos t . 
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Economists believe that the demand for money -will be sensitive 
to interest rates. By this, they mean that with higher interest 
rates the demand for money will be low. The classical economic 
concept of three motives, i.e. transactions motives, pre-
cautionary motives and even speculative motives are considered 
to be appreciaible even in an Islamic economy. Though explained 
by Keynes^ these motives in the capitalist system are foundation, 
of the denand for money. However, among these there motives, 
the speculative d&nand for money has raised some questions. 
It is felt that there is room for speculative motives in Islam, 
This is so because speculation often entails stockpiling and 
profiteering activities which have adverse ecoaomic implications 
29 
fo r the community a t l a r g e . 
28 John Maynard Keynes, (1883-1946) General Theory of 
Employment. Interest« and Money, (New Yoric? Harcourt, Brace, & 
World, 1^36). Keynes c a l l e d tRe n e ^ to hold money as a means 
of pa3^ent the t r ansac t ions motives fo r holding money. In addi-
t ion to holding money to make normal day-to-day purchases, people 
may a lso hold some e x t r a money to deal with une:q?ected circums-
tanceS'Keynes ca l led t h i s the precautionary motive for holding 
money. In addi t ion, however, Vteynes d is t inguished a t h i r d motives 
fo r holding money ca l l ed as specula t ive motives. Because people 
may p re fe r to held much of t h e i r wealth in the form of money, 
hoping to exchange the money fo r bonds a f t e r i n t e r e s t r a t e s r i s e 
and the p r ice of bonds f a l l s . In t h i s way, Keynes thought that the 
demand for money depends both on the l eve l of nominal income and 
on nominal i n t e r e s t r a t e s . As nominal income a r i s e s , other things 
being equal , the demand fo r money wi l l increase because of the 
t ransac t ions and precaut ionary motives. But given the leve l of 
nominal na t iona l income, the specula t ive motive wi l l tend to make 
the demand for money increase as nominal i n t e r e s t r a t e s decrease 
and to make i t decrease as nominal i n t e r e s t r a t e s increase . For 
a ful3 treatment on the subject see; Stephen M. Goldfeld, Lester 
V, Chandler, The Economics of Money aixd Banking, 9th ed, (New 
York* Harper & Row, Publ i shers , 1986) p a r t 4 . 
29 Mohaimiad Arif f, ed . Monetary and F i sca l Eccmomics of 
Islam, op. c i t . , p . 297. 
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A c l o s e r looX a t demeoad f o r money concept of i n t e r e s t -
f r e e system r e v e a l s t h a t i t i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t f r an what i s now 
p r e v a i l i n g in e x i s t i n g f i n a n c i a l wor ld . As we have seen, 
c r e a t i o n of money i n an i n t e r e s t - f r e e system w i l l be inves tment 
o r i e n t e d , no t based on l a n d i n g . Here a r i s e s t h e ques t i ons t h a t 
i n t h e absence of i n t e r e s t r a t e s -nAxat w i l l i n f l u e n c e the 
borrowing and l e n d i n g . Th i s i s because i n t e r e s t r a t e i n f luences 
the amount of money peop le want t o ho ld and the reby t h e amount 
30 
they lend o r bor row. 
I s l a m i c monetary p o l i c y sugges t t h a t ' i n t e r e s t - b e a r i n g 
a s s e t , in an I s l a m i c economy, would n o t be a v a i l a b l e ; l eav ing 
t h e h o l d e r of l i q u i d f vmds t h e op t ion of e i t h e r ho ld ing them 
i n t h e form of cash wi th no r e t u r n o r i n v e s t i n g the i r p r o f i t -
ea rn ing a s s e t s t o g e t a t l e a s t some r e t u r n . Sho r t - t e rm as wel l 
a s long-term inves tment o p p o r t u n i t i e s wi th varying degree of 
r i s k w i l l presumably be a v a i l a b l e t o a l l i n v e s t o r s whether they 
a r e h igh o r low r i s k tSJcers, Th i s i s pe rhaps t h e most 
cha l l eng ing i s s u e , so f a r t h e a v a i l a b l e s t u d i e s and r e l a t e d 
conc lus ions f o r c e one t o ask t h a t wh i l e implementing an I s l a m i c 
f i n a n c i a l system how t h e r i s k y r e t u r n - b e a r i n g ins t rument can 
be dev ised so t h a t sx i f f ic ien t degree of l i q x i i d i t y , s e c u r i t y 
and p r o f i t a b i l i t y can be a t t a i n e d . 
30 D i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t e r e s t r a t e s on d i f f e r e n t k inds of 
s e c u r i t i e s , i n f l u e n c e how bor rowers o b t a i n t h e i r funds and 
l e n d e r s i n v e s t t h e i r fxinds. Thus changes i n s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s draw money from market where fiznds a r e p l e n t i f u l t o 
markets where t hey a r e scarce-? See t h e whole p r o c e s s i n ex ten-
s i v e a n a l y s i s by David E -La id l e r , The Demand f o r Moneyt Theories 
and Evidence (Bombayj A l l i e d px ib l i she r s , 1972) p a r t 2. " 
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CHAPTER - VI 
EXPERIMENTS IN ISLAMIC BANKING - EGYPT 
Development of banking system i n West Asian cx)xintries was ^ 
.Ijhe r e s u l t of t h e i r t r a d e r e l a t i o n s wi th t h e western cox jn t r i es . 
Arab t r a d e r s impor ted d u r a b l e goods from t h e West and i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l companies i n v e s t e d in o i l e x p l o r a t i o n and l i g h t manu-
f a c t u r i n g in t h e Arab r e g i o n . This of course , r e q u i r e d f low of 
payment i n bo th ways which, i n t u r n , l e d to t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t 
of f o r e i g n banks in t h e Arab wor ld . I n i t i a l l y , B r i t i s h and 
French banks were dominant and spread a l l over t h e Arab reg ion , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r World War I I , American banks came in l a t e r 
i n t h e 1960s, At t h a t t ime, t h e r e were no Arab banks i n t h e 
western c o u n t r i e s . Trade payments, e x p a t r i a t e r e m i t t a n c e s and 
c o r p o r a t e p r o f i t s were t h e r e f o r e channa l i sed in and ou t of t h e 
Arab wDCLd through f o r e i g n banks o r through Arab banks wi th 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o r r e s p o n d e n t s . The Arab merchants s tepped i n t o 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l banking i n t h e 1970s mainly because t h i s decade wit-
nessed a s u b s t a n t i a l expansion of Arab f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y in Arab o i l e ^ o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s of t h e Gulf Coope-
r a t i o n C o u n c i l , 
The a v a i l a b i l i t y of funds and absence of r e s t r i c t i o n s a r e 
two impor t an t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t have f a c i l i t a t e d t h e e n t r y 
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of Arab banking i n t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l arena, Arab p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
took var ious forms, s t a r t i n g in the l a t e 1960s, Arab banks formed 
j o i n t ventures with la rge European banks. Example of these 
include the French Arab Bank (FRAB) and the Union of Arab-French 
Banks. These arrangements re f lec ted the procninance a t the time, 
of Beirut based Arab banks and t h e i r strong t i e s with Prance. 
There was also a move towards London, where o ther j o i n t ventures 
were formed, notably the Saudi In t e rna t i ona l Bank. 
By 1975, d i f f e ren t arrangements evaluated in response t o 
new oppor tun i t i e s . For the f i r s t time, the Arabs es tab l i shed 
t h e i r own banking consor t ia to cover new markets. For example, 
a large pan-Arab consortium es tabl i shed the Gulf In t e rna t i ona l 
Bank in Bahrain, All the GCC governments and I r aq pa r t i c i pa t ed in 
the formation of t h i s bank f ive years l a t t e r . The Arab banking 
corporation followed, and by then, Bahrain had become an important 
offshore market serving the whole region. 
Apart from i t s , t h i s region i s also known as a centre of 
Is lamic banking. Some of the oldest and l a rges t Islamic banks are 
1 Jean - Francois Seznes, The Financia l Markets of the 
Arabian Gulf, (Beckenham s Groom Helm Ltd , 1987), Ch,3 . 
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located in the region, operating in sn environment of Islamic 
ideas on banking and commercial a c t i v i t i e s . These Islamic banks 
have t h e i r spec i f ic fea tures t h a t d i f f e r from o ther banks. In 
p a r t i c u l a r . Is lamic banks are by de f in i t ion i n v e s t o r s . This means 
tha t they cannot deposit t h e i r funds in o t h e r banking communities, 
l i k e o the r commercial banks. This i s a challenge tha t the Islamic 
banks face, e spec ia l ly when such t r a d i t i o n a l banks are working in 
a d i f fe ren t a tmo^here, working according to d i f fe ren t ru les than 
those t ha t should govern Is lamic banks. 
In t h i s chapter we wi l l see the funct ions and performance 
of Is lamic banks being experimented in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, 
Although the f u l l scale operat ions of Is lamic banking p e r s i s t in 
I ran and Pakistan where experiments have a t t r a c t e d the a t ten t ion 
of bankers and economists, we have se lec ted the former two 
countr ies mainly due to the fac t t ha t the Is lamic bank originated 
in Egypt and tha t Saudi Arabia has also played a key role in the 
development of Islamic banking system in Muslim coun t r i e s . 
Is lamic Banking in Egypt : 
4 In Egypt, Islamic banks emerged in response to a huge 
popular demand. As soon as the Is lamic banks were set-up they 
were a t t r a c t e d by customers. In fac t Egypt was the f i r s t country 
to introduce the Islamic bank. The Nasser Bank, opened in the 
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s ix t ies as a pool of resources for the poor. I t was supported 
by the s t a t e . I t offered in teres t - f ree loans to the low-paid 
at favourable terms for social as well as commercial needs and 
acted more as a social security organization than a bank. In fact, 
there are various factors that have influenced the danand for the 
services of Islamic banks. Also the prevailing economic condition 
of Egypt has fac i l i ta ted the move towards t h i s direction. During 
scene past years, Egyptian economy has been passing through hard 
times with current recession effecting the world economy. This 
2 in turn has effected the growth ra te of Islamic banking. 
So far the future of Islamic bank i s concerned, i t i s too 
early to give a final evaluation of Islamic banking in Egypt, 
Infact, even though, three decades have passed, the experiments 
are s t i l l at the early stage. Since Islamic banks adhere to the 
Shari * ah, the challenge has put additional pressures on Islamic 
bankers to explain the i r new pract ices not only to customers but 
to other finance houses. From the i r various annual reports i t 
appears that they are very far from having exhausted the i r poten-
t i a l s . There i s a conflict between Islamic and conventional 
banking in th i s respect. Islamic banking also has a socio-economic 
aspect, as i t combines the object of p rof i t ab i l i ty with the 
2 Rodney Wilson, 'Islamic Banking and Finance', The Middle 
East and North Africa, 3 4th ed, (Europa Publications Limited, 
1988;, p,160. 
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importance of meeting ce r ta in soc ia l goa ls through the iroploDaen-
t a t i on of zalcah, a tax on p r o f i t and c a p i t a l . Funds co l lec ted 
in t h i s way are d i s t r i b u t e d according t o ce r t a in c r i t e r i a t o the 
poor and needy, and t h e i r impact on soc ie ty p a r t i c u l a r l y in 
3 
developing countr ies i s moral, psychological and economic. 
There are considerable amount of c r i t i c i s m s regarding the 
functions of Islamic banks in Egypt which would mobil ise long-
term funds. How the banking would af fec t the economy? What 
po l icy w i l l i t adopt? The Central opera t ional methods of an 
Is lamic banks guarantees tw6 thingst F i r s t , one must know the 
customers in t imate ly and vindertake p ro j ec t s in Cjuestion, Secondly, 
one must study the projec t thoroughly t o assess i t s v i a b i l i t y . 
Is lamic banks facing problems in Egypt are genera l ly of 
two types . The f i r s t problem a r i s e s from the banking control , 
procedures exercised by the cen t r a l bank on a l l banks including 
Is lamic banks with regard t o monetary reserves and l i q u i d i t y 
requirements. The second problon r e l a t e s to the fac t tha t in 
p r a c t i c e Islamic banks do not have a bank of banks. But d e ^ i t e 
a l l these defects , they have been found not only highly competitive 
3 "Islamic Banking in Egypt x the s tory so far" , Arabia (London), February 1986, p . 5 8 . 
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as c r e d i t banks but also highly ccwipetitive as deposi t banks. 
The r e l i g ious enthusiasm of a l l concerned seems t o present a major 
4 force behind the success of the banks . Banks in Egypt are 
divided in to commercial banks, business and investment banks, 
and spec ia l i sed banks. There i s no spec ia l category fo r Islamic 
banks. The Fa i sa l Islamic Bank comes under commercial banks, 
while the Islamic in t e rna t iona l bank fo r investment and development 
i s included in the business and investment bank category. There i s 
4 The governor of Fa i sa l Is lamic Bank of Egypt El-Helws 
claims tha t the philosophy behind the Is lamic banks make them 
capable of f u l f i l l i n g the ro le of development banks, as they 
n e i t h e r take i n t e r e s t nor regard c o l l a t e r a l as a dec is ive element 
in d i c t a t i n g investment op t ions . The c e n t r a l opera t ional method 
of an Islamic bank guarantees two th ings : F i r s t , one must know 
the customer in t imately and determine i f he i s the r igh t person 
to undertake project in question, secondly, one must study the 
p ro jec t thoroughly t o assess i t s v i a b i l i t y , Helows po in t s out 
t h a t i f a l l banking system adopted t h i s approach), two things would 
happen. F i r s t , a l l deve lo^en t p r o j e c t s would be s tudied 
thoroughly. This would enable the customer and the na t iona l 
economy to avoid the p i t f a l l s of t r a d i t i o n a l f inanc ing . Tradi t ional 
bankers may not be very s t r i c t regarding the v i a b i l i t y of a 
pjcoject they finance i f they are guaranteed a high r a t e of i n t e r e s t 
and c o l l a t e r a l . Thus Islamic financing appears to be more s u i t -
able for t h i r d world count r ies . The ea^eriment, however, i s s t i l l 
in i t s ea r ly stages, and the t a l k about a t o t a l l y Is lamised 
banking systonn can only be t h e o r i t i c a l a t t h i s s tage; I b i d , , p , 5 8 . 
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no Is lamic bank in the specia l ized group, and the Nasser social 
bank i s not included anywhere since i t i s not r eg i s t e red with the 
5 
c e n t r a l bank. 
The pressure i s also coming from o the r d i r e c t i o n . Cit izens 
are now refusing to pay i n t e r e s t , Egypt i s a country where 
majori ty l i v e s in poor condi t ions . In t h i s atmosphere c a l l s 
ra i sed by the Islamic t rends are f inding many a t t e n t i v e l i s t n e r s . 
The pressure on the government to comply with the da:nand of the 
I s l amis t i s mainly r e l i g i o u s . At l e a s t two o the r Is lamic banks 
are being set up and investment conapanies on Is lamic p r inc ip le 
are f l ou r i sh ing , 
Abdel Aziz, former Egyptian pr ime-minis ter I-., i s known 
to have a wealth of experience in i n t e r n a t i o n a l f inance . He has 
been c lose ly involved with western banking system as well as 
playing an ac t ive role in the development of Is lamic banking. He 
has a l so been investment audi tor of Geneva-based Dar al-Maal 
5 According to a recent repor t , the Is lamic banks have 
been a t the centre of a p o l i t i c a l row? A l o t of p ressure has 
been put t o implement Islamic law and to over turn the Western 
banking system. The pressure has become so in tense l a t e l y tha t 
normally moderate Mubarak regimes was forced t o forsake democ-
r a t i c appearances. For f u l l d e t a i l s , see "Is lamic banking jo ins 
the Shar i ' ah Struggle in Egypt", Arabia (London), September 1985, 
pp , 58-66, 
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a l - I s i ami and Deputy chairman of ca i ro-based Fa i sa l Islamic 
Managenent, and i s cu r ren t ly chairman of Egypts Bank of COTwerce 
and Development. He looks a t the world i n s ide p o t a i t i a l s for 
Is lamic banking. He says t h a t the development of Islamic banking 
in Egypt cannot be s tudied in i s o l a t i o n from the whole concept of 
economic thought i s Is lam, Islamic bank cannot function apart 
f r<Mn the economic order of the country in which the concept i s 
implemented. They have to develop within an economic framework 
where they function side by side with o the r economic u n i t s , in 
t rade , industry, agr icu l tu re , cont rac t ing and so on. 
To make t h i s poss ib le , r u l e r s must be drawn up for a 
f inanc ia l and monetary system which c e n t r a l bank can adopt. Islamic 
banking cannot be run within a system of supervision and control 
which i s b u i l t on creat ion of money supply, with c a p i t a l and 
l i q u i d i t y r a t i o which take in to cons idera t ion . 
In Egypt regulat ing of Is lamic banks by cen t r a l bank i s 
missing. I t i s f e l t t ha t , fo r Islamic banks to function, the 
cen t ra l banks must develop new laws and regula t ions concerning 
t h e i r use of funds. In p a r t i c u l a r , c e n t r a l banks need to develop 
c r i t e r i a of p rof i t - shar ing r a t i o s between current deposi t accounts, 
and recognition of zakah and regula t ions concerning i t s expendi-
t u r e . In addit ion, some system may be developed for the p a r t i c i -
pation of deposi tors in annual general meetings of f inanc ia l 
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ins t i tu t ions , as they are real ly part ic ipants in risk taking or 
prof i t - loss sharing. There are many other functions to be revised 
and new c r i t e r i a to be developed. According to a study a l l the 
countries\*V^rab world, i t i s in Egypt that Islamic financial i n s t i -
tutions have taken over the largest share - an estimated 30 per cent -
of a l l privately held depositsi The government has been pro-
mising legislat ion to regulate the i r ac t iv i t i e s and provide sane 
protection for the i r depositors, who have been lured by the 24 
per cent return they offer . Deposits at regular banks can earn 
CTily 13 per cent. In March 1988 however, the government suddenly 
withdrew the draft law, which had been designed by the stock 
exchange authority. I t would have granted depositors the status 
of preferred share-holders, giving them p r io r i ty over other 
creditors in case of bankrupcy. 
However, Hedozy feels that cooperation between Islamic 
bank and western ins t i tu t ion i s rather v i t a l . According to him 
'since Islamic banks and financial ins t i tu t ions are developing 
fast in trade and investment, they could cooperate be t te r with 
western ins t i tu t ions if these ins t i tu t ions changed the rules of the 
financial game to exclude i n t e r e s t . There has been an understanding 
6 The Economic Intell igence Unit (EUI) Country Report -
Egypt, No,2 1988, p . 13, 
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by some western banking, such as financing trade cjn a participa^ 
tion basis , which means sharing in the r i sk . Such a system i s far 
more advanced in i t s judgement of economic f eas ib i l i t y than 
conventional in te res t bearing techniques, since i t f ca l l ed for 
more sophisticated accouting and cost/benefit analysis . 
Islamic banking operations do have to be kept separate 
in terms of t he i r source and application for fxinids, but th i s does 
not preclude close woricing with conventional systems. One type 
of bank i s wholly run on Islamic basis, but there i s another that 
uses separate departmaits or branches for Islamic and conventional 
7 banking to ensure that fxmds are not mixed up, 
• In recent years, b i l l ions of Egyptian pounds have flooded 
into so-called Islamic investment companies providing investors 
with return of 20% or more. The government i s frightened by 
their growing financial power and wants to bring them under closer 
control and security. The Islamic investment companies have become 
so successful that i t i s at tract ing the savings of millions of 
ordinary Egyptians and threatens to pass a serious challenge to the 
Q 
established banking system. Though, these companies are 
7 See Arab Banking File, Middle East Economic Digest. 
(London), August 1985, p,24. 
8 "Money on the Loose", The Middle East (London), 
January 1988, pp-24. ~ 
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completely xinregulated, but they have been able to a t t r a c t more 
than $ 505 b i l l i o n by offer ing re turn as high as 24 per cent , 
Egypt 's commercial banks, with t h e i r low i n t e r e s t r a t e s , have 
deposi ts t o t a l l i n g only $ 10,5 b i l l i o n , ^ These companies se t up 
according to Islamic p r i n c i p l e pay out p r o f i t s to depositors which 
vary according to the success of investment made by the respective 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . However, i f the investment proves to be a f a i lu re , 
then the deposi tors losses money as well as the company or bank. 
The Is lamic nature of such financing and banking has a strcmg 
appeal in Egypt where r e l i g i o u s upsurge i s a powerful force . The 
annual d ividents of 20% o r more (sanetimes reaching 40%) have 
captured publ ic a t t r i t i o n s . They are now providing a rea l a l t e r -
na t ive to the t r a d i t i o n a l banking system and even to the exis t ing 
Islamic banks. 
These investment houses such as El-Rayyaon, El-Sherif, 
El-Huda Misr and El-Saad, toge ther with some 20 smaller firms have 
grown in power and importance f a r f a s t e r than the au tho r i t i e s have 
been able to respond. The p rec i se na ture and t rue extent of t h e i r 
speculation and investment i s unknown, but some estimates put t h e i r 
wealth at round Ef l2 bn ($ 5 bn,) By comparison, t o t a l commeixial 
9 Country Report - Egypt, (E.I .U. ) ,No. l , 1988, p . 10. 
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bank deposi t a t the end of the f i s c a l 1985/86 stood a t Ef 26,8 bn 
($ 19,3 b n ) . According t o the Economic I n t e l l i g e n c e Unit report 
Al-Rayan i s the more powerful of the two, mentioned above. I t 
has perhaps $ 10 b i l l i o n in depos i t s and business i n t e r e s t s 
ranging from res tauren t s , tourism, meat packing and dairy products 
to consumer goods and proper ty t h a t are concentrated in Cairo and 
Alexandria, Another Egyptian Is lamic JLnvestment coinpany, Al-Saad, 
spec ia l i zes in construction and small t o medium sized manufacturing, 
I t i s s t ronger in the Delta reg ion . I t was feared tha t t h i s 
merger, pos i t ing the companies t o blanket the country, was only 
a f i r s t step in crea t ing a monolith t h a t would devor the economy. 
The l ega l pos i t ion of both of the companies and t h e i r 
deposi tors i s s t i l l unclear, and t h i s i s causing concern to both 
government and the companies themselves. Recently, a new law 
has been passed in the parliament which w i l l make i t necessary for 
the Islamic investment groups to form j o i n t stock cc3mpanies and 
10 In 1986, El-Rayyan suffered a huge loss on i t s deposits 
a f t e r rumours c i r cu la t ed of a $ 100 m losses the bul l ion market. 
Anxious deposi tors reached the company headquarters , but everyone 
who wanted h i s cash was paid off, El-Rayyan denied the rumours and 
loudly proclaimed i t s f inanc ia l h e a l t h . See The Middle East, 
January 1988, p , 2 3 . 
11 Country Report Egypt, CEIU),No,2, op . c i t . . p . 1 3 . 
o 08 
convert depos i to r ' s fxinds (which a t present has no legal pro-
tec t ion i n t o sha res . The companies w i l l be obliged to publish 
balance sheets, depos i t s funds with the Central Bank and get 
12 
o f f i c i a l approval for money to be kept abroad. The phenomenal 
success of the Is lamic investment companies in Egypt can be 
t raced la rge ly to the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the Egyptian f inancia l 
system. Rela t ively few ind iv idua l s p laces t h e i r savings in banks 
and almost a l l perscxial t r ansac t ions are ca r r i ed out in cash. 
The ru ra l v i l l a g e r ' s, unf a m i l i a r i t y with banks leads people to 
keep t h e i r wealth l a rge ly in land Qtt gold . Most v i l l a g e r s would 
be f a r happier in en t rus t ing t h e i r personal wealth to a r e s e c t -
able e lders r a the r than an anonymous bank. To a great extent, 
the investment firms owe t h e i r o r ig ins to such mis t rus t . These 
companies,for the u t i l i s a t i o n of funds, were i n i t i a l l y set up by 
money brokers engaged in r epa t r i a t i ng the funds of Egyptian workers 
abroad. Many of the labourers abroad were making excel lent money 
in the Gulf and most of them would never have dreamt of put t ing 
of put t ing t h e i r savings in to a bank. Even today, an estimated 
2,2 mil l ion, Egyptians work overseas and t h e i r remittances make up 
a large preparat ion of Egypt 's foreign hard currency inccme. 
Egyptian na t ional r e s iden t s in the country have been forbidden to 
12 The Economic In t e l l i gence Unit (EIU), CG\intry Report 
Egypt (EIU), No. 1, 1988, p , 1 0 . 
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hold hard currency which had to be remit ted t o the banks a t the 
o f f i c i a l exchange r a t e . Vil lage e x p a t r i a t e viere f a r more wil l ing 
to hand over t h e i r earnings to t r u s t ed in te rmedia r i e s r a the r than 
deal with the bank themselves; The brokers , in tu rn , exchanged 
the hard currency and del ivered the proceeds t o t h e workers 
f a m i l i e s . 
According to the Middle East Report, these ccampanies are 
f loa t ing in a lega l limbo. Under the Egyptian law, only j o i n t 
stock companies are l icened to inves t funds in the manner pract iced 
by El-Sharif , El-Rayyan and o t h e r s . At the same time i t i s 
t e chn ica l ly i l l e g a l for i n s t i t u t i o n s o the r than banks to co l lec t 
depos i t s and the au tho r i t i e s are worried t h a t the finance houses 
depos i to rs have none of the legal p ro tec t ion offered t o j o i n t 
stock company* "these companies, wr i tes an Egyptian economist, are 
dangerous. No one knows how many people are involved, how much 
money i s invested cwodwhere the money i s . t h e depos i tors themselves 
have an uncer ta in legal s t a t u s . They cannot be p a r t n e r s under 
Egyptian law because they made no contr ibut ion to the c a p i t a l i -
sat ion of the companies which are owned by ind iv idua l s or other 
groups of i n v e s t o r s . But as deposi tors , they cannot deemed to be 
13 see the report published in the Middle East, 
January, 1988, p . 2 3 , " 
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c r e d i t o r since they receive p r o f i t r a the r than i n t e r e s t . Partners 
o r shares-holders have r igh t to a t tend annual general meetings 
and review a company's a c t i v i t i e s , deposi tors have none of these 
r i gh t s , nor can they gain access to the books. They are deposi tors 
in the holding company and not i t s subs id ia r i e s , and t h e i r legal 
14 
re la t ionsh ip with investment companies i s t o t a l l y un iden t i f i ed , 
Egyptian governments, i t se«ns, do not favour these Islamic 
investment ccwipanies. The reason might be the revival of Islamic 
fundamentalism. As James Bedding wr i t e r s : ' E a r l i e r t h i s year, 
j u s t before the a u t h o r i t i e s i n s t i t u t e d a f ree exchange r a t e , 
they were appalled by the apparent a b i l i t y of the Is lamic f inancia l 
groups t o manipulate the currency with t h e i r large cash reserves . 
Whatever the p o l i t i c a l gulf between the well-heeled enterpreneurs 
of the finance houses and the extremists who have taken pot shots 
a t loca l p o l i t i c i a n s and foreign emissar ies , the regime i s wary of 
what i t may provoke by confronting the Islamic investment companies 
15 head-on and upset t ing r e l i g ious s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s . 
The investment ccwipanies adver t is ing heavily on te lev is ion 
pro jec t ail image of a new kind of en te rp r i se tha t i s Is lamic, moral 
14 I b i d . , p . 2 4 . 
15 "Money on the Loose", The Middle East (London), January, 1988, p ,24 , 
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and highly successful . I t s l e s s than a t h i r d of deposi tors money 
ends up in loca l project^ The r e s t i s held l i qu id or invested in 
gold and in t e rna t iona l market < or used t o f inance import deals for 
the government. The El-Rayyan company i s able t o record massive 
p r o f i t s , and the reason, as i t s chairman says, i s due to the fact 
tha t only a r e l a t i v e l y small proportion of depos i t s , (about 30%) 
i s invested in long-term p r o j e c t s , Fourty pe r cent i s used for 
t rading-speculat ion on in t e rna t iona l stock exchange, import deals 
on behalf of the government and gold s to re of some Ef 300,000. 
This leaves a massive 30% of holdings as l i q u i d a s se t s , vhich can 
explain how El-Rayyan was able to pay i t s depos i to rs in l a s t years 
loss on the company, A staggering 15% of deposi t i s held fu l ly 
l i qu id fo r deposi tors need and 15% more i s semi- l iquid for ins tan t 
investment. 
16 In a conversation with the Middle East, the Company's 
chairman Haqq Ahmad t ^ e d about the groups companies. In 1979, one 
of the three brothers , returned from work in Libya and invested 
h i s saving in t rad ing . He was so successful t h a t in 1982, three 
bro thers founded a company, and now, a f t e r f i ve years , they hold 
16 subsidiary companies which are involved in every-thing frcxn 
detergent production to jewellary r e t a i l i n g . According to Haqq 
Ahmad, the ccxnpany never adver t ise , for saving. People come to them 
by recommendation. The 3000,000 deposi tors have contr ibuted 
between E£ 2,25 bn and E£ 2,5 bn (approx, $ 1 bn,) an average 
investment of E£ 7,500; See The Middle East (Londcai), January 1988, 
PP. 24. 
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El-Rayyan a l so has investment abroad. The corporation 
owis th ree subsdiar ies in Geneva and United S t a t e s , t ha t deal in 
seeds, and another speculating companies in Geneva, They have 
already undertaken p ro j ec t s in Saudici Arabia and plans are being 
made fo r more in Jordan, 
Under pressure from the Government, El-Rayyan i s converting 
to a Jo in t Stock Company by asking depos i to rs t o convert t h e i r 
deposi ts i n to shares in a subsidiary El-Rayyan for f inanc ia l 
dea l ing . 
case Study I i Nasser Social Bank t 
The Nasser Social Bank (NSB) can be regarded as the f i r s t 
attempt a t e s t ab l i sh ing an Islamic f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n in Egypt 
and indeed the second in the modem Islamic world as a whole. The 
bank, however, i s an extension of and has been founded on, what 
used to be Mit Ghamr Local Saving Banks, before the l a t t e r ' s nayme 
17 was changed to Nasser Social Bank with s t a t e fxinding in 1971. 
The Bank was es tab l i shed in 1963 in a p rov inc ia l cap i t a l , 
Mit Ghamr, a ru r a l area in the Nile Del ta , The driviiig force 
17 Much of t h i s study i s based on the f i e l d survey done by 
Ahmad ^bdel-Fat tah Ashker El, The Islamic Business Enterpr ise , (CroOTi Helm, 1987) . ~ " 
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behind the establishment of the bank was Ahmed al-Naggar^ an 
^ 
academic with p r a c t i c a l experience in loca l saving banks in West 
18 Geimany, Notably, although the bank was run on the Islamic bas i s 
with the in t en t ion of applying the Shar i ' ah to i t s operat ions, 
such in ten t ion was not pub l ic ly pronoxinced by El-Naggar and the 
bank did not bear the name ' I s l amic ' in i t s de sc r ip t i on . That was 
meant, as al-Naggar esqslains, to avoid any poss ib le misconception 
18 He l a t e r became secretary-general of the In te rna t iona l 
Association of Is lamic Banks and a menber of the board of d i r ec to r s 
of the F a i s a l Is lamic bank of Egypt; see Ahmad al-Naggar, ' I s lamic 
Banks: A Model and the Challenge' , in The Challenge of Islam, ed, 
Altaf Gauhar (LondoniIslamic Council of Europe, 1978),pp, 220-34. 
The driving force behind the revival of the Mit Ghamr Savings 
Bank under the new name Nasser Social Bank was Ahmed al-Naggar, He 
helped e s t a b l i s h the new bank in 1972, in which he was appointed 
deputy general manager. Three fac to rs could be sa id t o have helped 
al-Naggar in h i s new endeavour: (1) the decl ine in the niamber of 
deposi tors and deposi t s a f t e r put t ing the Mit Ghamr Bank and i t s 
branches under the control of commercial banks. (2) the publ ic 
debate on the i s sue of loca l savings banks, which was ca r r i ed to 
the Egyptian Assembly (Parliament) and (3) the changes in the 
government ac3ministration under the new President , Sadat , 
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on the p a r t of the government t h a t the name roight encourage the 
regrouping of Is lamic p o l i t i c a l elements in the country, an idea 
which was not t o l e r a t ed by the s t a t e . This gives an idea about 
the p o l i t i c a l cl imate of Egypt a t t ha t time, the changes in which 
l a t e r on proved to have played a s ign i f i can t ro le in the h i s tory 
of the bank and the development of Is lamic banks in Egypt in 
genera l . Instead, the bank was declared as a loca l saving centre 
tha t was run on the no - in t e r e s t bas i s t o help small entrepreneurs 
avoid elements of explo i ta t ion inp l i ed in i n t e r e s t and to encourage 
saving and boost economic development in the a r e a . That fojonula 
seemed t o have been ideo log ica l ly accepted by the count ry ' s leader-
sh ip . The bank was regarded as a publ ic sec tor i n s t i t u t i o n and was 
accountable to the s t a t e , though i t was given a degree of operat ional 
autonomy. 
Based on the p r inc ip l e s of the sha r i ' ah , the Mit Ghamr 
bank's operat ions did not deal in i n t e r e s t paid o r received. 
However, a borrower would have to have a deposi t account with the 
bank showing regular savings for a t l e a s t s ix months before he 
could be considered for c red i t f a c i l i t i e s . 
The bank's operat ions were mainly f ive : deposi t accounts, 
loan accounts, equity pa r t i c ipa t ion , d i r ec t investment, and social 
se rv ices . 
o 15 
Deposit Accounts s 
These are divided into saving accounts and investment 
accounts: 
(1) saving accounts t these did not bear any financial rewards, 
but did not incur any esqpenses to the depositors. There 
was a minimum amoxint for opening the account as well as 
for lodging funds in it, though the amount was almost 
negligible. Also, the account holder was allowed to 
withdraw funds f rcMn his account on demand. 
The idea of introducing these accounts was two 
folds: to provide individuals with a 'safe-place* to keep 
their savings* and, more importantly, to develop the habit 
of saving in individuals. Until 1967, the majority of 
saving accounts' holders were students,54 per cent followed 
by blue collar workers, 14 per cent peasants, 11 per cent 
white collar workers, 10 per cent housewives, 5 per cent 
minors (under age), 2 per cent and miscellaneous, 4 per cent, 
(2) Investment accounts s these were run on the basis of profit-
and-loss sharing. The profit share depended on the amount 
deposited the period of deposit and the amount of profit 
achieved by the bank from investment operations. With-
drawals from these accounts where on a yearly basis and 
216 
the deposi tor could not withdraw on demand (except in 
special ciixuinstances examined by the bank) . Ctonceivably, 
the bank r e l i ed mainly on these fiands in financing i t s 
investment ope ra t ions . Un t i l 1967, the deposi tors in 
these accounts were as follows: s tudents , 26 per cent; 
white c o l l a r workers, 22 pe r cent ; peasants , 16 per cent; 
blue c o l l a r workers, 13 pe r cent ; minors 'under age), 
19 13 per cent ; housewives, 6 pe r c en t . 
Loan Accounts; 
These wsre divided in to two main types : 
( l ) bjon-investment Loans: these were given ( in t e res t - f r ee ) 
to help overcome personal f inanc ia l problems. However, fo r a 
borrower to qualify for the loan he had to have a saving account 
in the bank for a ce r t a in per iod. There was, therefore , f inanc ia l 
motivation to deposit funds in saving accoxints. Some borrowers 
pledged that the loan would not be used for investment purposes. 
Hon«sty, t r u s t , personal contact , studying the regu la r i ty of 
deposi ts in saving accoxints and the f ea r t ha t a future loan appl i -
cation would not be accepted i f i t was fovmd out tha t the loan 
was used for purposes o the r than tha t fo r which i t was given, helped 
the system to opera te . 
19 '^Y^Q Islamic Business _Enterprise, pp . 156. 
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(2) Investment Loans* these were given for investment purposes 
on the basis of profit sharing and Mere paid back on maturity or in 
instalments, The period of loans ranged between one and five years. 
This method of finance suited small enterprise, entrepreneurs and 
craftanen who had the skill but not the fund to set up their own 
businesses. Loans covered various activities, mostly of anall size, 
such as the purchase of sewing machines/ hand looms for weaving 
textiles, tools for improving irrigation and farm animals, 
Scpiitv participation; 
The Mit Ghamr Savings Bank also participated in enterprise 
capital as a joint owner, profit was shared between the bank and 
the entrepreneur in proportion to the amount of capital invested. 
Also, the bank was involved in the management and financial control 
of these enterprise, holding a title deed to the enterprise assets. 
Direct Investment : 
By the end of the second year of its establishment, the 
Mit Ghamr Bank had started to initiate enterprise on its own. The 
first of these was the establishment of a brick factory, a product, 
the demand for which was very high. The second project was the 
purchase of a private school which had been run by a foreign 
missionary team which decided to withdraw from operation. Other 
o 18 
pro j ec t s followed a macaroni factory, a semi-mechanised bakery, 
a mechanised i r r i g a t i o n pro jec t , and a da i ry . By 1967, t o t a l 
c ap i t a l invested in these p ro jec t s reached I . E . 67,000, 
Social Services : 
A specia l fund was es tab l i shed by the bank with a view to 
pooling Zakah revenues paid vo lun ta r i l y by ind iv idua ls to be used 
for the purpose of helping o thers soc i a l l y and economically. The 
soc ia l aspect of the bank was emphasised on i t s establishment, 
which was seen to be in l i n e with the bank's purpose of improving 
the economic condit ions of the population in the a rea . Revenues 
of the fund were mainly Zakah paid by ind iv idua ls as well as tha t 
due on the bank 's operat ions and p r iva t e donat ions. Expenses 
were represented mainly in giving f inanc ia l help to the needy and 
i n t e r e s t - f r e e loans to those who did not have savings accounts 
in the bank. 
Before long, the Mit Ghamr Savings Bank prospered, and 
within f ive years i t opened four more branches in d i f ferent p a r t s 
of the province . Also, the number of deposi tors in the bank as 
well as in i t s branches increased frcra 17.560 of l . E 41,000 in 
1963-6 4 to 251.000 claiming about £.E 1,8m in 1966,67, The success 
of the bank was notable ; prbbleras of ru ra l debt were reduced as 
20 I b i d . , p . 157. 
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borrowers no longer had to depend on moneylenders, many of vhoro 
charged a high i n t e r e s t r a t e . The success of the bank was also 
coninented upon in a Ford Foundation repor t in June 1967, vdiich 
pra ised the bank fo r winning tiie personal support of a large 
number of farmers and v i l l a g e r s vdio regarded the bank as t h e i r own, 
In the beginning, the Naser Social Bank had s t a r t e d in a modest 
way with one room and a staff of twenty f ive persons , Ihe rura l 
people in tha t region were r e l i g ious and would not put t h e i r 
savings in to any bank because of i n t e r e s t . Moreover, thejie was 
21 hardly any f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n ava i l ab le to them. 
The experiment of the Mit Ghamr Savings Bank suffered a 
setback, however, in the per iod from the second half of 1967 to 
1971, Owing to the p o l i t i c a l atmosphere and t o d i f f e r en i p o l i t i c a l 
currents in the administrat ion of the Egyptian government at that 
time, between l e f t and r igh t , the Mit Ghamr bank and i t s branches 
were put under the d i r ec t control of the s t a t e administrat ion and 
21 R.K. Ready, "The Egyptian Munispal Saving Bank 
Project" , In t e rna t iona l Developmgit Review, Vol,9, No,2, 1967, 
pp, 2-5, as quoted by Ausaf Ahmad, Development and PJohlgms_gf 
Islamic Banks, (Jeddah: Is lamic Research and Training I n s t i t u t e , 
Tsiamic Development Bank, 1987), p , 2 . 
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cx)nsequently l o s t t h e i r opera t iona l autonomy. The organization 
of Insurance/ one of the s t a t e ' s organisa t ions , took charge of 
the bank in the second half of 1967 and appointed members to 
execute the bank's operat ions - one from the National Bank of 
Egypt and the o ther f rem the Central Bank, The two banks, the 
National and the Central , were run on the i n t e r e s t b a s i s . 
Ccaaceivably, opera t iona l p o l i c i e s were changed and the bas i s of 
i n t e r e s t - f r ee banking was abandoned. I t was not xint i l l 1971 
when Sadat came to o f f ice t ha t the experiment of the Mit Ghamr 
savings Bank was revived under the name Nasser Social Bank, The 
Nasser Social Bank took over the Mit Ghamr Savings Bank, benefit ing 
from the l a t t e r ' s popular goodwill and honouring i t s outstanding 
f inancia l corornitroents. 
Unlike i t s predecessor, the Nasser Social Bank (wSB) was 
f inanc ia l ly supported by the government. This helped the new 
i n s t i t u t i o n to s t a r t operat ing on a much firmer f inanc ia l base. 
Also, the bank was a publ ic sec tor bank, was ovBfied fu l ly by the 
s t a t e and was xinder the f u l l cont ro l of the government. The head-
quarters of the bank was in Cai ro , 
The p r inc ip l e s of operat ion in the Nasser Social Bank are 
very s imi lar to those of the Mit Ghamr Savings Bank, though i t s 
functions are wider. The Is lamic p r inc ip l e s are applied to the 
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b a n k ' s o p e r a t i o n s wi th no i n t e r e s t p a i d o r r e c e i v e d . Besides t h e 
a c t i v i t i e s r e f e r r e d to above, t h e new i n s t i t u t i o n o f f e r s a f u l l 
range of normal banking s e r v i c e s , though fo re ign-exchange d e a l i n g s 
a r e l i m i t e d and c l i e n t s a r e r e f e r r e d t o o t h e r banks f o r such 
o p e r a t i o n s , Also^ t h e NSB has a wide range of inves tment a c t i -
v i t i e s through e q u i t y p a r t i c i p a t i o n . The Egypt ian government 
r e g i s t e r e d t h i s bank f o r i t s r o l e i n t h e economic development. 
This bank a c c e p t s d e p o s i t s , p a r t i c i p a t e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g and 
suppor t ing p r o j e c t s wi th o b j e c t i v e s t o p r o v i d i n g p roduc t ion 
requi rements f o r craf tsman, f inanc ing t h e comprehensive s o c i a l 
i n s u r a n c e system and e x e r t i n g a l l p o s s i b l e e f f o r t t o r e i n i t i a t e 
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Zakah o r d i n a n c e . 
The NSB o p e r a t i o n s have been s u c c e s s f u l . By 1979 i t had 
25 branches and i t s t o t a l d e p o s i t s reached £ .2* 240m. P r o f i t s were 
i n c r e a s i n g , reaching £ , E , l2ra, about $ 17,3m, by 1978-79. 
Fur thermore, t h e s o c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s one of i t s main 
o b j e c t i v e s . Like i t s p redecesso r , t h e NSB has e s t a b l i s h e d a 
s p e c i a l fund, Zakah Fund, to spend on s o c i a l p u r p o s e s . The main 
revenues of t h e fund come from Zakah. payments and dona t i ons , which 
22 See EoDnomic Review, C e n t r a l Bank of Egypt (Cairo) 
Vol , XXIII,No.4, I 9 8 3 , p , 4 . 
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increased from £,E. 39,000 in 1972-73 to £.E. 2.8in in 1982-83. 
In collecting zaXah^ the bank has established a number of 
committees, (reaching 2,000 by 1983) the main task of which i s to 
administer the col lect ion. The committees travel to different 
par ts of the cotintry for t h i s purpose, to reach individuals rather 
than waiting for individuals to reach them. The number of b«ie-
f i c i a r i e s increased from 5,000 in 1972-73 to 773,000 in 1982-83, 
I tens of expenses are represented mainly in: establishing vocational 
training centres for artcraf tS and manual sk i l l s , establishing 
evening classes for students, contributing to mosqae building and ' 
religious i n s t i t u t e s , projects for studying the Our*an, medical 
assistance, spectacles and hearing aids to the needy and other 
assistance in money. Government financial support to the social 
role of the bank i s also very significant. To reinforce the 
bank's finance in t h i s par t icular side of ac t iv i t i e s , public 
sector companies have to pay the NSB 2 per cent of the i r annual 
profi t to be used for the purpose of establishing pension funds 
for those who do not enjoy pension schemes. Taking into account 
the broad base of public sector companies in £g;ypt t h i s provides 
the bank with a significant source of finance. 
The Mir Ghamr Savings Bank can be regarded as the f i r s t 
successful attempt at establishing Islamic financial ins t i tu t ions 
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23 in modern Is lamic world. The bank gained high popular i ty and 
goodwill among Egyptians in general and loca l inhabi tan ts in 
p a r t i c u l a r . Despite the hardships t h a t faced the bank, i t was a 
s igni f icant experiment f o r pu t t ing Is lamic p r inc ip l e s i n to prac t ice , 
which s ignal led t o Muslims t h a t the s h a r i ' a was s t i l l ^ p l i c a b l e 
t o economic i s sues in the modem world. I t i s not surpris ing t o 
know tha t the Mit Ghamr Savings Benk e^e r imen t was studied by 
many Muslim countr ies and was the pioneering example for the 
establishment of the Is lamic Development Bank in 1975 and the other 
Is lamic banks tha t followed. The s igni f icance of the Mit Ghamr Bank 
lay in the fac t tha t i t r e l i e d on the savings of small investors , 
managed t o mobilise small savings of ind iv idua l s of l imited income, 
and succeeded in improving the standard of l iv ing of many in the 
a rea . 
23 A western observer descr ibes the s ignif icance of Mit Ghamr experiment in the following way; 
"The majority of the population had never been dealing with 
the f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s , . , . Basical ly ru ra l and re l ig ious they 
tended to d i s t r u s t bankers operating in Western s ty l e and, what i s 
more, the re were few loca l branches they could pa t ronise since a 
subs tan t ia l pa r t of t h e i r income was not spent immediately, but 
put aside fo r soc ia l events , emergencies and a l ike , t h i s i d l e 
c a p i t a l could not be used fo r productive investment, A pre-condit ion, 
however, for any change of behaviour, from hording and " rea l asset 
saving" to "f inancia l saving" was the crea t ion of f inanc ia l i n s t i -
t u t ions which would not v i o l a t e the r e l i g i o u s p r inc ip l e s of large 
segements of p o p u l a t i o n , , , , " ; see T. Wholers - Scharf, Arab and 
Islamic Banks: New Business_Partners for Developing Countries, 
TParisj CECD, 1983)7 PP. 79-80, as c i t ed by Ausaf Ahmad, o p T c i t . , 
P . 3 . 
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The Nasse r s o c i a l bank i s an ex^nple of government i n v o l v e -
ment i n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of an I s l a m i c bank, and i s a l ead ing 
example i n t h i s f i e l d . No doubt , government f i n a n c i a l suppor t 
g i v e s a bank t h e chance of having a s u b s t a n t i a l source of f i nance 
t o r e l y on i f t h e need a r i s e s . However, t h e problem wi th such 
support i s t h a t t h e government t e n d s t o p u t t h e bank under i t s own 
c o n t r o l , and vmless t h e government ' s ideo logy i s I s l a m i c o r I s l a m i c 
f lavoured , t h e p u b l i c becomes s u s p i c i o u s of i t s main purpose and 
24 t h e bank ends up l o s i n g t h e t r u s t of many of i t s c l i e n t s , 
gase Study 2 i The F a i s a l I s l a m i c Bank of EgyP"*^  (FIBE) 
The F a i s a l I s l a m i c Bank of Egypt i s l i k e a j o i n t s tock 
company o p e r a t i n g i n s t r i c t compliance wi th t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e 
I s l a m i c s h a r i ' a h . I t was founded o f f i c i a l l y by law 48 f o r t h e y e a r 
1977, and was i n a u g u r a t e d on 5 J u l y 1979. 
The a u t h o r i s e d c a p i t a l of t h e bank i s US $ 500 m, and t h e 
p a i d up c a p i t a l i s US $40 m i l l i o n . F i f tyone p e r cen t of t h e c a p i t a l 
25 i s ovmed by Egypt ians and 49 owned by Saudis and o t h e r Muslims; 
24 The I s l an i i c Bus iness E n t e r p r i s e , op , c i t . , p , 1 6 l . 
25 For the b a l a n c e shee t of FIBE, see append ix - I I 
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The main function of the bank i s t o finance investment 
p ro jec t s through mudarabah. murabaha and Equity p a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
Recently the bank has been concentrat ing on long-term financing, 
together with expanding i t s investment in small i n d u s t r i e s t o help 
object ives of the Economic Five Year Plan, and t o improve the 
d i s t r i bu t i on of income and wealth within the country . 
Towards t h i s object ive , the Bank has es tab l i shed more 
than 3 2 companies covering various f i e l d s of production such as: 
l ivestock, production, i n d u s t r i a l production, and medical care, 
housing and const ract ion, investment t r ade , tourism, and many 
o t h e r s . One aspect of tne F a i s a l Is lamic Bank i s t o e s t ab l i sh and 
develop j u s t i c e , equal i ty , and p rospe r i t y amongs a l l members of 
soc ie ty . To r e a l i s e t h i s , the zakab fund undertakes payments of 
the l eg i t ima te ly due zakajn on the Bank's Funds, in addit ion to 
co l lec t ing zakab on behalf of i t s c l i e n t s f o r disbursement in 
legi t imate channels defined in the Qur*an. 
The main feature::; of Fa i sa l Is lamic Bank i s t ha t n e i t h e r 
i t charges nor gives i n t e r e s t . I t o f fe rs to finance the di f ferent 
sec tors in the form of musharkah, mudarabah and murabahas, in 
addition to invest ing in c a p i t a l p r o j e c t s . I t i s a l so d i f ferent 
from o thers when ca lcu la t ing the return on i t s d i f ferent f inance. 
No p r e - s e t re turns are ca lcula ted on musharakah and mudarabah 
ooc: 2o 
d e a l s . The two s i d e s ( the banks and c l i e n t s ) ag ree t o sha re the 
n e t p r o f i t s r e s u l t i n g from t h e j o i n t v e n t u r e . I t ie p r o c e d u r e s 
normal ly fo l lowed s t i p u l a t e s t h a t t h e c l i e n t (employer) deduc ts 
a c e r t a i n p e r c e n t a g e frcsn t h e n e t p r o f i t s , u s u a l l y between 20 and 
30 p e r c e n t , f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n f e e . The remaining n e t p r o f i t i s 
t; o d i v i d e d between t h e two p a r t i e s , depending on each s i d e ' s 
f i n a n c i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e v e n t u r e . If , f o r example, t he bank 
c o n t r i b u t e d 50 p e r cen t towards t h e f i n a n c e , i t s s h a r e of the n e t 
p r o f i t would be 50 p e r cen t and so on . 
Over t h e l a s t f i v e y e a r s maximum p r o f i t s have been 
exceeded 15 p e r cen t p e r annum. During t h e f i r s t f o u r month of 
t h e p r e s e n t F i s c a l yea r (1405 H) t h e f i g u r e dropped t o 12,6 p e r 
c e n t . " I t i s o f ten s a id t h a t f i n a n c i a l c o s t s i n t h e banks a r e 
27 f o r h i g h e r than those in t h e commercial b a n k s . 
26 "The r i s k s and c o s t s of n o n - r i b a " , ^ .rabia (London), 
J u l y 1985, p . 6 4 . 
27 I b i d . * P . 6 4 ; i^s Kiohaxnmad El-Helw Governor of F a i s a l 
I s l a m i c Bank of Egypt p o i n t s out t h a t : ' T h e Confusion may have been 
t h e r e s u l t of a misunders tanding of f i n a n c i n g d e a l s and o p e r a t i o n s 
i n t h e I s l a m i c banks, as wel l a s of t h e way t h e p r o f i t s a r e c a l -
c u l a t e d i n r e l a t i o n to f inance c o s t . When f o r example, an I s l a m i c 
banks a c c e p t s a customer e n t e r i n g a d e a l of «to shark ah o r 
mudarabah and o f f e r s the f inance n e c e s s a r y f o r t h i s k i n d of d e a l s 
ag ree ing t o have a 50 p e r cen t sha re s of t h e p r o f i t s , t h e b a n k ' s 
50 p e r c e n t of t h e ne t p r o f i t i s i n no way t h e f i n a n c e c o s t , f o r 
t h i s f i g u r e i s p a r t of t h e new p r o f i t and n o t of t h e t o t a l va lue 
of f i nanced o f f e r e d . 
0 27 
As f o r Wurabaha d e a l s , t h e bank (FIBE) and t h e c l i e n t 
ag ree t o t h e s a l e of t h e goods t r a d e d on a murabaha b a s i s t o 
which a r e added t h e b a n k ' s p r o f i t s from t h e d e a l t o t h e c o s t s 
of buying t h e goods . There i s no doubt t h a t a c l i e n t always 
conpares t h i s p r o f i t margin and t h e c o s t of f i n a n c i n g a v a i l a b l e 
from o t h e r s o u r c e s ; he would n e v e r ag ree t o t h e b a n k ' s making 
p r o f i t s t h a t exceed S i l t e i n a t i v e f i nanc ing c o s t s frcan o t h e r s o u r c e s . 
The I s l a m i c bank, moreover, i s l i a b l e t o be exposed t o 
more r i s k s than o t h e r b a n k s . For example, an I s l a m i c b a n k ' s 
l i a b i l i t y s t a r t s from t h e v e r y movement, t h e goods a r e t r a n s p o r t e d 
f ran t h e s i t e where t h e s e were bought, and o n l y ends when t h e 
goods a r e a c t u a l l y d e l i v e r e d t o t h e c l i e n t s . Again, t h e c l i e n t s 
may d e l a y repayment of murbaha premiums ( i n s t a l m e n t s ) as a r e s u l t 
of l i q u i d i t y p rob lems . This FIBS w i l l have t o p u t up wi th wi thout 
any corapenoation f o r t h e p e r i o d of de lay , excep t f o r r a r e occasion 
when such a d e l a y cannot be t r u e l y a s c r i b e d t o l i q u i d i t y problems, 
whereas o t h e r banks a r e no t concerned wi th t h e r i s k of t r a n s p o r t a -
t i o n , sh ipp ing , loading o r un loading and so on, t a x i n g t h e c l i e n t 
by making him pay i n t e r e s t on h i s d e b i t e d account i r r e s p e c t i v e of 
28 
h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 
28 The I s l a m i c Business E n t e r p r i s e , o p , c i t „ 
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The return which the (FIBE) charges are the same whatever 
the currency used in the dea l , Ccjmmercial banks, on the o ther 
hand, d i f f e r e n t i a t e between finances in Egyptian pounds and those 
in US do l l a r s , the l a t t e r always varying and being index-linked to 
the r a t e s of i n t e r e s t on the In t e rna t i ona l money market. 
The Fa i sa l Ba«ik charges no commissions, fees, o r expenses 
of the )cinds charged by ccmmercial t>anks. I t has been noted tha t 
the g r ea t e s t p a r t of the commercial bank*5 finances are of the 
short- tenn kind aimed a t financing t rade and providing secur i ty to 
i n d u s t r i a l canpanies ac tua l c a p i t a l . Fa i s a l Bank finance opera 
t i ons , on o the r hand, are l imi ted to middle-and long-term operations 
extending, in the case of i n d u s t r i a l and manufacturing companies, 
over a period of nine months to cover production l i n e s . The 
finance period in t h i s sec tor as well as in other production and 
services sec tors such as housing, include a grace period suff ic ient 
to cover the time fo r construct ion, during which no premium or 
instalments are due. 
I t i s qui te c l e a r t h a t the modest f igure below i s a ref-
lect ion of the fac t tha t the Islamic bank does involve i t s e l f in 
a l l the r i sk to which i t s c l i e n t s may be exposed, roost important 
of which i s the period for repayment which i s expected to be much 
longer than agreed due to the market circumstances at p resen t . 
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F i n a l l y , a l l t h e r e t u r n s , revenues and p r o f i t e f f e c t e d 
by t h e F a i s a l Banks a r e d i s t r i b u t e d t o i n v e s t o r s . Inves tment 
accoun t s w i th t h e F a i s a l Bank now exceed on m i l l i o n ^ . P r o f i t s a r e 
, 29 d i s t r i b u t e d q u a r t e r l y . 
F a i s a l I s l a m i c Bank has been engaged i n f i n a n c i a l 
o p e r a t i o n s and t o a s u i t a b l e degree , inves tment a c t i v i t i e s a re 
d i v e r s i f i e d . The bank has a l s o shown a c o n t i n u o u s growth i n 
d e p o s i t a s t h e t a b l e below shows: 
To ta l Depos i t s , FIBB 1979-84 ( in US $ M i l l i o n ) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 l984 
23,6 140 469 792.5 1216.7 531 
The only breakdown a v a i l a b l e from t h e y e a r s 1979-84 i s 
t h e one f o r 1979, which suggest t h a t t h e t o t a l d e p o s i t s , t h e main 
p a r t was due t o inves tment accounts , amounting t o about $ 16 m i l l i o n 
as 68 p e r cen t of t h e t o t a l , t h e r e were c u r r e n t a ccoun t s of about 
29 •^g^bia (London), J u l y 1985, p .65 
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$ 7 , 2 mil l ion or 30,2 p e r cent of the t o t a l and the neg l ig ib le 
amount of $ 33, 408 as 1,5 p e r cent of the t o t a l via.s saving 
account, ^ e growth in saving account has been neg l ig ib le and 
sharp increase in t o t a l depos i t s follows very c lose ly the growth 
of i nves tm^ t accounts." " 
According to El-Helw, governor of FIBE, most of the bank* s 
financing i s in Middle and long-term operat ions which accounts 
fo r more than 50 p e r cent of a c t i v i t i e s and in d i s t r ibu t ion of 
short-and medium-term f i n a n c i a l operat ions, being 53 per cent 
(services including housing and t r a n s p o r t ) , 32 pe r cent (industry) 
8 per cent (commerce) and 7 p e r cent ( a g r i c u l t u r e ) , 
However, lack of involvement in productive investment does 
not necessar i ly ru le out f inancing r e l a t ed to manufacturing on a 
short-term b a s i s . A b e t t e r p i c t u r e can be obtained on t h i s by 
looking a t the share of the bank 's d i r e c t investment and equity 
par t i c ipa t ion in the p r o j e c t s in comparison with the t o t a l a s se t s . 
In 1983, out of t o t a l a s s e t s of $ 1504 mil l ion, only 
£ 86 mill ion was d i r e c t o r equi ty investment, t ha t i s no more than 
5,7 per cent of t o t a l assetS;, By 1984 however, out of a t o t a l of 
3 0 "Faisal Is lamic Bank of Egypt: an assessment", Arabia (London)^ Movember 1985, pp . 63-64. 
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$ 1861 mil l ion, a mere $ 95,5 mi l l ion w^s in the form of d i r ec t 
or equi ty investment, t ha t i s about 5 p e r cent of the t o t a l and 
a drop of 0,7 pe r cent over the previous year . The numbers of 
p ro jec t s were 26 and 31 fo r 1983 and 1984 respect ively , suggesting 
tha t short and perhaps medium term of t r ade of var ious forms are 
the major pa r t of FIB 's a s s e t s . 
F inal ly , i t would be i n t e r e s t i n g to f ind out how FIBE 
has been affected by the recess ion . This may be re f lec ted in access 
of supply of funds r e l a t i v e t o demand and as a proxy for t h i s we 
have combined the f igures fo r "cash in hand" and 'cash with banks 
and correspondents" to obtain the amoxont of i d l e cash avai lable and 
i t i s shown in the below f i g u r e . 
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From the above t ab l e , i t i s c l e a r t ha t with the deeping 
of the recess ion, the magnitude of the problem has grovna. I d l e 
cash was $ 34.6 mi l l ion in 1980 and $ 235 mil l ion in 1984 an 
3 1 increase of 579 p e r cent over the per iod . 
Although the po l i cy o£ investment abroad i n i t i a l l y seaned 
^ swecesstul move, t h e qap be-Cween the home and foreign emapLo-vpnent 
of funds has narrowed consideirably since with near ly e ^ a l amounts 
32 
on each s ide in 1984, 
31 I b i d . , p , 6 4 . 
3 2 Both El Helw and Ahmad Amin Fuad, Chairman of the 
Cairo-based I n t e r n a t i o n a l Isiswiic Bank, argue tha t the recession 
has h i t Is lamic banks harder -Chan t r a d i t i o n a l banks. El-Helw 
arguments hinges on the assessment tha t most of the PIBE's c l i e n t s 
are small and medium bus iness . They are l i k e l y to be h i t harder 
by the recession and do not h^ve large reserver to f a l l back on. 
In any case the Islamic banks suffer when the business i s bad 
regardless of the a s s e t s of the c l i e n t , because i t s p r o f i t i s 
ca lcu la ted on the deal in question i t s e l f . 
Fuad adds t ha t Islamic? banks are suffering because they 
have fewer opt ions fo r investrKient than t r a d i t i o n a l banks and are 
hampered by the s t i f f regula t ions which have not yet been adopted 
to the opera t ions of Islamic i?anks. 
Both bank chiefs , however, say tha t they are s a t i s f i e d 
with the performance of t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n s in sp i t e of the adverse 
circumstances; see Arabia (Lcx^don), November 1985, p ,64 . 
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Expenditure of the Fund : 
The t o t a l anount of Zakah pa id to ind iv idua ls during the 
year 1405 amounted t o £ E. 654,887 compared to £ E 60,446 during 
1401H. An amount of £ E 784, 2l4 was paid in money and o ther kind 
(as housing, c lo thes , foods and compensatory a ids ) , to poor and 
needy students of Univers i ty , higher i n s t i t u t e s , Al-Azhar 
i n s t i t u t e s and school during 1405 H in conparison to £ E 34,525 
during 1401 H, And £ E 66,054 was pa id out fo r the maintenance of 
mosques during 1405H compared to £ E3, 200 during 1405H, £E 138, 408 
was paid to 37 reg i s t e red p r i v a t e s o c i e t i e s in 140IH, This 
ccanpares with £ E 62,900 paid t o s ix s o c i e t i e s during 1401 H for 
soc ia l services to poor and needy i n d i v i d u a l s . 
The sum of £ E 4,550 was pa id out to 21 persons frc«n 310 
p a r t i c i p a n t s in the annual competition for the Memorisation of the 
Cur* an during 1405H, 
The Fund has a l loca ted £ E % 50,000 in i t s planned 
Estimates fo r 1406 H, to furnishing poor craftsmen, who are capable 
of working but lack c a p i t a l , with production r equ i s i t e s and the 
equipments necessary for than t o opera te . 
33 For the Zakah Fund revenues and expenditure of FIBE, 
see appendix I I I 
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ZaJcah paid by ind iv idua l s f o r the year 1405 H amounted' 
to £ E 114.421, 
Dcaaaticai received from persons during the year 1405 
amoxinted to £E 38,440 in comparison to £E 11,748 during 1401 H. 
Socio-investment accounts fo r the year 1405 H amounted 
to £ E 410,876 (US ) 167.474) compared to US $ 10,000 during 
34 140IH. 
Reff9uyces of the Fund : 
To f u l f i l the i n t e r a c t i o n between the eccxiomic and socia l 
dimensions, the Fa i sa l I s lamic Bank of Egypt es tab l i shed Zakah 
Fund. The aim of the Fund i s to pay the due Zakah on the share-
holders fvind of the bank as well as to co l l ec t Zakah on behalf 
of investment account ho lde r s . These funds are disbursed through 
Shar i ' ah . 
The following i s the br ie f s tatonent of the Zakah develop-
ment of the Zakah fund 's resources and expoid i tu re . 
1M .Zakah due on the Bank's fvmd (share-holders) for the 
year 1405 H amounted t o £,E $ 549.650 compared to 
£ E 244.3 24 charged to the F i sca l year 1401 H, 
34 Arabia (London), October 1986, p .45 , 
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2 , Zakah c o l l e c t e d from c l i e n t s ( inves tment account ho lde r s ) 
f o r t h e y e a r 1405 anounted t o £ E 602,507 coBipared t o 
£ E 20.659 dur ing 1401H, This i n c r e a s e r e f l e c t t h e 
35 
c l i e n t ' s con f iden t i n the Bank t o d i s t r i b u t e t h e i r Zakah. 
I n t h e m a t t e r of f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s , t h e FIBE p r o v i d e s 
more c r e d i t than o t h e r b a n k s . This i s because of i t s s p e c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p wi th i t s d e p o s i t o r s which i s based on t h e p r o f i t and 
l o s s s h a r i n g b a s i s . S ince t h e d e p o s i t o r S i n t h e FIBE a r e n o t 
gua ran t eed e i t h e r a f i x e d inccmie o r t h e repayment of h i s d e p o s i t , 
FIBE i s i n a p o s i t i o n to t r a n s f e r p a r t of t h e r i s k invo lved t o t h e 
d e p o s i t o r , wh i l e o t h e r banks do n o t . The h igh growth i n t h e b a n k ' s 
d e p o s i t s , conpared wi th t h a t of o t h e r ccxnmercial banks , can be 
r e l a t e d t o two major f a c t o r s : t h e r e l i g i o u s f a c t o r which mot iva t e s 
Muslim s a v e r s t o save i n an I s l a m i c bank, and t h e r e t u r n f a c t o r , 
where t h e b a n k ' s r a t e i s h i g h e r than t h e r a t e of i n t e r e s t i n non-
I s l a m i c b a n k s . 
Case Study 3 i I s l a m i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r Inves tment 
and Development ( I B I D T "" 
This bank was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1980 by m i n i s t e r i a l decree 
i n accordance wi th t h e Investment Law of Arab and Fore ign Funds 
36 
and F ree Zones Law, n o , 43 of 1974, I t was r e g i s t e r e d wi th t h e 
35 I b i d . , p . 45 . 
36 A l l t h e subsequent f i g u r e s on IBID a r e from Ahmad 
Abde l -Fa t t ah Ashker E l . , The I s l amic Business E n t e r p r i s e 
(Groom Helm 1987 ' " 
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Central Baaik in Novonber 1980, The Islamic In t e rna t i ona l Bank 
f o r Investment and Development (IBID) was es tab l i shed in the form 
of a j o i n t - s t o c k publ ic l imi ted company. The l i a b i l i t y of share-
holders i s l imited to the amount of c a p i t a l f o r which they have 
subscribed. 
The general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of shares are s imi la r to those 
of the FIBE, Shares cannot be divided i n t o f rac t ion of shares, 
they have nominal values ( p ^ va lue) , the nominal value per share 
must be in the range of t . S , 5,00 roiniraum and i i ,E, 1,000,00 
maxiimim and at l e a s t 25 pe r cent of the shares should be offered 
t o the p u b l i c . 
The authorised c a p i t a l of the bank i s $ lOOm, divided in to 
10,000,000 shares of $ 10 per value pe r share . The issued cap i t a l 
was $ l2m u n t i l the f i r s t half of 1984, a f t e r which i t was 
increased to $ 30 m (according to the decision of the annual 
general meeting on 25 June 1984). The paid-up c a p i t a l increased 
from $ 4,375raiP$ 5,638m and $ 8.647m to 11,42m in 1981, 1982, 1983 
and 1984 respec t ive ly . All the founders of the bank are Egyptians, 
I t s i n i t i a t i v e and c a p i t a l i s therefore e n t i r e l y Egyptian, unlike 
t ha t of the FIBE,. The success of the FIBE. and i t s effect in 
i n v e s t o r s ' wil l ingness to inves t in the new bank (IBID) cannot 
be ignored, however. 
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Similar to the FIBE the bank has a board of directors, 
a religious supervisory board, and a general meeting. The 
character is t ics of these boeirds are very similar to those of the 
FIBE. 
The bank offers a l l banking operations in Egyptian and 
foreign currency as follows: 
(1) Opening a l l bank accounts and accepting a l l kinds of 
deposits. 
(2) Performing and undertaking a l l operations relating to 
securi t ies , shares and similar stocks in local, Arab and 
international markets; creation and management of invest-
ment fund systems in various commercial, agricultural , 
real es ta te , industr ia l and other a c t i v i t i e s . 
(4) Innovating sol idari ty and security fxinds to face any 
poss ib i l i ty of loss which may inf lect the bank's cl ients , 
in compliance with Islamic co-operative systems, 
(5) Issuing of Islamic promissory notes on behalf of third 
par t ies and the receipt of relevant subscription, 
(6) Pxx)viding technical, economic, financial, managerial 
marketing and consultancy services relevant to projects, 
and preparing of feas ib i l i ty s tudies . 
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(7) Financing and se t t ing up a l l Icinds of p ro j ec t s e i t h e r fo r 
the bank 's own account or fo r the account of o r in p a r t i -
c ipa t ion with o ther p a r t i e s , 
(8) Contributing t o the crea t ion , development and promotion 
of investment in a l l sectors of development by e s t ab l i sh ing 
new p ro j ec t s and/or emending and upgrading ex i s t i ng 
p r o j e c t s , 
(9) Carrying out a l l banking, t rading, f i nanc i a l and investn«nt 
operat ions based on p a r t i f i c a t i o n or o ther forms cons is ten t 
37 
with the provision of the Shar i ' ab» 
Current Accounts $ 
The general f ea tu res of current accounts in the IBID are 
s imi la r to those of the FIBE, The accounts are not e n t i t l e d to 
any re turn , they are on-demand accounts, they may be opened in 
d i f ferent cur rencies , amounts may be t ransfer red from them to any 
other accounts e t c . Also, the c l i e n t ' s re l ig ion i s not a b a r r i e r . 
'^7 iM^»* P . 144, For the balance-sheet of IBID; see 
appendix IV. 
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Savincts Accounts » 
The g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s of t h e s e accoun t s a r e s i m i l a r t o 
t h o s e of o t h e r accoun t s , a l s o , a roiniraum amount i s r e q u i r e d t o 
open the account! £ , E , 300 o r t h e e q u i v a l e n t i n o t h e r c o n v e r t i b l e 
c u r r e n c i e s . Savings accoun t s have some f e a t u r e s of c u r r e n t 
accounts and some of inves tment a c c o u n t s . Cheque:^ i s a l s o allowed 
provided a rainimtim ba l ance i s ma in t a ined a t £ , £ , 150 o r e q u i v a l e n t 
38 in c o n v e r t i b l e c u r r e n c i e s . 
Savings accounts a r e e n t i t l e d t o a r e t u r n based on t h e 
prof i t r * S h a r i n g p r i n c i p l e , c a l c u l a t e d on t h e minimum inonthly 
account b a l a n c e ; However, t h e s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e of t h i s r e t u r n i s 
t h a t i t i s d i s t r i b u t e d a t t h e d i r e c t i o n of the board of d i r e c t o r s 
which has t h e r i g h t t o de te rmine how much w i l l be d i s t r i b u t e d , o r 
indeed i f t h e r e w i l l be a d i s t r i b u t i o n a t a l l . The d e c i s i o n of t h e 
board i n t h i s r e s p e c t depends upon how much p r o f i t i s made in a 
yea r - h i g h e r p r o f i t s a r e a s s o c i a t e d wi th h i g h e r r e t u r n s . The 
r e t u r n , which ranges between 3 and 6 p e r c e n t , i s regarded as a 
• g i f t ' from the bank. Compared wi th inves tment accounts , sav ings 
accounts a re l e s s r i s k y ; t h e account fvaid cannot be reduced by any 
l o s s e s the bank may s u f f e r . There fore , t h i s type of account s u i t s the 
39 t h e l e s s adventurous i n v e s t o r , 
38 I b i d . , p . 145. 
39 IbiqL.. p . 146 
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Investment-savings Accounts J 
These accounts were introduced in order t o encourage the 
inves tor to inves t with the bank and meanwhile to give him access 
to h i s savings without being t i e d up in 'investment fo r a long 
per iod . They have the following c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s j 
(1) The c l i e n t may f r ee ly withdraw from h i s account up to 
40 per cent of the balance, 60 pe r cent of the balance 
remaining inves ted , 
(2) The c l i e n t i s e n t i t l e d t o a p ro f i t - sha r ing return calculated 
on 60 per cent of the lowest monthly balance, 
(3) The t o t a l return t o the c l i e n t from t h i s account consis ts , 
therefore , of two par t s? the f i r s t i s a port ion of the 
investment p r o f i t (on 60 pe r cent of the minimum monthly 
balance), and the second i s a ' g i f t ' por t ion determined 
a t the d i sc re t ion of the board of d i r e c t o r s (s imi lar to 
savings accounts) on 40 pe r cent of the minimum monthly 
40 balance. To qualify f o r the g i f t por t ion, the c l i e n t 
should maintain the mininuxm balance s t a t ed in the section on 
savings accovints, 
40 I b i d . , p . 147. 
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Investment-savings accounts bear two types of r i sk , one 
higher than the o the r . The f i r s t concerns the 60 per cent 
port ion of the account, which may be l o s t e n t i r e l y or p a r t l y in 
case of a major loss on investments impairing the c a p i t a l . The 
seccnd concerns the 40 pe r cent por t ion , which can be v i r t u a l l y 
41 ignored, unless the bank goes bankrupt. 
Investnient Accounts » 
Investment accoxmts have the following c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : 
(1) They are accepted in d i f f e ren t currencies fo r a miniimxm 
i n i t i a l amount of ii-K 1000, o r the equivalent in conver-
t i b l e cur renc ies , 
(2) Replenishment of accounts i s accepted on the bas i s of 
50 per cent of the above minimum, 
(3) The periods of accounts are s ix months, one year, 
(4) Depos i t s may n o t be withdrawan dur ing t h e depos i t pe r iod 
except f o r c r u c i a l c o n d i t i o n s accep ted by t h e bank manage-
ment, 
C5) Depos i t s a r e renewable a u t o m a t i c a l l y f o r t h e same pe r iod 
xinless c o n t r a r y advice i s g iven i n w r i t i n g seven days p r i o r 
t o t h e m a t u r i t y d a t e , 
41 I b i d , , p . 
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(6) D e p o s i t o r s a r e e n t i t l e d t o a r e t u r n on t h e p r o f i t - s h a r i n g 
b a s i s , c a l c u l a t e d monthly. However, t hey a r e app rop r i a t ed 
t o c l i e n t s on a q u a r t e r l y b a s i s , excep t f o r six-rnonths 
d e p o s i t s , which a r e app rop r i a t ed on m a t u r i t y . 
(7) Returns a r e c r e d i t e d t o c l i e n t s ' c u r r e n t accounts i n the 
same cu r r ency a s t h e d e p o s i t , t ^ a r t e r l y o r b i - a n n u a l l y 
42 depending on t h e t ime d e p o s i t b a s i s . 
In f a c t t h e IBID ' s r a t e i s h i g h e r tha^i t h a t of t h e FIBE, 
The r a t e a r e shovan in t h e f i g u r e which p r o v i d e s a comparison 
between the average r a t e of i n t e r e s t on d e p o s i t s ( in non- I s l amic 
banks, ) t h e average r a t e of r e tu rn of t h e FIBE and t h a t of t h e IBID 
42 I b i d . , p . 147 
o 43 
In t h i s respect , i t seems tha t the IBID performs b e t t e r than the 
FIBE, 
Various f ac to r s can be sa id to have contr ibuted to the 
growth of deposi t funds in the IBID (which a lso applies to the 
FIBE) : 
l l ) The des i re of Muslims t o inves t t h e i r savings in 
accordance with Is lamic p r i n c i p l e s , a feel ing which i s 
enhanced by the growing move of Islamic resurgence. 
(2) The increase in the remit tance of Egyptians working abroad, 
t ransfe r red to Is lamic banks, though t h i s i s an important 
fac tor , i t i s but one. Remittance t ransfer red i s not the 
only source of depos i t s to Is lamic banks, deposi ts or ig ina te 
also from loca l savings . Also, not a l l Egyptians working 
abroad are Muslims, and fo r those who are, not a l l of them 
are prepared to inves t t h e i r savings in accounts with no 
fixed i n t e r e s t , 
(3) Trust in the management of Is lamic banks, 
(4) The success of Is lamic banks, vihich in i t s turn increases 
investors* t r u s t in the e f f ic iency of managanent and so on. 
43 For more de t a i l ed account of Islamic banks* 
performaDnce; see Is lamic Business En te rp r i s e . 
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Financia l F a c i l i t i e s t 
The IKLD provides f i nanc i a l f a c i l i t i e s fo r various t3fpes 
of projects* a g r i c u l t u r a l , i n d u s t r i a l and coinniercial. The f a c i -
l i t i e s can be broadly c l a s s i f i e d i n t o short term and medium and 
long-term opera t ions . 
Short-term Operations : 
The b a s i s of these operat ions , which i s common to Islamic 
banks in general , i s : 
Murabaha t The bank supplies c l i e n t s (wil l ing to buy) with t h e i r 
requirements (equipment, means of t r anspor ta t ion , raw mater ia ls , 
ccMtimodity requirements, e t c . ) taking the following fac tors in to 
accovmt, 
(1) The bank makes enqui r ies about, buys, owns and then s e l l s 
goods to the c l i e n t , 
(2) The bank as a buyer takes the f u l l r i sk of the purchased 
goods, 
(3) Once the goods are sold a t a higher p r i c e (purchase p r ice 
p lus p r o f i t margin) under terms of payment mutually 
agreed upon with the c l i e n t , the bank cannot ca lcu la te any 
fu r the r increase due to delay in repayment on instalments 
on maturi ty da t e s . 
o 45 
The interesting point here which characterises the IBID 
wurabaha and makes i t different fran that of the FIBE i s that 
the IBID does not calculate any further increase due to delay in 
repayment of instalments on maturity dates •from the FIBE case, 
that the banK i s of the view that since the delay causes haim to 
the bank in terms of profi t forgone, the bank i s en t i t l ed to 
compelsation calculated on the basis of the average annual rate 
of return realised on the bank's investment funds. The IBID's 
policy i s more lenient and beneficial to c l ien t s who might not be 
able to pay on maturity. This policy does not necessarily 
encourage c l i en t s not to pay in time* c l i en t s take in to account 
the effect of any delay in the i r payment on the i r ' h i s to r i ca l 
record' with the bank and the impact of that on future operations. 
The policy, however, requires the IBID to be more selective in 
accepting c l ien ts for these operations than the FIBE, and i t 
iinplies that a thorough scrutiny of c l i en t s ' applications i s 
highly necessary. 
Musharaka (participation): The bank together with i t s c l ients , 
part ly finances operations in the f ie lds of import, export 
internal trading, contracting e t c . The cl ient gets the return of 
his effort and expertise on the basis of a percentage of the 
prof i t which i s estimated but not known in advance. The c^jpro-
prlation i s calculated on the basis of the actual prof i t achieved. 
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Mttdaraba » I t i s p r a c t i c a l l y l i k e Musharaka except t h a t the 
bank f i n a n c e t h e ope ra t i on i n f u l l , whi le t h e c l i e n t p a r t i c i p a t e s 
w i th h i s e f f o r t and e x p e r t i s e , Oviously , t h e c l i e n t ' s h i s t o r y , 
conduct and e3q>ertise a r e e s s e n t i a l f o r unde r t ak ing t h e s e opera t ion^ 
However, t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s t end t o c o n c e n t r a t e on smal l b u s i n e s s 
which depend h e a v i l y on e x p e r t i s e wi th smal l c a p i t a l , such as 
smal l a r t and c r a f t wojdcshops. The r e l a t i v e s i z e of the <^e ra t ions 
in r e l a t i o n t o Olurabaha and ftiusharaka i s ve ry smal l , l e s s than 
10 p e r c e n t . 
As f o r t h e degree of r i s k invo lved , i t can be seen t h a t 
t h e r i s k a s s o c i a t e d wi th roudaraba i s t h e h i g h e s t , fo l lowed by 
musharaka and rourabaha r e s p e c t i v e l y . This e x p l a i n s why »iudaraba 
o p e r a t i o n s revo lve on the small type of b u s i n e s s t h a t does not 
44 
r e q u i r e l a r g e c a p i t a l * t h e p a r t n e r does no t p rov ide any c a p i t a l ' . 
Taking i n t o account t h e r e c e n t o r i g i n s of t h e s e I s l amic 
banks, t h e i r performance a re n o t i n s i g n i f i c a n t . As f o r t h e 
d e p o s i t s a r e concerned, t h e s e banks a re q u i t e compe t i t i ve i n 
acqu i r i ng d e p o s i t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t ime and saving d e p o s i t s . This 
shows t h a t I s l a m i c banking p r o v i d e s p r o d u c t i v e o u t l e t f o r i n v e s t a b l e 
r e s o u r c e s . The i n c r e a s e in t h e saving d e p o s i t s i n d i c a t e s t h a t 
i n v e s t o r s a p p r e c i a t e t h i s type of i nves tmen t . 
44 For t h e f i n a n c i a l o p e r a t i o n s of IBID; see appendix V. 
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There is no special entity for Islamic banks in Egypt, 
Banks in Egypt are divided into commercial banks, business and 
investment banks and specialised banks. Their financial position 
is included in the total data with commercial, business and 
investment etc. 
Whatever information available to us on the functioning 
of these financial institutions in Egypt, it c¥»pears that their 
existence is at individual level. This is a big drawback for 
their development. To make them successful, however, rules must 
be drawn up for a financial and monetairy system which central 
bank can adopt. Central bank, in this connection, must develop 
new laws and regulations concerning their use of funds. The lack 
of adequate financial instruments, including trained banking 
staff, and moreover, the means for dealing with higher informatioi 
and transaction cost to both depositors and banks. All these 
and many other problems are first to be resolved for the success 
of Islamic banking system. 
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CHAPTER - VII 
EXPERIMENTS IN ISLAMIC BANKING - SAUDI ARABIA 
Saudi 1 A r a b i a ' s banking system c o n s i s t of c e n t r a l and 
commercial b a n k s . The Saudi C e n t r a l Bank was c r e a t e d in A p r i l 
1952 in Jeddah under the name Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) u n t i l l , - t h e n t h e cot in t ry had no cen t ra l i s sed monetary 
a u t h o r i t y . Fore ign comroercial companies l i k e G e l l a t l y , Ne ther lands 
Trading Soc i e ty , s e rved a s bankers t o t h e s t a t e s , SAMA's head 
o f f i c e i s i n Riyadh; i t h a s 10 b ranches , l o c a t e d i n t h e town Abha, 
Buraidah, Dammam, J a i z a n , Jeddah, Mecca, Medina, Riyadh, Tabuk 
and Ta ie f , 
Saudi A r a b i a ' s biftiking s e c t o r i s s t r i c t l y c o n t r o l l e d by 
t h e government . SAMA i s a l s o v e s t e d wi th s p e c i a l powers l i k e ( l ) 
power t o i s s u e cu r r ency and s t a b i l i z e f l u c t u a t i c m s (2) t o c o n t r o l 
t h e management of commercial b a n k s . However, I s l a m i c law, the 
s h a r i ' a h , d e n i e s two major a t t r i b u t e s ccwimon t o c e n t r a l b a n k s . 
These a r e d i s c o u n t i n g b i l l s a t h igh r a t e s t o c o n t r o l bank c r e d i t , 
and open market o p e r a t i o n s ( t r e a s u r y bonds) to mop up exces s 
l i q u i d i t y . Deprived of t h e s e t o o l s , SAMA s t r i v e s t o use powers 
vaguely termed "moral p e r s u a t i o n " . 
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The banking cont ro l law prcxnulgated in June 1966, 
es tab l i shed the ru les o ther than t h a t banks operation in Saudi 
Arabia must confonn to the shai:! ' ah, which regards i n t e r e s t payments 
as usuary. Thus, i n t e r e s t re turns a re replaced by "service f ees" . 
The "service fees" on c r e d i t s from p r i v a t e banks vary between T% 
and 8,5% depending on the type of loan , SAMA occasional ly adjusts 
the r a t e taking i n t o account genera l economic condit ions, the 
needs of various sec tors , and world money market developments. 
The "service fee" i s lower on saving accounts and time deposits 
ranging between 2% and 4%. In 1980, time deposi t came to 35,334 
of demand deposi ts or 21,3% of t o t a l depos i t s ccwipared with l^ and 
2 
12% respect ively in 1976. In Saudi Arabia the re has been consi-
derable support fo r Is lamic banking, even though the kingdom had 
1 Although Saudia Arabia have a p roh ib i t ion on a l l i n t e r e s t 
payments and rece ip t s under t h e i r Is lamic laws, never thless the 
service charges are permitted on bank loan, and in p rac t i ce , as 
they are calculated on a percentage b a s i s , they resemble i n t e r e s t 
in many re spec t s . The service charges are f ixed, however, and 
hence borrowers are not subject to the u n c e r t a i n i t y as to the future 
cost of debt servicing which a r i s e s when i n t e r e s t r a t e s vaxry. In 
Saudi Arabia most bank deposi ts are in cur ren t accovints which earn 
no income, but even deposi ts in saving accounts only earn a modest 
f ixed r e tu rn . See Rodney Wilson, ' I s l amic Banking and Finance'/ 
The Middle East and North Africa, 34th Edi t ion, (Europa Publications 
Limited, 1988X7 p . 160, 
2 See "Saudi Arabia, Banking System", Arab World F i l e (Cyprus), April l982, 
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no s p e c i f i c a l l y Is lamic banks t i n t i l l r ecen t ly . A member of the 
Saudi royal family, p r ince Muhamroad a l - F a i s a l Al-Saud has continued 
3 
h i s pu r su i t in the ejcpanding of Is lamic banking. 
The following i n s t i t u t i o n s provide loan as i n t e r e s t - f r e e : 
1, The Pxiblic Investment Fundt (PIF) 
I t i s a l so knovm as the General Investment Fund. I t was 
se t up in 1971, This fund i s responsible t o the Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy, The Fund i s supposed to promote the 
d ive r s i f i c a t i on of the economy mainly by lending i n t e r e s t - f r e e t o 
publ ic corporat ion and by subscript ion to t h e i r bond i s s u e s . The 
PIF' s most important considerat ion i s the commercial v i a b i l i t y of • 
the p ro j ec t which must a lso be of some s ignif icance in the over 
a l l development of the country. Un t i l e a r ly 1980, the PIF had 
3 In June 1981, Muhammad Fa i sa l Al-Sa*ud announced the 
establishment of a $ 1 bn investment holding company, Dar*-al-Maal 
a l - I s lami (DMI). The purpose was to 'provide the oppor tuni t ies 
to Muslim t o perform t h e i r t ransac t ions in accordance with the 
Islamic sha r i * ah, The projected cap i t a l i za t i on was the l a rges t 
of any Is lamic bank. In December 1982, Fa i sa l announced tha t the 
i n i t i a l p r i v a t e and publ ic offer ings had ra ised $ 310 mil l ion frc«n 
14,500 share-holders . He also negot iated with o ther Arab S ta tes to 
open addi t iona l banks; see Middle East Contemporary Survey,Vol.7 
(New York* Holmes & J>jeier Publishers , I nc , 1982-83), p ,247 . 
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extended loans worth SR 16 b i l l i o n t o Saudia and Perroinin alone, 
and had approved a request by the Saudi Arabian Basic Indus t r i e s 
Corporation (SABIC) , The P IF ' s equi ty acquis i t ion t o t a l l e d 
SR 7»2 b i l l i o n a t tha t t ime. In 1981, the PIP disimbursed more 
than SR 10 b i l l i o n to launch petrochemical, me ta l lu rg ica l and 
ref ining complexes in J u b a i l and Yanbu, The shares of the newly 
incorporated publ ic corporat ions aire t o be sold subsequently to 
4 low income Saudi n a t i o n a l s , 
(2) The Real Es ta te Development Funds (REDF) 
I t was se t up in Ju ly 1974., This fund also grants 
i n t e r e s t - f r e e loans f o r the construct ion of p r i va t e houses or 
housing complexes. For the former, the c r e d i t covers up to l^o 
of cos t s and fo r the l a t t e r , 5(»4. If repayment proceeds 
regula r ly upon the maturi ty of each instalment , the benef ic iary 
enjoys a 2064 reduction of h i s debt; i f the c r ed i t i s rapid before 
the maturi ty , a fu r ther 10% reduction i s app l icab le . In 1978, 
the REDF designed four types of medium (10 years) and long-term 
(25 years) housing loans for between SR 100,000 and SR 200,000, 
From raid 1975, when the f i r s t loan was granted, the REDF had 
extended over 200,000 long term c r e d i t worth some SR 40,5 b i l l i o n 
4 "Saudi Arabia, Banking System", Arab World F i l e , 
( C y p r u s ) , 19 May, 1982 . 
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fo r the construct ion of p r i v a t e houses^ and 7*500 medixan term 
5 
loans t o t a l l i n g SR 1,8 b i l l i o n fo r 1,500 apartment bu i ld ings . 
SAMA 
Over the pas t few yearsj took measures t o enforce regula-
t ion of the banking sec to r . Tb date , SAMA's approach has been 
f a i r l y p ro t ec t ive towards loca l coiranercial banks. Among recent 
developments in t h i s vein has been a clamp-dovaa on money lenders, 
whose a c t i v i t i e s previously f e l l outs ide the regulatory process 
and e f fec t ive ly undermined the opera t ions of commercial banks, 
SAMA has also excluded foreign banks from Saudi r iyal -syndicated 
lending within the Kingdom, 
In February 1984, the agency experimented with a 90-day 
b i l l , which i t termed a "banker ' s s ecu r i ty deposi t account". This 
issue was undersubscribed by the commercial banks but SAMA claimed 
5 "Saudi- Arabia Banking Syst«n", Arab World F i l e 
(Cyprus) May 1982, 
6 Most Saudi c i t i z e n s do not maintain accounts with the 
commercial banks in the Kingdom, Ins tead they resor t to money 
lenders and money-changers fo r t h e i r f i nanc i a l requirements. Some 
of these 'informal* bankers offer a wide ran^e of f inanc ia l services, 
including the exchange of currency, the handling of overseas 
remittances, deposit f a c i l i t i e s and loans . I n t e r e s t i s not earned 
on loans, which are often in kind r a the r than cash. For example, i f 
a c l i e n t needs some item of equipment, the money-lender wi l l usual ly 
purchase i t on behalf of the c l i e n t and then e i t h e r co l l ec t i n s t a l -
momts frcTO the c l i en t , o r e l s e e n t e r a leasing arrangement. In 
e i t h e r case the payments over a per iod wi l l exceed the i n i t i a l cost 
of the i t«n , the difference represent ing the money-lenders p r o f i t ; 
see Rodeny Wilson, ' I s lamic Banking and Finance ' , in The Middle East 
and North Africa (Europa Publ icat ion Limited, 1988) ,p , l6 l . 
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to be pleased with the response, o f f i c i a l s s t r e ssed tha t the 
instrument was not fo r debt f inancing, but to provide domestic 
banks with an o u t l e t for investment . 
However, despi te the governments commitment to balanced 
budget over the next f ive years , the p o s s i b i l i t y of d e f i c i t 
financing cannot be ruled out, given the s h o r t - f a l l in o i l revenues 
c lea r ly , government borrowing would open up ioQore business oppor-
7 
t u n i t i e s fo r the domestic banks. 
According to the ABF repor t 'Development of the Saudi 
coinmercial banking sec to r over the pas t ten years would seent at 
f i r s t r igh t to of fer l i t t l e reason f o r discppointment. The 11 
commercial banks had 524 branches by 1984, compared with only 
76 in 1975. Total a s se t s had r i sen seven-fold to SR 145,000 
mil l ion ($ 39,720 mi l l ion) while deposit had increased from 
SR 15,000 mil l ion ($ 4,104 mi l l ion) to SR 109,000 mil l ion 
($ 29,859 m i l l i o n ) . Between 1979-84, t o t a l foreign asse t s had 
grown to SR 67,000 mil l ion ($ 18,354 mi l l ion) frcxn SR 17,000 
($ 4,657 m i l l i o n ) . 
7 See "Arab Banking F i l e " MEES, August 1985, p ,4 
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There have, however, been some s ign i f i can t changes in the 
pas t two years , h ighl ight ing the harsher economic cl imate in which 
commercial banks must opera te . According to the same report 
the banks are s t i l l p ro f i t ab l e , but margins a re dec l in ing . The 
two big. Wholly Saudi owned banks. Nat ional Commercial Bank and 
Riyadh Bank - with combined asse t s of $ 25, 200 mi l l ion and over 
280 branches - saw t h e i r pre tax p r o f i t l a s t year drop t o 0,92 per 
cent and 1,92 p e r cent of a s se t s respec t ive ly , 'And for the f i r s t 
time s ince 1979, the t o t a l a s se t s of the coun t ry ' s commercial 
banks f e l l in 1984 as publ ic expenditure dropped to i t s lowest 
8 l e v e l . The report fu r the r says t Chief among f ac to r s affecting 
canramercial banks future performance w i l l be the l eve l of o i l 
revenues. These w i l l determine publ ic spending and, in turn, the 
growth of the economy. In June 1985 o i l production f e l l to as 
l i t t l e as 2,5 mil l ion ba r r e l s a day (b/d) a quar te r of 1981 output. 
The fourth f ive-years development plan (1985-90) puts 
t o t a l government spending at SRI mil l ion ($274,000 mi l l ion) includinc 
m i l i t a r y requirements - some SR 200,000 mi l l ion ($ 55,000 million) 
l e s s than was spent in the previous f ive y e a r s . This more modest 
level of expenditure wi l l undoubtedly t r a n s l a t e i n to a heal thy 
8 I b i d . , p . 4 . 
9 I b i d , , p . 5 . 
rk " — 
but r e l a t i v e lov) growth r a t e f o r the non-o i l econoroy. During 
the f i r s t years of the t h i r d development plan (1980,85) non-oi l 
gross dcroestic product (GDP) grew in r e a l terms by 10 per cent 
a year fo r 1981 and 1982.and by 7,2 per cent in 1983, Despite 
the cutback in spending, p rov i s iona l es t imates put growth at 4,3 
pe r cent fo r 1984, The four th development p l a n : t a rge t i s 
2,9 pe r cent a year f o r the non-o i l economy, with over a l l 
averages growth fo r o i l and non-o i l sec tors ta rge ted a t 4 per cent . 
A nvunber of f a c t o r s w i l l inf luence the d i rec t ion bank 
t ake . They are already wary of becoming too involved in the 
construct ion sector , with inf r a s t r u c t u r a l development la rgely 
complete and the drop in pxiblic spending fu r the r r e s t r i c t i n g 
the nioniber of cont rac t awards. The fourth development plan ta rge ts 
construct ion growth a t 2,8 pe r cent a year . Although opportu-
n i t i e s w i l l remain for banks in t h i s sector , they must be well 
researched. Over-investment and cash.flow problems have placed 
demands on the banks in the pas t , but as emphasis turns to boil ing 
out cont rac tors which have fa l l en i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s , and 
as s i s t ing with f inanc ia l r e s t ruc t ing , there i s a need for p a r t i -
cular cau t ion . Meanwhile, banking services are s t i l l required for 
the continuing construct ion a c t i v i t i e s in those favoured sectors -
11 human a higher proport ion of government money than o ther a reas . 
10 I b i d . , Po6 
11 See "Banking on The Middle East", The Middle East 
(London), December 1987, pp. 41-46. ~ 
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His to r i ca l ly the ccxranercial banks have been f inanc ia l 
"gap - f i l l e r s " in Saudiv^ Arabia* xinable to compete with the cheap 
finance offered by s t a t e owned i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the Saudi 
I ndus t r i a l Development Pvmd (SIDF) and the Real Esta te Development 
Fund, they have tended t o concent ra te on sector whose access to 
government subsidy i s more l i m i t e d . These have included i n t e r s 
nat ional t rade and c e r t a i n a reas of construct ion such as office 
building and housing fo r foreign workers. 
Trade finance remain a major a c t i v i t y of the banks, but 
i t s r e l a t i ve importance may diminish in future years . Reduced 
government spending has led t o a dec l ine in inpor te r tha t i s 
l ike ly to continue as impor t -s i ibs t i tu t ion indus t r i e s s t a r t - u p . 
Given the r i sk and unce r t a in ty often a t tached to domestic lending, 
and the absence of su f f i c i en t o u t l e t s fo r funds, the commercial 
banks have been a t t r a c t e d to investment overseas . This could be 
accentuated in future by the opening of s t i l l more foreign branches. 
Considerable p r i va t e wealth continuous to be d i r e c t l y invested 
abroad, and the growing r e s p e c t a b i l i t y and maturi ty of the Saudi 
banks should be an important f ac to r in a t t r a c t i n g more of t h i s 
12 business, one Saudi Arabian money-lending and money-changing 
12 One gap which the commercial banks have been reluctant 
to f i l l i s tha t of sro^ll bus iness f inance , Saudi.i Arabia 's non-oil 
economy i s almost e n t i r e l y composed of small-scale en te rp r i se s . 
But the needs of the modest ent repreneurs have yet to be accommo-
dated. However, i t i s hoped t h a t as small firms grow more 
accustaned to drawing up annual f i n a n c i a l statement, commercial 
banks wi l l f ind i t a e a s i e r to assess the v i a b i l i t y of financing 
them, end wi l l be a t t r a c t e d in to the market (ABF,August 1985),p.4. 
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family, the Ar-Rajhis, have grown to become the t h i r d l a rges t 
commercial f i nanc i a l i n s t i t u t i o n in the kingdom, a f t e r the 
National Coitanercial and the Riyadh banks. Their a s se t s exceed 
$ 180 mil l ion , and a l l of the business has been bxiilt up on the 
bas i s of r i ba f ree t r a n s a c t i o n s . In 1983, there were pressures on 
the Ar-Rajhis to r e g i s t e r as a conroercial bank, as, unl ike the 
other banks, they did not hold reserves with the Saudi Arabian 
monetary Agency and were completely unregulated. Rather than 
r e g i s t e r as a conventional ccaranercial bank, the Ar-Rajhis decided 
to seek Is lamic banking s t a t u s , as they claimed t h e i r business 
methods conformed t o ©eranic p r inc ip l e s in any case . There were 
some h e s i t a t i o n on the p a r t of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
given the i r tp l icat ion fo r the other banks, and the problems in 
acting as lender of the l a s t r e so r t fo r t h i s type of f inanc ia l 
i n s t i t u t i o n . In the end, however, the Saudi Arabian ^tonetary Agency 
decided t o l i cense the Ar-Rajhis o f f i c i a l l y in 1985 as deposit 
takers and exchange dea le r s , l a rge ly in order to help safeguard 
the s t a b i l i t y of the domestic f inanc ia l system. Although the 
monetary agency i s not obliged to act as lender of the l a s t resor t 
with respect to i n s t i t u t i o n s such as the Ar-Rajhi, i t i s widely 
13 believed tha t i t would i f the need arose . 
13 Rodeny Wilson, ' I s lamic Banking and Finance* op. c i t , 
P . 161. * 
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I s l ^ l c Development Bank s 
The Is lamic Development Bank (IDB), created in 1973, was 
inaugurated in 1975 and began i t s a c t i v i t i e s in October 1976. The 
purpose behind i t s establishment i s t o promote s o l i d a r i t y among the 
d i f fe ren t Is lamic coxintries. By the end of Apri l 1978, 32 African 
and Asian countr ies had become member s t a t e s . The bank's head-
quarters are in Jeddah. 
Organisat ional S t ruc ture t 
The board of governors i s the bank 's highest authori ty, 
i t i s a s s i s t ed by a board of d i r e c t o r s and i t s chairman, by one 
or several v ice-pres iden ts and by the adminis t ra t ive personnel. 
Each member s t a t e i s represented on the board of governors by one 
governor and one deputy governor, the l a t t e r having voting power 
only in the absence of the governor. The pres ident of the IDE 
i s e lected, for a 5-year term, from among the governors a t the 
board ' s annual meeting. The board of d i r e c t o r s i s composed of 
ten members e lec ted fo r 3 years, renewable by the board of governors, 
d i r ec to r s cannot be governors. The board of d i r ec to r s i s responsi-
ble for the bank's operat ions and for executing the decisions of 
the board of governors. 
Each raomber s t a t e i s e n t i t l e d to 500 votes plus one vote 
per equi ty share (110,000 Is lamic d i n a r s ) . The decisions are taken 
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by simple majority, with the exception of those involving the 
o r i en ta t ion of the bank 's po l i cy and objec t ives or the supervision 
of specia l fxmds* 
Objectives and Operations s 
The bank ' s ob jec t ive i s t o promote the economic and soc ia l 
development of the Islainic peoples and commtmities in accordance 
with Islamic s h a r i ' a h . This means t h a t i t does not co l l ec t or 
pay i n t e r e s t ; while i t s s t a t u s provide f o r the repayment of i t s 
adminis t ra t ive expenses. The IDB i s e n t i t l e d to carry out the 
following operat ions: (1) p a r t i c i p a t i n g the c a p i t a l of member 
s t a t e s ' productive p ro j ec t s (2) inves t ing in publ ic o r p r iva t e 
sector p ro jec t s (3) managing funds dest ined to serve Muslim 
communities in non-member s t a t e s (4) stipervising p r iva te funds 
(5) accepting deposi ts and obtaining funds by any other means 
(6) contr ibut ing to the development of the member s t a t e ' s foreign 
t rade (7) granting t echn ica l a s s i s t ance to member s t a t e s 
(8) providing means fo r the t r a in ing of the personnel working in 
the various p ro jec t s financed by the bank (9) conducting the 
necessary s tudies fo r the economic and soc ia l development of 
14 
member s t a t e s . 
14 See ' I s lamic Development Bank', The Middle East and 
Morth Africa, (Europa Publ ica t ion Limited, 1988)~. 
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c o i t a l and Other Resources t 
The bank's unit of account i s the Islamic dinar (ID)^  
i t has an authorised capi ta l of ID 2 b i l l ion divided into 
200,000 shares i t may be increased by a tw>-thirds majority of the 
board of governors i n i t i a l l y set at 508^ , the paid up cepital has 
been reduced to 37,5% and i s distr ibuted as follows* 
The q?erations of the Is lanic Development Bank are 
classif ied into four main categories* 
1, Loans to the least developed countries to ass is t them 
to build or extend the i r infrastructures. 
2, Financing in the form of equity par t ic ipat ions, 
3 , Financing of the member countries foreign t rade. 
4, Technical assistance in the form of financing feas ib i l i ty 
s tudies . 
In the past ten years, between 1975/76 to 1984/85, the 
Islamic Development Bank has ins t i tu ted multiple modes of financing 
in accordance with the Islamic shari 'ah law. 
15 For de ta i l figures of countrywise operations by 
Islamic Development Bank; see appendix VI. 
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After the ea^eriment s tage, the bank successful ly coope-
ra ted with var ious i n t e rna t i ona l and regional agencies and funds. 
In ten years , the IDB approved 575 p ro j ec t s valued a t ID 4,858,99 
mi l l ion contr ibut ing to the socio-economic development of the 
I s l a n i c conference Organiza t ion ' s (100) 43 member countiries. 
Since count r ies needs increase more rapidly than ava i l ab le dunds^ 
the IDB has fonnulated a f ive-year plan (1985/86 t o 1990/91) which 
forecasts* ( l ) es t imates fo r ID 270 mil l ion for 1985/36 and an 
annual growth of XCfA (2) distrLbuticxi of modes of financing for 
the same per iod as follows* loans; 306 ;^ equi ty ; l(f/»f l eas ing ; 56?i; 
t echn ica l a s s i s t ance : 4% (3) an accrued d ive r s i f i ca t ion of modes 
of financing to mobilize resources through c a p i t a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
and Islamic c e r t i f i c a t e s of deposit and investment, these two modes 
being in the process of formulation. Furthermore 1984/85 witnessed 
the readmission of Egypt t o the IDB a f t e r a suspension of more than 
f ive y e a r s , ' 
The Is lamic Development Bank has completed the f i r s t decade 
of i t s development. During t h i s periocS, i t s membership has 
increased to 43 coun t r i e s . Having become operat ional in the very 
f i r s t year, i t has ca r r i ed out about 250 ordinary operat ions 
t o t a l l i n g near ly US $ 1,5 bn. The foreign t rade financing made 
16 Figures fo r d i f ferent modes of financing are avai lable 
in Appendix VII , 
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avai lable by i t upto about US § 4 bn . Addit ional ly, i t has 
undertaken about f i f t y operat ions from i t s spec ia l account which 
would add another $ 150 in approximately t o the financing provided 
by the Bank since i t s incep t ion . I t s f inancing has taken the form 
of loans, equi ty investment, leas ing, p r o f i t - s h a r i n g technica l 
ass i s tance and foreign t rade ope ra t ions . I t has res tored to three 
o ther types of operation known as Line of Equity, l i n e of Leasing 
and Instalment Financing, Viewed from a s ec to r a l standpoint, i t 
has covered several sec tors , such as i n d u s t r i e s and mining, t r ans -
por t and commxmications, ag r i cu l tu re and agro-based indus t r i e s , 
u t i l i t i e s and socia l s e rv i ce s . I t has a l so financed scxne j o i n t 
ventures and has sought t o a s s i s t and bu i ld a c lose re la t ionship 
with na t iona l Islamic banks and na t iona l development banks. I t has 
provided over US $ 60 m for helping the Muslim communities in non-
member coun t r i e s . I t s t o t a l c a p i t a l resources have gone up from 
17 SDR 750 m to over SDR 2 bn. 
In absolute term t h i s i s indeed, a highly impressive 
record. Yet, in the context of the wide ranging tasks assigned to 
i t and the enormity of the resources needs of i t s member countries 
fo r development, t h i s can be regarded a t bes t as a good beginning. "'"^  
17 "The Islamic Developmoit Bank: The f i r s t ten years", Arabia (London) May 1986, pp , 66-69. " " 
18 Bank, as ref lec ted byihis decision to embark upon a 
comprehensive evaluation exe rc i s e . According to p r e s s report , he 
has appointed a high level panel for t h i s purpose; see Questions 
for the IDB", Arabia (London) ^ r l l 1986, 
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The I s l a m i c Development Bank has approved a cumula t ive 
t o t a l of 579 p r o j e c t s va lued a t almost ID ( I s l a m i c Dinar) 5 b n . 
F i n a n c i a l o p e r a t i o n can be c a t o g r a i a e d as o r d i n a r y ( p r o j e c t f inanc ing 
and Techn ica l A s s i s t a n c e ) . Fore ign Trade and s p e c i a l A s s i s t a n c e 
Account , T e c h n i c a l l y sound and economical ly v i a b l e v e n t u r e s are 
e l i g i b l e f o r p r o j e c t f i n a n c i n g " . This cou ld be i n t h e form of a 
loan, i n t e r e s t - f r e e loans are advanced t o p r o j e c t of an i n f r a -
s t r u c t u r a l n a t u r e such as roads , b r i d g e , a i r p o r t and so on , "nhey 
could a l s o be t hose wi th a marked impact on socio-economic d e v e l -
opment l i k e schoo l s , h o s p i t a l s , r u r a l f a c i l i t i e s and low c o s t 
hous ing . Techn ica l a s s i s t a n c e i s a v a i l a b l e t o conduct f e a s i b i l i t y 
s t u d i e s and t o p r o c e s s p r o j e c t ready f o r f i n a n c i n g . Equi ty p a r t i -
c i p a t i o n i s p o s s i b l e i n c a p i t a l of a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l 
p r o j e c t s . Funds can be provided a l s o through l i n e s of e q u i t y 
g r a n t e d t o n a t i o n a l development f inanc ing i n s t i t u t i o n , Leaaming 
f o r i t a n s such a s s h i p s , locomotives , heavy machinery and equipment 
i s a l s o a v a i l a b l e ownership p a s s e s on t h e l e s s e e a f t e r a f i xed 
19 p e r i o d . L i n e s of l e a s i n g , f a c i l i t i e s a re a l s o a v a i l a b l e . Equi ty 
f inanc ing , u n t i l l r e c e n t l y had been ejqjahding, n o n - a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of v i a b l e p r o j e c t s i n t h e p i p e - l i n e has been c i t e d as a reason f o r 
20 t h e p r e s e n t r e l a t i v e d e c l i n e . 
19 ' I s l a m i c Developmarit Bank', FMA ( B e i r u t ) 13 November 
1985. 
20 "The I s l a m i c Development Bank: The f i r s t ten yea r s" , 
Arabia (London) May 1986, p . 66 -69 . 
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The Is landc Development Bank introduced a method knov«i as 
"Instalment r a t e " in vhich ownership of the asse t i s t ransfer red 
to the purchase inmediately a f t e r de l ivery while the p r i c e i s 
payable by ins ta lments . Financing of p ro j ec t s having a quick and 
d i r e c t iretums by means of pa r t i c ipa t i on i s known as ' p r o f i t -
sharing ' . 
The IDB has sought t o invest funds not immediately needed, 
in short term investment, in member count r ies , t o f inance "foreign 
t rade" , s ince 1977, The 'Investment Deposit Scheme* has been 
introduced within the framework of financing foreign t r a d e . Deposits 
are accepted from government i n s t i t u t i o n s and ind iv idua l s with a 
21 
minimum of US $ 250,000, 
The Islamic Development Bank has been u t i l i s i n g net 
proceeds from i t s deposi ts to provide ass i s tance under the "special 
Assistance Amount", I t s main object ives a re : 
I , Training and research aimed at guiding members to 
r eo r i en t s t h e i r economic a c t i v i t i e s in conformity with the 
s h a r i ' a h . 
21 I b i d , , p . 66. 
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I I , Provision of r e l i e f to members as well as Is lamic 
coiwnunities in non-rausljLm countr ies ef fec ted by na tu ra l 
d i s a s t e r s . 
I I I . F i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e t o meiribers f o r t he promotion of 
Is laoaic c a u s e s . 
A u s e f u l medium f o r t h e t r a n s f e r of technology among 
menbers has been t h e ' T e c h n i c a l Cooperat ion Programme". I t s 
o b j e c t i v e s a r e t o m o b i l i s e t e c h n i c a l a b i l i t y of member coxmtr ies 
by promoting c o o p e r a t i o n s and exchange of e x p e r t i s e , expe r i ence 
and in format ion f o r t h e i r mutual b e n e f i t . 
To f o s t e r socio-economic development amcwig member and 
muslim ccanmvmities world-wide, IDB has e s t a b l i s h e d r e l a t i o n s with 
o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n s which have t h e same g e n e r a l g o a l s . Close and 
a c t i v e coope ra t i on i s ma in ta ined wi th s e c r e t a r i a t e Genera l of t he 
OIC, the statO-s' :>, econcraic and s o c i a l r e s e a r c h and t r a i n i n g 
22 Centre f o r I s l a m i c c o u n t r i e s a t Ankara, Turkey among o t h e r s . 
The I s l a m i c Research and Tra in ing I n s t i t u t e (IRTI) was 
e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1983 t o e s ^ l o r e t h e domain of r e sea r ch and t r a i n i n g 
i n I s l a m i c economics . The IRTI o r g a n i s e s and c o o r d i n a t e s r e sea rch 
22 The Middle E a s t and North Afr ica , (Europa P u b l i c a t i o n 
Limited, 198877 P . 2 ^ 3 . 
266 
f o r developing models and methods f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of s h a r i ' a h 
in economies, f i n a n c e and banking and t o e n a b l e member's a c t i -
v i t i e s i n t h e s e f i e l d s t o conform. I t a l s o p r o v i d e s t r a i n i n g 
f a c i l i t i e s t o p e r s o n n e l engaged in development a c t i v i t i e s . 
Out of t h e Bank ' s s t a f f of 449 (30 a t i n c e p t i o n ) 43 2 are 
from member c o u n t r i e s and 17 frem Muslim communities e l sewhere . 
The t e c h n i c a l s t a f f i n c l u d e s h i g h l y q u a l i f i e d economis ts , f i n a n c i a l 
a n a l y s t s , accoun tan t s , lawyers , s t a t i s t i c i o n s and e n g i n e e r s . To a 
g r e a t e x t e n t , dependence i s p l a c e d on IDB's own p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a f f 
23 f o r examining and a p p r a i s i n g p r o j e c t s . 
The developing c o u n t r i e s f a c e a m u l t i t u d e of economic 
h a r d i e s , ch ie f among them arex 
1. fal l ing prices of ccsiunodities, 
2. increasing protectionism of industrial ized countries 
in the form of s t i f fe r tar i f f and non-tariff barr ier 
that adversely effect export, 
4, Low level of external resources inflow, 
5, violent fluctuations in exchange r a t e . 
All of these factors are creating severe debt servicing 
problems for developing member covmtries. In addition, the effects 
23 Ibid. , p , 223, 
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of na tu ra l d i s a s t e r such as the prot raced drought in the Sahel and 
floods in Bangladesh contr ibuted s ign i f i can t ly towards constraning 
econcMnic growth and development. In order t o o f f se t fu r the r dete-
r io ra t ion and to counter the emerging d is loca t ion the member 
countr ies have no choice but t o work out p r a c t i c a l scheme, f a c i -
l i t i e s and arrangements f o r the generation of t rade as well as 
d ivers ions of t h e i r exports and imports in the d i rec t ion of 
i n t r a - t r a d e and to i n t ens i fy t h e i r e f fo r t s in favour of g rea te r 
se lE-re l iance and cooperation in var ious f i e l d s , a t sxib-regional 
and regional l e v e l s . At present , the l eve l of i n t r a - t r a d e among 
member countr ies i s depressingly low, i n s p i t e of the IDB's effor t 
of the l a s t ten yea r s . Whereas the developed countr ies conduct 
70 per cent of t h e i r t rade among themselves, and even developing 
countr ies as a whole conduct 30 pe r cent of t h e i r t rade among 
themselves fo r the member countr ies of the IDE, 
In recognition of t h i s fac t , the IDE has been assigned 
by the OIC, and the task of s e t t i ng up long-term financing f ac i -
l i t i e s fo r promoting i n t r a - t r a d e through such schemes as Regional 
Export c r ed i t Guarantees, The dilemma faced by the IDE i s tha t 
ex is t ing scheme of guaranteeing export c r e d i t were incons is ten t 
with the s h a r i ' a h . The challenge of IDE i s to device export 
guarantee insurance scheme in conformity with the s h a r i ' a h . The 
f e a s i b i l i t y of a m u l t i l a t e r a l Is lamic c lear ing Union i s being 
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s t u d i e d by t h e IDB, The I s l a m i c world awa i t s t he r e s u l t s of t h i s 
s tudy because of t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of i t s p o t e n t i a l impact on 
. 24 
f u r t h e r i n g economic growth i n member c o u n t r i e s , 
Al-Rajhi Bylcing and Inves tment Corpora t ion : 
Perhaps t h e b i g g e s t success f o r I s l a m i c banking i s t he 
r e c e n t d e c i s i o n of t h e Saudia Areibia Monetary Agency (SAMA) t o g i v e 
a f u l l banking l i c e n c e t o t h e Kingdom's famed and i n f l u e n t i a l 
money c h a n g e r s , Al-Rajh i company f o r cu r rency change and commerce 
(ARCCEC). 
A f t e r f o u r y e a r s of ^ p l i c a t i o n s , SAMA has f i n a l l y agreed 
t o a l low t h e f o u r Al-Rajhi b r o t h e r s , Saleh , Abdullah, Sulaiman and 
Muhammad, t o conve r t t h e i r money changing f i rm i n t o a banking 
company, the Al-Racjhi Inves tment cannpany. The new bank, t h e 
Kingdom's 12th, w i l l be half-owned by the p u b l i c and a sha re 
f l o t a t i o n . SiiMA has s t i p u l a t e d t h a t Al-Rajhi must shed scxne 
SR 660 m i l l i o n worth of r e a l e s t a t e , b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s and a g r i -
c u l t u r a l i nves tmen t s be fo re going p u b l i c . ARCCEC has a s s e t s 
wi th SR 16,6 bn ($4,2 b n . ) a t p r e s e n t . 
24 The I s l amic Development Bank: The f i r s t ten y e a r s " . 
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Al-Rajhi has made i t c l e a r in i t s appl ica t ion tha t i t 
wi l l operate vmder Is lamic banking p ro f i t - and - lo s s p r i n c i p l e s , 
Al-Rajhi has a network of over 23 0 branches in Saud i . Arabia 
alone - more than both the National Commercial Bank and the 
Riyadh Bank, the top two in the Kingdom, Saudi banking sources 
p red ic t t ha t a f t e r one o r two years of operat ion, the new Al-Rajhi 
investment ccsnpany wi l l surplus the two in terms of asse t s , 
deposi ts and branches. The p o t e n t i a l fo r i n t e r e s t - f r e e banking 
i s vas t , and deposi tors and inves to rs who previously hoarded money 
at home would now go to Al-Rajhi, Already the Kingdom's other 
two Islamic banking g i an t s . Sheikh Saleh Kamel; Al-Baraka group 
and pr ince Muhammad A l - F a i s a l ' s Dar al-Maal Al-Islami (DM) 
group - both of whom have been denied f u l l banking l icences in 
Saudi Arabia in the pas t - are watching the Al-Rajhi developments 
keenly. A second local money changer a lso from the inf luent ional 
Al-Rajhi family, the Jeddahbased al-Rajhi commercial establishment 
fo r currency change has applied to SAMA to change i t s name in 
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25 
advance of ge t t ing a banking l i c ence , Al-Rajhi Banking and 
Ihvestment Corporation (ARABIC) i s now consideredflLs the "greates t 
challenge to be faced by the Saudi banking system, ARABIC i s now 
converting from a money changer i n t o a f u l l serv ice Islamic banks. 
This new bank has some powerful advantages over i t s conventional 
r i v a l s . I t s c a p i t a l of SR 750 mi l l ion i s l a r g e r than the four 
l a rges t banks in the kingdom combined which have only SR 680 million 
c a p i t a l between them. I t has the l a r g e s t number of branches of any 
25 Recently, the Jeddah-based Al-Barakah banking group's 
London subsidiary, Al-Baraka I n t e r n a t i o n a l Ltd, (ABIL) has been 
allowed by the Bank of England t o change i t s name to Al-baraka 
In te rna t iona l Bank Ltd, CAIB) This I s lamic bank i s now on par 
with banks such as Bardays Bank and c i t y Trust Ltd , , and can engage 
in r e t a i l banking and i s sue cur ren t accounts. For the growth of 
i t s t rading a c t i v i t i e s , l icences have been applied for in Egypt, 
Nigeria, Malaysia, Palcistan, North Yemen, Kuwait and Marocco. 
Al-Baraka has also been developing i t s t rading a c t i v i t i e s thix>ugh 
i t s three par is-based Sabaha o i l , Sabaha Text i l e and Sabaha 
Trading Cannpanies, The group has a l so had t a l k with the I n t e r 
Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation and the Kuwait Finance House 
about se t t ing up an export c r e d i t insurance ccanpany. At the end 
of l a s t year, the Bahrain-based Al-Baraka Islamic Investment Bank 
launched i t s second investment ftind, the Al-Ameen Company fo r 
f inanc ia l s e c u r i t i e s . E a r l i e r in 1987, Al-Baraka had se t up the 
Al-Tawfeeq company for Investment Fxmds, The investment funds are 
seen a precursor to the establ ishment of an Islamic c a p i t a l market 
and they ccxnprise morabaha (short- term) i j a r a , ( leasing medium 
term) and long-term pro jec t fxonds. However, there i s bad news as 
well fo r the group. According t o r e l i a b l e Is lamic banking sources, 
Al-Baraka i s to pu l l out of two of i t s a f f i l i a t e s in western Europe, 
the Islamic In te rna t iona l of Denmark (IBID) which i s Europe's 
f i r s t Islamic bank, and the Islamic Finance House in luxcanbuorgy 
see the f u l l report, "Al-Baraka expands and cont rac ts" . The Middle 
East, (London) March 1988, p , 4 0 . ~" 
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banX in the kingdom, i t s balance sheet i s f ree of any bad and 
doxibtful debt, and i t has a c l ea r l y de f ined- iden t i ty as the only 
26 Islamic bank in the country, Arabic share i s sue , and i t s 
a r t i c l e s of incorporat ion, are d i f fe ren t in severa l c r u c i a l 
respec ts from es tab l i shed prac t ice in the kingdom. The share 
subscr ip t ion i s f u l l y paid and avai lable t o ind iv idua l and 
corporate inves to r s , whereas uaual ly such svibscription in Saudi . 
Arabia are pa r t l y -pa id and avai lable to ind iv idua l i n v e s t o r s . 
26 ARABIC has been created with many \inique l ega l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The 16-man board of d i r e c t o r s needs a gaaruro of 
11 and has e igh t Al-Rajhis s i t t i n g on i t with one of the family 
e:xpected t o hold the c h a i r . The l a rges t s ingle share-holder i s 
shaikh sulaiman bin Abd-al-Aziz al-RacJhi with 23,5% followed by 
h i s th ree b ro the r s . Sheikh Sal ih (17,5%), Shaikh* Abdullah (6,5% 
and Sheikh Mahroud (4,5%), All four s i t e on the board together 
with t h e i r sons, th ree of whcan are l i s t e d as nominal share-holder 
(with 100 shares a p i e c e ) . Three o ther family members are among 
the o the r 125 foxinding share-holders, each with a SR 0,3 mil l ion 
stake, so t ha t the t o t a l stock held by a l l members of the Al-Rajhi 
family i s SR 390,9 mil l ion, equivalent to 52,12% of the c a p i t a l . 
The remaining founding share-holders have been ca re fu l ly se lected by 
the Al-Rajhis in order to re- inforce the Is lamic i d e n t i t y of the 
bank as well as to represent the Saudi soc i a l order of the 132 name, 
79 belong to the cen t ra l region of the country and 33 to the west. 
The Eastern province i s represented by n names, with the remaining 
9 coming from the nor th and south of the country. The share ho lde r ' s 
l i s t reads l ike a who's who of Saudi socie ty , including the children 
of prominent royal c a l i ne t minis ters , as well as of the amirs of 
Mecca and Medina and son of the country 's leading r e l i g i o u s 
au thor i ty . The fo\ander of the al-Baraka group of Is lamic banks-
shaikh sal ih* Abdullah Kamil-is included as a founding share-
holder; see, MEES (London), 20 Jvme 1988, 
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Dr. Muhammad Ali al-Saqqaf, Di rec to r of Research and 
Publ icat ions a t Jeddah's Nat ional Cc»nmercial Bank, says tha t 
while 'Arabic ' may not "lead" in conventional sense i t i s l e f t 
xinclear on what terms the bank can borrow. He argues t h a t ARABIC 
wi l l be able t o use i t s own shares as a guarantee fo r c r e d i t 
f a c i l i t i e s , t ha t i t can act as a deb t -co l l ec t ion agency, and, 
within the context of 'murabah' t rade f inance, can t rade commodities 
on i t s own account, while the net-w023c of warehousing f a c i l i t i e s 
envisaged by the a r t i c l e s makes al-Rajhi a major p o t e n t i a l land-
owner unl ike other banks. 
He suggests t h a t the creat ion of 'ARABIC wi l l lead to 
major s t r uc tu r a l changes in Saudi banking, since i t i s poss ib le tha t 
other money changers in the kingdom may wish to follow s u i t . 
In both country of our study, there e x i s t s a dual economic 
s t ruc tu re ; on the one hand, there i s a f a i r l y modem urban economy 
with i n s t i t u t i o n s and adminis t ra t ive in f r a s t ruc tu re s imi la r to 
those of an average c a p i t a l i s t economy in the West. Government 
regulat ions over the spheres of productions and t r ansac t ions are 
* 
general ly observed. In p a r t i c u l a r , the money market i s dominated 
by o f f i c i a l l y endarsed i n s t i t u t i o n s , amongst which are the recently 
bom Islamic f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n . 
27 MEES (London), 20 June 1988, 
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On the o ther hand, l ike in roost developing coxintries the 
ru ra l sec tor of the Muslim developing countr ies have fea tu res T^hich 
can hardly be termed as conventional economies. The production and 
f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s are outs ide the formal and o f f i c i a l network, 
and in the absence of e f f ec t i ve government control , t he re i s ample 
room fo r atnise by usure r s and money lenders . The most c l e a r 
example of such vddespread abuse e x i s t s in the v i l l a g e of most 
muslim covmtries e g , Pakis tan, Bangladesh and Egypt e t c . 
Keeping in view the experiments of the Islamic f i nanc i a l 
i n s t i t u t i o n s and investment companies, the question a r i s e s as to 
how f a r t h e i r performances are b e t t e r than conventional banks. I t 
i s genera l ly r ep l i ed t h a t i t i s a d i f f i cu l t task to assess t h e i r 
v i a b i l i t y as these are newly es tabl ished i n s t i t u t i o n s . Various 
problems seem to be faced by these banks some of thorn appear to be 
insoliable. One problem t h a t has not been tackled i s as to how 
these banks w i l l make t ransac t ion with foreign a c t i v i t i e s of 
Islamic banks, because they have to enter in to contact with non-
Islamic banks a lso and in t h i s connections Islamic jur isprudence 
does not provide us any gviidelines. As fo r the e f fec t s of Islamic 
banks an na t iona l econcxny axe concern, i t wi l l surely depend on 
the nature of new f i n a n c i a l instruments devised and the manner in 
which the system develops. Therefore at t h i s stage of experiments, 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to make any de f in i t e assessment of the prospects 
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of the financial success of Islamic banks. It spears that 
for an adequate solutions to all these problems. Islamic financial 
institutions have yet go through a lot of experiments. 
Having in view the performance of these Islamic banks, the 
success would depend on how far successful 1 they are in tackling in 
these problems. Some protagonists have ccane to the conclusion 
that for the success of these Islamic banks it is essential to 
change the social institutions in such a way that they beccxne 
responsible to an effective transformation in social and individual 
economic conduct, a«id enhance social and economic justice. This 
process of institutional change, however, is by no means an easy 
caie. Most importantly the economic conditions for the operation 
of entirely new institutions should exist, together with a strong 
will and power on the part of the government to see the proper 
operation of the new institutions such changes cannot simply be 
brought about by decree or force. 
These are the challenging tasks on the implementation of 
which the success of Islamic banking system would be evaluated in 
future. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
The abolition o£ tiba apd the Imposition of Zalcah as 
mentioned in Our* an and Hadith are the cornerstones of Islamic 
banking and financial i n s t i t u t i o n s . An Islamic bank must 
meet two basic requirements. F i r s t , i t should be based on the 
Islamic shari'ah< and second^ i t must meet a l l the requirements 
of sound banking. Feas ib i l i ty of a banking operation without 
the rate of in teres t i s the basic issue faced by Muslim 
economists. However, i t i s r ight to say that to reject the 
rate of in teres t i s one thing but to deny rate of in teres t to 
others who do not subscribe to the idea logy i s quite another. 
In a trading operation which i s quite different frcxn a loan 
operation, the Islamic Bank can be an active or sleeping partner 
into various forms of prof i t sharing joint-venture. 
I t i s often claimed that Islamic banking can be more 
stable than the interest-based system, since in an Islamic 
banking syst«n deposits are t reated as shares, and any shock 
to a bank's asset position i s immediately absorbed'by a corres-
ponding change in the value of shares held by the public in the 
bank which consti tutes the bank's l i a b i l i t i e s . Thus such a 
system has been found to be be t te r suited to adjust to economic 
and financial schoks that can produce banking c r i s i s . 
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From the various studies available to us# i t se&ns that 
banking system based on profi t and loss sharing rather than on 
in te res t , ho\*ever, does not laake any difference af ter jus t being 
branded as "Islamic", After a l l , the basic function of a bank 
i s financial intermediation, and tY»re i s no p r io r reason to 
conclude that in teres t i s the only proper instrument to do the 
j o b . 
For the fu l l explication of t h i s system, various un-
resolved issues may come in the prac t ica l handling of banking 
operations, Ingo Karst^i has r ightly pointed out the problems 
in granting short-term loan for industry and coimnerce as ve i l 
as consumer credi t . An analysis of the effects of t h i s systan 
on savers, banks and investors has revealed that the system's 
inopact depends on the nature of the new financial instruments 
devised and the manner in which the system develops, "If th is 
systen i s introduced on an optimal bas is , i t se«ns l ikely that 
the enlarganent of choice wil l have generally beneficial conse-
quences, pairticularly for savings. Furthermore, increased 
investment could result from the role played by Islamic banks in 
promotion of entrepreneuralship, A complete conversion to 
Islamic system, however, would require sat isfactory handling of 
several issues that are yet unresolved, par t icu lar ly those 
concerning the allocation and remuneration of short-term 
financing. 
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The Islamic banking is still at the stage of trial 
and error and that it has to oorapete with the highly developed 
western ccwnroercial banks. The achievements of many Islamic 
banks are quite impressives They have been very successful in 
attracting funds f rcxa private depositors, and people in Muslim 
countries accept these new banks. After their establishment, 
however, these Islamic banks came in direct confrontation with 
already established Western commercial banks. They had thus 
to face, in this regard, tough competition. The esqperiments 
uptill now show that there are certain areas of employment of 
funds where the Islamic banks face strong competiticm with 
conventional banks, namely in the financing of trade, especially 
foreign trade, real estate and construction. It is still to be 
seen haw the Islamic banks can achieve better results than the 
conventional banks. But the questions are generally asked, how 
for this concept is applicable to the cont«nporary economic 
situation ? Can it be the alternative to the modem banking 
system ? Will not the increased availability of risk capital 
be expected to lead to higher investmenti Will not investment 
levels be expected to rise as the cost of a project entering 
into investor's profit calculations will be reduced and the 
payment for capital will be shifted frc«n the cost to the resi-
dual income category ? 
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It has been argued that a large society of present day 
can be hardly suitable for Islamic economists> ideal economy. 
In a large society, members may be tetapted to violate the 
principle on vhich this system rests. One writer, in this 
regard, thinks that Islamic economists have so far neglected 
this aspect, without providing a single example of a large 
society that has resolved this problan through religious faith, 
they have simply assumed that in a society of religious Muslims, 
everything would work smoothly. The claim that depositor's 
risk of productive enterprises will give a tremaidous boost to 
economic growth, and that, the higher employment opportunities 
can also be expected to increase. These phenoroenan'- are still 
to be observed. In a system based on profits and loss-sharing, 
it will be to the advantage of financial institutions to seek 
out those projects which promise the higher rate of profit. 
On the contrary to this some writers have also expressed the 
apprehensions that, replacanent of interest by profit/loss sharing 
may make the whole economic system highly unstable as distur-
bances originating in one part of the economy will be transmitted 
to the rest of the economy. In fact Islamic banks are located 
or doing business mostly in the finance-rich countries and they 
probably have not faced real problen of raising deposits. They 
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are ind iv idua l banks working r a the r in in so la t ion of the general 
banking systen around them. The bank 's opera t iona l a c t i v i t i e s 
are s imi l a r to those of investment companies with no o r almost 
non-exis t ing pure loan accounts. The s t ra tegy of these banks 
genera l ly seems t o be to look fo r p ro jec t with quick r e tu rn . 
To help to understand the e f fec t s of Is lamic f inanc ia l systan» 
we inves t iga ted the e f f ic iency of t h i s sys tan , We observed ttiat 
while the success of I s l a n i c bank i s encouraging, they s t i l l 
require.', g r e a t e r ass is tance. . . I s lamic banks need the stqpport 
of government. Co i t r a l bank should be more supportive in case 
Islamic bankisare met with l i q u i d i t y c r i s i s . 
Is lamic banks in Saudi Arabia and Egypt during t h e i r 
r e l a t i v e l y short per iod of experiences, have had t o face two 
main t a s k s . The f i r s t being the evolution of a reasonably compe-
t en t operation in the modem i n t e r n a t i o n a l banking world. 
Various Islamic banks have had varying degree of successes in 
t h i s respect , though they may s t i l l have a long way to go to 
per fec t t h e i r opera t ions . The second task concerns the evolu-
t ion of banking operat ions within an Is lamic socio-economic 
framework. Here the need to transform the i n s t i t u t i o n s towards 
fundamentally Is lamic norms and e t h i c s of business i s very 
necessary. The implementation of these norms and e th i c s are 
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f a r beyond the capaci ty of any one bank a lone . There I s a need 
fo r a comprehensive in t e r ac t ion of msuiy Is lamic i n s t i t u t i onS in 
f u l l , -fledged Islamic environment. Even i f the Islamic bank 
i s functioning on the na t iona l levels i t s t ransac t ion with 
non-Islamic banks abroad would cause p rob lans . For of course the 
Islamic economy cannot be a siniple closed economy. 
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APPENDIX - I 
NUMBERS OF ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
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S,No. I n s t i t u t i o n Co\antry Date of 
Foundation 
1, Al Baraka Bank 
2 , Al Baraka I s l a m i c Inves tment Bank 
3 , Al Baraka I n t e r n a t i o n a l PLSC 
4 , Al Baraka Inves tment and 
Development Co, 
5 , Al Baraka Turk ish Finance House 
6 , Al Rajhi Co, f o r cur rency 
exchange and commerce 
7, Al Rajhi CO, f o r I s l a m i c 
Inves tments 
8 , Bahrain I s l a m i c Bank 
9 , Bahrain I s l a m i c Inves tment Co, 
10, Bank Is lam Malaysia 
11 , Be i t E t t amou i l Saudi Tousi 
12, D a r ^ a l - M a l - a l - I s l a m i 
13, Dubai I s l a m i c Bank 
14, F a i s a l I s l a m i c Bank of Egypt 
15, F a i s a l I s l a m i c Bank of Sudan 
16, F a i s a l I s l a m i c Bank of Turkey 
Sudan 
B a h r a i n 
UK 
S a u d i A r a b i a 
T u r k e y 
S a u d i A r a b i a 
UK 
B a h r a i n 
B a h r a i n 
M a l a y s i a 
T u n i s i a 


























2 1 . 
22 . 





2 8 . 
29 . 
3 0 . 
3 1 . 
3 2 . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l I s l a m i c Bank 
I s l a m i c Bank I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
I s l a m i c Banking Systesn 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Holding 
I s l a m i c Development Bank 
I s l a m i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r 
Investment and Development 
I s l a m i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l Co. f o r 
Real E s t a t e Development 
I s l a m i c Investment Co. of 
t h e Gulf 
I s l a m i c Inves tment House 
Jordan I s l a m i c Bank f o r 
F inance and Inves tmo i t 
Kuwait F inance House 
Kuwait Finance House (Turkey) 
Nasser S o c i a l Bank 
Qatar I s l a m i c Bank 
S a u d i - P h i l i p p i n e I s l a m i c 
Development Bank 
Tadamon I s l a m i c Bank 

































Source : Arab ia ; Middle Eas t e rn F i n a n c i a l D i r e c t o r , 1985; 
S}®_!3iddle__Ea.st, 1985. 
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APPENDIX - I I 
PIBE BALANCE SHEET AT THE END OF YEABS 1979, 1980, 
1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984 
Asse t s 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 l984 
Cash 
Bank and cor responden ts 
Musharaka, Mudaraba 
Murabaha and sho r t - t e rm 
inves tment o p e r a t i o n s 
Long-term investment 
Sundry d e b i t accounts 
F ixed a s s e t s (ne t ) 
T o t a l . a s s e t s 
L i a b i U t i e s 
Depos i t s 
Banks and correspondence 
C r e d i t o r s and sundry 
c r e d i t 
Accounts 
Zakat F\jnd 
Prov i s ion f o r ^^^sharaka 
ope ra t ion r i s k 
P rov i s ion f o r employees - - - - -. o,2 0,5 
r e t i r e m e n t 
Equi ty 
C a p i t a l 
Paid-up c a p i t a l 10,0 19.0 19.7 29,5 38 .0 40.0 
C e p i t a l i n s t a lmen t p a i d 1.8 0,7 1.5 0.3 
i n advance 
Reserves 
General r e s e rve - 0 , 1 0,5 i.O 1,5 2,4 
S p e c i a l r e se rve - - - 3 , 1 3 , i 3 . i 
Net d i s t r i b u t a b l e p r o f i t 1,0 3 ,5 3 . 3 5,7 S^B 7^9 
( a f t e r d i s t r i b u t i o n s t o 
investment accovmts 
























5 . 1 
10.2 











































Source : The I s l amic Business E n t e r p r i s e (1987) 
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APPEL'JDIX - III 
ZAKAT FUND REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF FIBE 
Revenues 
Balance f rc»n p r e v i o u s y e a r s 
P rev ious a l l o t rno i t 
Zakat due on t h e b a n k ' s o p e r a t i o n s 
Zaka.t from i n d i v i d u a l s 
Dcxiations 
Return on investment of d e p o s i t s i n 















Tota l 865 1168 
Expenses 
Zakat t o i n d i v i d u a l s 
Zakat t o needy s t u d e n t s 
Zakat to mosques 
C h a r i t a b l e o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
Clo thes 
Zakat due t o i n d i v i d u a l s (not y e t p a i d ) 

















I . E . 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX - IV 
IBID BALANCE SHEET AT THE END OP THE YEAR 1981, 
1982, 1983 and 1984 
A s s e t s 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Cash 0 , 1 4 , 1 40.4 3 l , 4 
Banks and correspondence and 
inves tment accounts i n I s la r tdc 3,3 28 ,0 148,5 89.9 
Banks 
Musharaka, Mudaraba, Murabaha 
and s h o r t - t e r m inves tment 6 ,8 4 6 , 1 184,6 487,8 
Opera t ions 
Long-tenn inves tmen t s - 0,5 1,6 2,4 
Debtors and sundry d e b i t 
accounts 1.9 4 , 2 27.9 57,9 
Fixed a s s e t s (ne t ) 2,5 6 ,5 9,3 i i , 2 
14,G 89 .4 412,3 680.6 
Source J The I s l amic Business E n t e r p r i s e (1987) 
APPENDIX - V 




































4 . 0 
0 .2 
2 . 5 
Finance with decl ining pa r t i c ipa t ion 




13.4 13.4 2.7 
59.5 93,0 19.1 
72.2 72.2 14.8 
247.2 487.8 100 
L i a b i l i t i e s 
Deposits 7,8 
Banks and correspondence 1,2 
Creditors and sxondry c r e d i t , 
accovints 
provisions 
Prof i t a l located fo r 
d i s t r ibu t ion 
Zakat Fiand 







7 . 7 
1.5 





2 . 4 





3 . 0 
0 . 1 
667.5 
Total 
Source J The Islamic Business Enterprise (1987) 
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Shareholders* equity 
capi ta l 
Paid capital 4.8 5.7 8.6 11,4 
Statutory reserve 0,1 0.2 0,5 0,8 
General reserve - - 0,4 0,3 
Profit carried forward 0.1 0,2 0,1 0.1 
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